Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine
nor I by yours, nor by any sense that might be common to both of us; but my sense is utterly mine, and yours is yours, although one odor or one flavor is perceived by both. In this respect, therefore, these two senses are found to have something like those other two, seeing and hearing. But in what pertains to the matter in hand they differ in this: that although we both draw in one air through our nostrils or take one food in tasting, I do not nevertheless breathe that part of the air which you breathe nor take the same part of the food as you, but I take one part and you another; so that when I breathe of the whole air I draw in a part such as suffices me, and you likewise from the whole draw in another sufhciency for yourself; and though one entire repast is eaten by both of us, nevertheless it cannot be eaten entire by me and also entire by you, in the way that I hear a whole word and you the same whole word at the same time, or as what I see of any view you too see at the same time; but of food or drink one part must pass into me and another into you. But perhaps this is not clear to you!
E. Nay, rather it is most clear and indubitable.
18. A. Do you think now that the sense of touch is to be compared to the senses of the eyes and ears, as regards the question before us? For not only can we both perceive one body by touching it, but you too can touch the same part of the body I have touched, so that we can both perceive by our touch not only the same body but the same part of that body. For with touching it is not the case as with something edible set before us, where you and I cannot both take all when we both eat of it; but the same undivided thing that I touch you too can touch, so that we both touch not each a part but each the whole.
FE. I admit that in this way the sense of touch is very like those other two. But it seems unlike in this respect; namely, that both of us can at one and the same time see or hear one entire thing: we can indeed also touch at the same time one entire object but in different parts—the same part, however, only at different times; for I can put my touch on no part which you are touching until you remove your hand.
19. A. Carefully answered—but since, of all the things that we perceive, there are some which both, some which each one individually may perceive, you ought to see this too: our sensations themselves are indeed perceived only individually, so that neither I perceive your sensation, nor you mine. As regards those things which we perceive with our bodily senses, what we cannot perceive both, but only individually, is only that which so becomes our own that we can change it and turn it into ourselves; like food and drink, of which no part that I digest can you too digest....
Other sensible things we may perceive as we will, without thereby destroying them and changing them into our bodies. 'There we may both perceive, either at the same time or by turns at different times, so that either the whole or the part that I perceive is perceived by you also; such are light or sound or bodies that we touch without injuring them.
E. 1 understand.
A. It is clear, then, that those things which we do not change and yet perceive by our bodily senses do not belong to the nature of our senses and hence are more our common possession, because they are not changed into something that is ours exclusively.
E. I thoroughly agree..
A. Therefore that is to be regarded as our own and as it were private possession which is of each one of us alone, and which he alone perceives within himself because it pertains properly to his own nature. That, however, is common and, so to speak, public, which is perceived by all percipients without any change or destruction.
E. Just so.
CHAPTER 8 The reason of numbers is perceived by no bodily sense; by anyone who understands it, it is perceived as one and immutable.
90, A. Consider now and tell me whether you can find anything which all men, each reasoning with his own mind and reason, may see in common; while that which they see is present to all and is not converted to the use of those to whom it is present, as are food and drink, but remains whole and uncorrupted, whether they see it or do not see it. Or would you perhaps think that there is nothing of this sort?
E. On the contrary, I think there are many, of which it is enough to mention one. For the reason and truth of numbers waits upon all who reason, so that every calculator may see it, each with his own reason and endeavor to grasp it with his understanding. And one will do so easily, another with more difficulty, and yet another will be quite unable; although notwithstanding it offers itself to all who have the power to grasp it; nor is it changed and transmuted when anyone perceives it into nutriment as it were for the