Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine
itself. For it would be unbecoming you to make any other answer. Wherefore now suppose him present, who is about to deliver to you a religion, in what way shall you assure him that you approach with a true mind and that, so far as this matter is concerned, there is in you no fraud or feigning? You will say with your own good conscience that you are no way feigning, asserting this with words as strong as you can, but yet with words. For you cannot lay open man to man the hiding places of your soul, so that you may be thoroughly known. But if he shall say, Lo, I believe you, but is it not more fair that you also believe me, when, if I hold any truth, you are about to receive, I about to give, a benefit? what will you answer, save that you must believe?
24. But you say, Were it not better that you should give me a reason, that, wherever that shall lead me, I may follow without any rashness? Perhaps it were: but, it being so great a matter, that you are by reason to come to the knowledge of God, do you think that all are qualified to understand the reasons by which the human soul is led to know God, or many, or few? Few I think, you say. Do you believe that you are in the number of these? It is not for me, you say, to answer this. Therefore you think it is for him to believe you in this also: and this indeed he does: only do you remember that he has already twice believed you saying things uncertain; that you are unwilling to believe him even once admonishing you in a religious spirit. But suppose that it is so, and that you approach with a true mind to receive religion, and that you are one of few men in such sense as to be able to take in the reasons by which the Divine Power is brought into certain knowledge; what? do you think that other men, who are not endowed with so serene a disposition, are to be denied religion? or do you think that they are to be led gradually by certain steps unto those highest inner recesses? you see clearly which is the more religious. For you cannot think that anyone whatever, in a case where he desires so great a thing, ought by any means to be abandoned or rejected. But do you not think that unless he first believes that he shall attain his goal and reveals the mind of a suppliant, submitting to certain great and necessary precepts and purging himself by a certain way of life, that he will not otherwise attain the things that are purely true? Certainly you think so. What, then, is the case of those (of whom I already believe you to be one) who are able most easily to receive divine secrets by sure reason? Will it be of any hindrance to them if they come as do they who at first believe? I think not. But yet, you say, what need to delay them? Because although they will in no way harm themselves by what is done, yet they will harm the rest by the precedent. For there is hardly one who has a just notion of his own power: but he who has a less notion must be roused; he who has a greater notion must be checked: that neither the one be broken by despair, nor the other carried headlong by rashness. And this is easily done, if even they, who are able to fly (that they may not allure others into danger) are forced for a short time to walk where the rest also may walk with safety. This is the forethought of true religion: this the command of God: this what has been handed down from our blessed forefathers: this what has been preserved even unto us: to wish to distrust and overthrow this is nothing else than to seek a sacrilegious way unto true religion. As to those who do this, not even if what they wish be granted to them, are they able to arrive at the point at which they aim. For whatever kind of excellent genius they have, unless God be present, they creep on the ground. But He is then present, if they, who are aiming at God, have a regard for their fellow men. Than which step there can be found nothing more surely Heavenward. I for my part cannot resist this reasoning, for how can I say that we are to believe nothing without certain knowledge? For there can be no friendship at all, unless there be believed something which cannot be proved by some reason. Frequently stewards, who are slaves, are trusted by their \masters without any fault on their part. But in religion what can there be more unfair than that the ministers of God believe us when we promise an unfeigned mind and we are unwilling to believe them when they enjoin us any thing. Lastly, what way can there be more healthful, than for a man to become fitted to receive the truth by believing those things which have been appointed by God to serve for the previous culture and treatment of the mind? Or, if you be already perfectly fitted, rather to make some little circuit where it is safest to tread, than both to cause yourself danger and to be a precedent for rashness to other men?
CHAPTER 11:25. Wherefore it now remains to consider, in what
manner we ought not to follow these, who profess that they will lead by reason. For how we may without fault follow those who bid us to believe, has already been said: but to these who make promises of reason, certain men think that they can come, not only without blame but also with some praise. But this is not so, for there are two classes of persons praiseworthy in religion: one of those who have already found, whom also we must judge most blessed; another of those who are seeking with all earnestness and in the right way. The first, therefore, are already in actual possession, the other on the way, yet on that way whereby they are most sure to arrive. (cf. Retractions I, 14, 2) There are three other kinds of men altogether to be disapproved of and detested. One is of those who hold an opinion, that is, of those who think that they know what they know not. Another is of those who are indeed aware that they know not but do not so seek as to be able to find. A third is of those who neither think that they know nor wish to seek. There are also three things, as it were bordering upon one another, in the minds of men well worth distinguishing: understanding, belief, opinion. And, if these be considered by themselves, the first is always without fault, the second sometimes with fault, the third never without fault. For the understanding of matters great, and honorable, and even divine, is most blessed. (cf. Retractions I, 14, 2) But the understanding of things unnecessary is not harmful; but perhaps the learning was harmful, in that it took up the time of necessary matters. But on the matters themselves that are harmful, it is not the understanding but the doing or suffering them that is wretched. For not, in case any one understand how an enemy may be slain without the danger to himself, is he guilty from the understanding, not the wish; and if the wish be absent, what can be called more innocent? But belief is then worthy of blame, when either any thing is believed of God which is unworthy of Him, or any thing is too readily believed of man. But in all other matters if any believe aught, provided he understand that he knows it not, there is no fault. For I believe that very wicked conspirators were formerly put to death by the virtue of Cicero; but this I not only know not, but also I know for certain that I can by no means know. But opinion is ON two accounts very base; in that both he who has persuaded himself that he already knows, cannot learn; provided only it may be learnt; and in itself rashness is a sign of a mind not well disposed. For even if anyone suppose that he knows what I said of Cicero (although it be no hindrance to him from learning, in that the matter itself is incapable of being grasped by any knowledge) ; yet (in that he understands not that there is a great difference, whether anything be grasped by sure reason of mind, which we call understanding, or whether for practical purposes it be entrusted to common fame or writing, for posterity to believe it) he assuredly errs, and no error is without what is base. What then we understand, we owe to reason; what we believe, to authority; what we have an opinion on, to error. (cf. Retractions I, 14, 3) But everyone who understands also believes, and also everyone who has an opinion believes; not everyone who believes understands, no one who has an opinion understands. Therefore if these three things be referred