Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine (continued)
CHAPTER 24 Criticism of the definition of sensation
45. Aug. Perhaps you are right in thinking so. But tell me, please, do we see everything that we recognize by means of sight?
Ev. I think so. Aug. Do you also believe that we recognize by means of sight everything we recognize by the act of seeing?
Ev. Yes, I believe that also. Aug. Why, then, when we see only smoke, do we generally recognize that beneath it there is hidden fire which we do not see?
Ev. You are right. [Your question is in order.] And now I do not think we see everything we recognize by means of sight, for we can, as you have shown, by seeing one thing, recognize another which is out of the range of sight.
Aug. Well, is it possible not to see what we sense by means of sight?
Ev. No, not at all.
Aug. Therefore, sense perception and recognition are two different things.
Ev. They are entirely different. For example, we have sense perception of the smoke which we see, and from that we recognize that beneath it there is fire which we do not see.
Aug. You understand that correctly. But you surely see that when this happens, our body, that is, our eyes are in no wise affected by the fire but by the smoke which is all they see. For we have already agreed that to see is to have sensation, and to have sensation is to be acted upon.
Ev. I grasp that and I agree.
Aug. When, therefore, as a result of an impression received by the body the soul is not unaware of something, this is not at once identifiable with one of the five senses mentioned; but this latter holds only when it is aware of the bodily experience itself. 'That fire, for example, is not seen nor heard nor smelled nor tasted nor touched by us; yet, the sight of smoke makes the soul aware of it. And, while this awareness is not called sensation, because the body is not affected by the fire, it is nevertheless termed recognition through sensation, because the fire is conjectured and established from an experience of the body, though the experience was something different, that is, the sight of a different reality.
Ev. I understand, and I see very well that this harmonizes with, and supports, that definition of yours which you gave me to defend as my own. For I remember that you defined sensation as "the