Introduction to the Philosophy of Saint Augustine (continued)
had not Wisdom condescended to adapt Himself to our weakness and to show us a pattern of holy life in the form of our own humanity. Yet, since we, when we come to Him, do wisely, He, when He came to us, was considered by proud men to have done very foolishly. And since we, when we come to Him, become strong, He, when He came to us, was looked upon as weak. But "the foolishness of God is wiser than men; and the weakness of God is stronger than men." (I Cor. 1:25) And thus, though Wisdom was Himself our home, He made Himself also the way by which we should reach our home.
CHAPTER 22 God alone to be enjoyed. 20. Among all these things, then, those only are the true objects of enjoyment which we have spoken of as eternal and unchangeable. The rest are for use, that we may be able to arrive at the full enjoyment of the former. We, however, who enjoy and use other things are things ourselves.
For a great thing truly is man, made after the image and similitude of God, not as respects the mortal body in which he is clothed but as respects the rational soul by which he is exalted in honor above the beasts. And so it becomes an important question whether men ought to enjoy, or to use, themselves, or to do both. For we are commanded to love one another: but it is a question whether man is to be loved by man for his own sake or for the sake of something else. If it is for his own sake, we enjoy him; if it is for the sake of something else, we use him. It seems to me, then, that he is to be loved for the sake of something else. For if a thing is to be loved for its own sake, then in the enjoyment of it consists a happy life, the hope of which at least, if not yet the reality, is our comfort in the present time. But a curse is pronounced on him who places his hope in man. (Jer. 17:5)
21. Neither ought any one to have joy in himself, if you look at the matter clearly, because no one ought to love even himself for his own sake but for the sake of Him who is the true object of enjoyment. For a man is never in so good a state as when his whole life is a journey towards the unchangeable life and his affections are entirely fixed upon that. If, however, he loves himself for his own sake, he does not look at himself in relation to God but turns his mind in upon himself, and so is not occupied with anything that is unchangeable. And thus he does not enjoy himself at his best, because he is better when his mind is fully fixed upon, and his affections wrapped up in, the unchangeable good than when he turns from that to enjoy even himself. Wherefore if you ought not to love even yourself for your own sake, but for His in whom your love finds its most worthy object, no other man has a right to be angry if you love him too for God's sake.,For this is the law of love that has been laid down by Divine authority: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;" but, "Thou shalt love God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind": (Matt. 22:37-39) so that you are to concentrate all your thoughts, your whole life, and your whole intelligence upon Him from whom you derive all that you bring. For when He says, "With all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind," He means that no part of our life is to be unoccupied and to afford room, as it were, for the wish to enjoy some other object, but that whatever else may suggest itself to us as an object worthy of love is to be borne into the same channel in which the whole current of our affections flows. Whoever, then, loves his neighbor aright, ought to urge upon him that he too should love God with his whole heart, and soul, and mind. For in this way, loving his neighbor as himself, a man turns the whole current of his love both for himself and his neighbor into the channel of the love of God, which suffers no stream to be drawn off from itself by whose diversion its own volume would be diminished.
CHAPTER 23 Man needs no injunction to love himself and his own body. 22. Those things which are objects of use are not all, however, to be loved, but those only [are to be loved] which are either united with us in a common relation to God, such as a man or an angel, or are so related to us as to need the goodness of God through our instrumentality, such as the body. For assuredly the martyrs did not love the wickedness of their persecutors, although they used it to attain the favor of God. As, then, there are four kinds of things that are to be loved,—first, that which is above us; second, ourselves; third, that which is on a level with us; fourth, that which is beneath us,—no precepts need be given about the second and fourth of these. For, however far a man may fall away from the truth, he still continues to love himself and to love his own body. The soul which flies away from the unchangeable Light, the Ruler of all things, does so that it may rule over itself and over its own body; and so it cannot but love both itself and its own body.
