Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine
trinities in the mind of man as an exegesis of the biblical statement that man was created in the image of God. The selection is an exposition of the existence of a trinity of mind, knowledge, and love that exists in us and which is revealed in the analysis of the mind's knowledge and love of itself. As revealing a conception of the nature of man, the selection might have been included with those dealing with the nature of the soul. However, the present selection also has considerable relevance for Augustine's theory of the Divine Illumination, his conception of wisdom, and the analysis of self-knowledge.
Nees THE ACADEMICS »*k BOOK III ** CHAPTER
3. The difference between the Wise Man and the Philosopher
5. "I would like you," I said, "to tell me briefly what you think to be the difference between the wise man and the philosopher."
"In my opinion," he said, "the wise man differs in no way from the philosopher except that the wise man in a certain way possesses those things which can only be longed for—however eagerly—by the philosopher."
"Now, then," I asked, "what are these things? For my part, I see no difference except that one knows wisdom and the other wants to know."
"If," he said, "you give us a simple definition of knowledge, your point already becomes more clear."
"No matter how I define it," I replied, "all are agreed that there cannot be knowledge of what is not true."
"In my remark," he said, "I purposed to limit that question for you, in order to prevent an unconsidered concession of mine from allowing your oratory to gallop unrestrained over the plains of this cardinal question."
I replied: "To be sure, you have left me no galloping space at all! Indeed, if I mistake not, we have arrived at that for which I have been striving all the time—the end. For it, as you stated so acutely and truly, there is no difference between the philosopher and the wise man except that the former loves, the latter possesses, wisdom—for which reason you did not hesitate to use the term proper here, 'possess'; and since no one can possess wisdom in his mind, if he has not learned anything; and since no one can learn anything, if he does not know anything; and since no one can know what is not true: therefore, the wise man knows truth, you yourself have just admitted that he has wisdom, that is to say, its 'possession,' in his mind."
"T may," he said, "seem to be impertinent, but I do wish to deny that I admitted that the wise man has the 'possession' of the power of inquiring into divine and human things. I do not see why you should think that it is not the 'possession' of discovered probabilities that he has."
"Do you concede to me," I asked, 'that no one knows what is not true?"
"Certainly," he replied. "Assert, if you can," I said, "that the wise man does not know wisdom."
"But why" said, he, "do you in this way restrict the whole question? Could he not believe that he has grasped wisdom?"
"Give me your hand," I said. "If you recall, this is the point which I said yesterday that I would prove; and now I am happy that it was not I who expressed this conclusion, but that you offered it to me spontaneously on your own. For I said that between the Academics and myself there was this difference: that while they thought it probable that truth could not be perceived, I believed that, though I myself had not yet found it, it could be found by the wise man. You now, when pressed by my question as to whether or not the wise man did not know wisdom, reply: 'He thinks that he knows'."
"Well," he asked, "what follows from that?' "This," I replied: "that if he thinks that he knows wisdom, he does not think that the wise man cannot know anything. Or, if wisdom is nothing, then say so."
6. "I should indeed believe," he replied, "that we had arrived at our final object but that suddenly, as we joined hands, I realized that we are very far apart and separated by a long distance. For, obviously, the only point at issue between us was, whether or not the wise man could arrive at the perception of truth. You asserted that he could. I denied it. But I do not think that I have now conceded to you anything except that the wise man can believe that he has achieved the wisdom of probabilities. That wisdom I understood to be concerned with the investigation of things human and divine. We are, I take it, agreed on that.7 "You will not," I said, "evolve a method of escape by involving the issue! For the moment, it would seem to me, you are arguing merely to try your skill. You know well that these young men can scarcely as yet follow subtle and acute reasoning. You abuse, then, the ignorance of your jury. It is a case of your saying as much as you like simply because no one will protest. Now, a few moments ago, when I was questioning you as to whether or not the wise man knew wisdom, you said that he believed that he knew. But he who believes that the wise man knows wisdom, certainly cannot believe that the wise man knows nothing. Such a proposition is impossible, unless a man dares to say that wisdom is nothing. From this it follows that in this your view is identical with mine. For my view that the wise man knows something, is, I believe, also yours, since you believe that the wise man believes that he knows wisdom."
He replied: "I think that you wish to exercise your powers just as much as I do. I am surprised at that, for you have no need of any practice in this matter at all. I may, of course, still be blind in seeing a difference between 'believing-one-knows' and 'knowing,' and between the wisdom bound up with investigation and truth itself. I do not see how these opinions expressed by each of us can be squared with one another."
As we were being called to lunch, I said: "I am not displeased that you should be so obstinate. Either both of us do not know what we are talking about, and we must, therefore, take steps to avoid such a disgrace; or this is true of only one of us, and to leave him so and neglect him, is equally disgraceful. We shall, however, have to meet again in the afternoon; for, just when I thought that we had finished, you began to indulge in fisticuffs with me."
They all laughed at this and we departed.
CHAPTER 4 The Wise Man Knows Truth 7. When we returned,
we found Licentius, whose thirst for Helicon could never be quenched, eagerly trying to think out verses. For he had quietly arisen without having had anything to drink, in the middle of lunch, even though this was over almost as quickly as it begun.
I remarked to him: "I certainly hope that some day you will realize your heart's desire and master poetry. Not that I take such pleasure in the art; but I see that you are so obsessed by it that you cannot escape from this infatuation except through tiring of it, and this is a common experience when one has reached perfection. And another thing, since you have a good voice, I would prefer that you would ply our ears with your verses than that you should sing, like poor little birds that we see in cages, from those Greek