Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine (continued)
nor I by yours, nor by any sense that might be common to both of us; but my sense is utterly mine, and yours is yours, although one odor or one flavor is perceived by both. In this respect, therefore, these two senses are found to have something like those other two, seeing and hearing. But in what pertains to the matter in hand they differ in this: that although we both draw in one air through our nostrils or take one food in tasting, I do not nevertheless breathe that part of the air which you breathe nor take the same part of the food as you, but I take one part and you another; so that when I breathe of the whole air I draw in a part such as suffices me, and you likewise from the whole draw in another sufhciency for yourself; and though one entire repast is eaten by both of us, nevertheless it cannot be eaten entire by me and also entire by you, in the way that I hear a whole word and you the same whole word at the same time, or as what I see of any view you too see at the same time; but of food or drink one part must pass into me and another into you. But perhaps this is not clear to you!
E. Nay, rather it is most clear and indubitable.
18. A. Do you think now that the sense of touch is to be compared to the senses of the eyes and ears, as regards the question before us? For not only can we both perceive one body by touching it, but you too can touch the same part of the body I have touched, so that we can both perceive by our touch not only the same body but the same part of that body. For with touching it is not the case as with something edible set before us, where you and I cannot both take all when we both eat of it; but the same undivided thing that I touch you too can touch, so that we both touch not each a part but each the whole.
FE. I admit that in this way the sense of touch is very like those other two. But it seems unlike in this respect; namely, that both of us can at one and the same time see or hear one entire thing: we can indeed also touch at the same time one entire object but in different parts—the same part, however, only at different times; for I can put my touch on no part which you are touching until you remove your hand.
19. A. Carefully answered—but since, of all the things that we perceive, there are some which both, some which each one individually may perceive, you ought to see this too: our sensations themselves are indeed perceived only individually, so that neither I perceive your sensation, nor you mine. As regards those things which we perceive with our bodily senses, what we cannot perceive