CHAPTER 26 The command to love God and our neighbor in
cludes a command to love ourselves. ile Seeing, then, that there is no need of a command that every man should love himself and his own body, seeing, that is, that we love ourselves and what is beneath us but connected with us, through a law of nature which has never been violated, and which is common to us with the beasts (for even the beasts love themselves and their own bodies) , it only remained necessary to lay injunctions upon us in regard to God above us and our neighbor beside us. "Thou shalt love," He says, "the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. . . . Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang the law of the prophets." (Matt. 22:37-40) Thus the end of the commandment is love, and that twofold: the love of God and the love of-our neighbor. Now, if you take yourself in your entirety—that is, soul and body together—and your neighbor in his entirety, soul and body together (for man is made up of soul and body) , you will find that none of the classes of things that are to be loved is overlooked in these two commandments. For though, when the love of God comes first and the measure of our love for Him is prescribed in such terms that it is evident all other things are to find their centre in Him, nothing seems to be said about our love for ourselves; yet when it is said, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself," it at once becomes evident that our love for ourselves has not been overlooked.
CHAPTER 27 The order of love. 28. Now he is a man of just and
holy life who forms an unprejudiced estimate of things and keeps his affections also under strict control, so that he neither loves what he ought not to love, nor fails to love what he ought to love, nor loves that more which ought to be loved less, nor loves that equally which ought to be loved either less or more, nor loves that less or more which ought to be loved equally. No sinner is to be loved as a sinner; and every man is to be loved as a man for God's sake; but God is to be loved for His own sake. And if God is to be loved more than any man, each man ought to love God more than himself. Likewise we ought to love another man better than our own body, because all things are to be loved in reference to God, and another man can have fellowship with us in the enjoyment of God, whereas our body cannot; for the body only lives through the soul, and it is by the soul that we enjoy God.
CHAPTER 35 The fulfilment and end of Scripture is the love of God and our neighbor. 39. Of all, then, that has been said since we entered upon the discussion about things, this is the sum: that we should clearly understand that the fulfilment and the end of the Law and of all Holy Scripture, is the love of an object which is to be enjoyed and the love of an object which can enjoy that other in fellowship with ourselves. For there is no need of a command that each man should love himself. The whole temporal dispensation for our salvation, therefore, was framed by the providence of God that we might know this truth and be able to act upon it; and we ought to use that dispensation, not with such love and delight as if it were a good to rest in but with a transient feeling rather, such as we have towards the road, or carriages, or other things that are merely means... .
CHAPTER 36 That interpretation of Scripture which builds us up
in love is not perniciously deceptive. . . . 40. Whoever, then, thinks that he understands the Holy Scriptures, or any part of them, but puts such an interpretation upon them as does not tend to build up this twofold love of God and our neighbor, does not yet understand them as he ought. If, on the other hand, a man draws a meaning from them that may be used for the building up of love, even though he does not happen upon the precise meaning which the author whom he reads intended to express in that place, his error is not pernicious, and he is wholly clear from the charge of decep- . tion. For there is involved in deception the intention to say what is false; and we find plenty of people who intend to deceive but nobody who wishes to be deceived. . . .
CHAPTER 37 Dangers of mistaken interpretation. For if he takes up rashly a meaning which the author whom he is reading did not intend, he often falls in with other statements which he cannot harmonize with this meaning. And if he admits that these statements are true and certain, then it follows that the meaning he had put upon the former passage cannot be the true one: and so it comes to pass, one can hardly tell how, that out of love for his own opinion, he begins to feel more angry with Scripture than he is with himself. And if he should once permit that evil to creep in, it will utterly destroy him. "For we walk by faith, not by sight." (II Cor. 5:7) Now faith will totter if the authority of Scripture begin to shake. And then, if faith totter, love itself will grow cold. For if a man has fallen from faith, he must necessarily also fall from love; for he cannot love what he does not believe to exist. But if he both believes and loves, then through good works and through diligent attention to the precepts of morality, he comes to hope also that he shall attain the object of his love. And so these are the three things to which all knowledge and all prophecy are subservient: faith, hope, love.
CHAPTER 38 Love never faileth. 42. But sight shall displace faith, and hope shall be swallowed up in that perfect bliss to which we shall come; love, on the other hand, shall wax greater when these others fail. For if we love by faith that which as yet we see not, how much more shall we love it when we begin to see! And if we love by hope that which as yet we have not reached, how much more shall we love it when we reach it! For there is this great difference between things temporal and things eternal, that a temporal object is valued more before we possess it and begins to prove worthless the moment we attain it, because it does not satisfy the soul, which has its only true and sure resting place in eternity: an eternal object, on the other hand, is loved with greater ardor when it is in possession than while it is still an object of desire, for no one in his longing for it can set a higher value on it than really belongs to it, so as to think it comparatively worthless when he finds it of less value than he thought; on the contrary, however high the value any man may set upon it when he is on his way to possess it, he will find it, when it comes into his possession, of higher value still.
