Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine
Ev. Indeed, if I did not grant that, how could the fact that we see be called sensation? Aug. Well, are we not also acted upon by everything of which we have a sensation?
Ev. That is right. Aug. Then, if we have a sensation of everything we see and if we are acted upon by everything of which we have a sensation, we are acted upon by everything we see.
Ev. I have no objection to make. Aug. Therefore, you are acted upon by me, and I in turn am acted upon by you, when we see each other.
Ev. So I think, and for me this is an instant dictate of reason.
43. Aug. Take what follows, for I believe you would regard it as quite absurd and foolish if anyone should say that you are acted upon by a body, where that body which affects you is not present.
Ev. It does seem absurd, and I believe it is just as you say.
Aug. Well, now, is it not evident that my body is in one place; and yours, in another?
Ev. Yes. Aug. Just the same, your eyes have a sensation of my body, and if they have a sensation, they certainly are being acted upon; and they cannot be acted upon where that which acts is not present. Yet, your eyes are not there where my body is. Therefore, they are subjected to action where they are not present.
Ev. Well, I granted all those points which it seemed unreasonable not to grant; but this last which flows from the rest is so very absurd that I would rather own that I have made a rash concession somewhere along the line than admit that this conclusion is true. Not even in my sleep would I dare to say that my eyes have sensation where they are not present. Aug. Then, see where you have dozed off. What would you have been too cautious to let slip by, if you had been as wide awake as you were a little while ago?
Ev. To be sure, that is what I am carefully retracing and reconsidering. Still, it is not quite clear to me that a concession should be regretted, except perhaps this, that our eyes have sensation when we see; for it is possibly sight itself that has the sensation.
Aug. Yes, that is it. Sight extends itself outward and through the eyes darts forth far in every possible direction to light up what we see. Hence it happens that it seems rather in the place where the object seen is present, not in the place from which it goes out to see.
Therefore, is it not you that see, when you see me?
Ev. Who but a crazy person would say this? By all means—it is I who see, but I see by the emission of sight through the eyes. Aug. But, if you see, you have a sensation. If you have a sensation, you are acted upon. And you cannot be acted upon at a place where you are not present. But you see me where I am. Therefore, you are acted upon where I am. But if you are not there where I am, I do not know at all how you dare to say that you see me.
Ev. I say that by means of sight, reaching out to that place where you are, I see you where you are. But that I am not there, I admit. Stull, let us suppose that I were to touch you with a stick: I certainly would be the one doing the touching and I would sense it; yet I would not be there where I touched you. In the same way, because I say that I see by means of sight, even though I am not there, I am not thereby compelled to admit that it is not I who see.
44, Aug. Then you have made no rash concession. For your eyes can be defended in this way also: their sight is, as you say, like the stick. And your conclusion that your eyes see where they are not present, is not absurd. Or do you think otherwise?
Ev. It is just as you say, certainly. In fact, I now realize that if the eyes should see where they are present, they would also see themselves.
Aug. It would be more correct for you to say, not that they would see also themselves, but that they would see only themselves. For where they are, that is, the place they occupy, they alone occupy. The nose is not where they are nor is anything else that is near them. Otherwise you would also be where I am, because we are near each other. Consequently, if the eyes were to see only where they are, they would see only themselves. But since they do not see themselves, we are compelled to agree not only that they can see where they are not but even that they cannot see at all, except where they are not.
Ev. Nothing can make me doubt that.
Aug. Then you do not doubt that the eyes are acted upon where they are not present. For where they see, there they have a sensation, for seeing itself is a sensation, and to have a sensation is to undergo an action. Hence, where they have a sensation, there they are acted upon. But they actually see in another place than that in which they are. Therefore, they are subjected to an action where they are not present.
Ev. I am surprised how I consider all this to be true.