Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine (continued)
there be persuasion or summons towards some one in whom to believe) , it surely follows that it is God who both works in man the willing to believe and in all things prevents us with His mercy. To yield our consent, indeed, to God's summons, or to withhold it, is (as I have said) the function of our own will. And this not only does not invalidate what is said, ''"For what hast thou that thou didst not receive?" (I Cor. 4:7) but it really confirms it. For the soul cannot receive and possess these gifts, which are here referred to, except by yielding its consent. And thus whatever it possesses, and whatever it receives, is from God; and yet the act of receiving and having belongs, of course, to the receiver and possessor. Now, should any man be for constraining us to examine into this profound mystery, why this person is so persuaded as to yield, and that person is not, there are only two things occurring to me, which I] should like to advance as my answer: "O the depth of the riches!"
(Rom. 11:33) and "Is there unrighteousness with God?" (Rom.
9:14) If the man is displeased with such an answer, he must seek more learned disputants; but let him beware lest he find presumptuous ones.
De ADVANTAGE OF BELIEVING *k CHAPTER 10:
23. But you will say, consider now whether we ought to believe in religion. For although we grant that it is one thing to believe, another to be credulous, it does not follow that it is no fault to believe in matters of religion. For what if it be a fault both to believe and to be credulous, as it is to be drunk and to be a drunkard? Now he who thinks this certain, it seems to me, can have no friend; for if it is base to believe anything, either he acts basely who believes a friend, or, in not believing a friend at all I see not how he can call either him or himself a friend. Here perhaps you may say, I grant that we must believe something at some time; now make plain, how in the case of religion it be not base to believe before one knows. I will do so, if I can. Wherefore I ask of you, which you esteem the graver fault, to deliver religion to one unworthy, or to believe what is said by them who deliver it. If you understand not whom I call unworthy, I call him unworthy who approaches it with hypocrisy. You grant, as I suppose, that it is more blameable to unfold to such an one whatever holy secrets there are than to believe religious men affirming any thing on the matter of religion