Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine (continued)
Ev. I shall defend it, all right, if you will stand by me; but if you do not, I am through with it already. Evidently you have good reason for deciding to refute it. oo Aug. Do not rely too much upon authority, especially mine, which does not exist. Also, to quote Horace, "Have the courage to think for yourself," lest fear defeat you before an argument does.
Ev. I have no fear at all, no matter what the issue, for you will not suffer me to be in error. But begin if you have anything to say, lest I be worn out by delay rather than by your objections.
42. Aug. Tell me, then, what effect does your body undergo when you see me?
Ev. It does experience something, for, if I mistake not, my eyes are part of my body; and if they experienced nothing, how could I see you?
Aug. But it is not enough for you to prove that your eyes experience some effect, unless you also show me what they experience.
Ev. Well, what could it be but sight itself? For they see. If you were to ask me what a sick person experiences, I should answer, sickness; a lustful person, lust; a fearful person, fear; a joyful person, joy. Why, then, when you ask me what someone experiences when he sees, should I not answer that it is sight itself? Aug. But a joyful person senses joy. Or do you deny that?
Ev. No, indeed, I agree. Aug. I should say the same about the other emotions. Ev. So should I. Aug. But whatever the eyes sense, they see. Ev. I should not say that at all. For who sees pain, even though the eyes often sense it? Aug. Evidently you are concerned with the eyes. You are wide awake. See, then, whether, just as a joyful person senses joy by being joyful, so also one who sees senses sight by seeing. Ev. Can it be otherwise? Aug. But whatever the one who sees senses in the act of seeing, he must also see.
Ev. No, that does not follow. For, suppose he has a sensation of love when he sees: he does not see love, does he?
Aug. A very cautious and shrewd observation! I am glad you are not easily deceived. But now, note this: we agree that we do not see everything which the eyes sense, nor everything we sense in the act of seeing; but do you think that at least this is true—that we sense everything that we see?