Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine
perceiver, nor when one makes a mistake in it is it thereby less; but while it remains true and whole, he is the more in error the less he perceives it.
21. A. Quite right: but I see that you answered readily as if not unversed in these things. Nevertheless, if some one should say that these numbers are as it were certain images of visible things impressed on our mind, not by any nature of their own but by those things that are reached by the senses of the body,—what would you answer? Or do you too think that?
E. I should by no means think that. For even if I have perceived numbers by a bodily sense, I cannot thereby perceive by a bodily sense the ratios of partition and combination of numbers. For by this light of the mind I refute him who gives a false result in calculation, either by addition or subtraction. And I do not know for how long will endure anything that I touch with my bodily senses, such as this sky and this earth, and whatever other bodies I perceive in them. But seven and three are ten, not only now but always; nor was there ever a time when seven and three were not ten, nor will ever be a time when seven and three will not be ten. I say, therefore, that this incorruptible truth of number is common to me and to any reasoning person whatsoever.
22. A. I do not oppose you when you answer so truly and indisputably. But you may also easily see that numbers are not derived from our bodily senses, if you will consider, as to any number, that as many times as it contains one, so many is it called. For example, if it contains one twice it is called two; if thrice, three; and if it contains one ten times it is called ten; and the number of times any number whatever contains one gives it its name, and it is called so much. But anyone who considers the matter aright will certainly find that we cannot perceive one by our bodily senses. For whatever reaches us through such a sense is clearly seen to be not one but many; for it is body, and therefore has innumerable parts. For—not to trace out finer and even finer divisions—however tiny a particle that body may be, it has certainly a right part and a left part, a top and a bottom, a front and a back, or an outside and an inside; for we might acknowledge that these are present in any body, however tiny its dimensions, and hence we must concede that no body is truly and simply one; although we nevertheless could not enumerate such a many without a separate and distinct knowledge of one. For when I look for one in a body and when I have no doubt that I do not find it, I know assuredly what I seek there, and what I do not