Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine (continued)
reason and that reason cannot do this unless they are presented to it for examination.
ES hataseteue:
A. Whatever, therefore, that other thing is, by means of which we perceive everything that we know, it is in the service of reason, to which it presents and reports whatever it touches, so that the things perceived may be distinguished by their properties and grasped not merely for perception but for knowledge as well.
E. That is so.
A. Well, how about this reason, which distinguishes from one another its servants and the things they bring before it, and likewise recognizes the difference between itself and these things and assures itself of its superiority to them? Does it comprehend itself by means of anything other than itself, that is, reason? Or would you know that you had reason if you did not perceive it by reason?
E. Most true.
A. So then, when we perceive a color we do not likewise by the sense itself perceive that we perceive; nor when we hear a sound do we also hear our hearing; nor when we smell a rose has the smelling fragrance too; nor tasting something does the tasting itself have flavor in the mouth; nor touching a thing can we also touch the sense of touch. Therefore it is clear that those five senses cannot be perceived by any one sense among them, although by them all corporeal things are perceived. E. That is clear.
CHAPTER 4 The interior sense perceives that it perceives; whether it also distinguishes itself or not.
10. A. I think it is clear that the interior sense perceives not only the things referred to it by the five senses but also the sensations themselves. For otherwise an animal would not stir, either to pursue or to run away from anything, if it did not perceive that it had the sensation—not as knowledge, for that is reason's province, but only in order to move—which it certainly does not perceive by any one of those five. If this is stil] not clear, it will become clear by considering some one sense, say sight. For one could not open his eyes or turn his gaze upon what he seeks to see, unless when his eyes were closed, or not turned toward it, he perceived that he did not see. But if, not seeing, he perceives that he does not see, he must also perceive that he sees when he