CHAPTER 39 He who is mature in faith, hope, and love, needs Scripture no longer. 43. And thus a man who is resting upon faith, hope, and love and who keeps a firm hold upon these does not need the Scriptures except for the purpose of instructing others. Accordingly, many live without copies of the Scriptures, even in solitude, on the strength of these three graces. So that in their case, I think, the saying is already fulfilled: '""Whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away."
(I Cor. 13:8) Yet by means of these instruments (as they may be called) , so great an edifice of faith and love has been built up in them, that, holding to what is perfect, they do not seek for what is only in part perfect—of course, I mean, so far as is possible in this life; for, in comparison with the future life, the life of no just and holy man is perfect here. Therefore the apostle says: "Now abideth, faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity." (I Cor. 13:13) Because, when a man shall have reached the eternal world, while the other two graces will fail, love will remain greater and more assured. i CITY OF GOD ** BOOK V *k CHAPTER 9 The manner in which Cicero addresses himself to the task of refuting the Stoics, shows that he did not think he could effect anything aginst them in argument unless he had first demolished divination. And this he attempts to accomplish by denying that there is any knowledge of future things and maintaining with all his might that there is no prediction of events. Thus he both denies the foreknowledge of God and attempts by vain arguments and by opposing to himself certain oracles very easy to be refuted to overthrow all prophecy, even such as is clearer than the light (though even these oracles are not refuted by him).
. we, in order that we may confess the most high and true God Himself, do confess His will, supreme power, and prescience. Neither let us be afraid lest, after all, we do not do by will that which we do by will, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew that we would do it. It was this which Cicero was afraid of, and therefore opposed foreknowledge. The Stoics also maintained that all things do not come to pass by necessity, although they contended that all things happen according to destiny. What is it, then, that Cicero feared in the prescience of future things? Doubtless it was this, that if all future things have been foreknown, they will happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and if they come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not preceded by some efficient causes. But if there is a certain order of causes according to which everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, all things happen which do happen. But if this be so, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no such thing as freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life is subverted. In vain are laws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had recourse to; and there is no ° justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good, and punishments for the wicked. And that consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of future things, and shuts up the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between two things, either that something is in our own power, or that there is foreknowledge—both of which cannot be true; but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. . . . But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by the faith of piety. But how so? says Cicero; for the knowledge of future things being granted, there follows a chain of consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing depending on our own free wills. And further, if there is anything depending on our wills, we must go backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the conclusion that there is no foreknowledge of future things. For we go backwards through all the steps in the following order: If there is free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God—for things cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes—but, if there is no fixed and certain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot be said to happen according as He foreknew that they would happen. And further, if it is not true that all things happen just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge of future events.
Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it... . But it does not follow that, though there is for God a certain order of all causes, there must therefore be nothing depending on the free exercise of our own wills, for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God, and is embraced by His foreknowledge, for human wills are also causes of human actions; and He who foreknew all the causes of things would certainly among those causes not have been ignorant of our wills. For even that very concession which Cicero himself makes is enough to refute him in this argument. For what does it help him to say that nothing takes place without a cause, but that every cause is not fatal, there being a fortuitous cause, a natural cause, and a voluntary cause? It is sufficient that he confesses that whatever happens must be preceded by a cause. For we say that those causes which are called fortuitous are not a mere name for the absence of causes, but are only latent, and we attribute them either to the will of the true God, or to that of spirits of some kind or other. And as to natural causes, we by no means separate them from the will of Him who is the author and framer of all nature. But now as to voluntary cause, they are referable either to God, or to angels, or to men . . . The cause of things, therefore, which makes but is not made, is God; but all other causes both make and are made. Such are all created spirits, and especially the rational. Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the will of spirits do by them. How, then, does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes? . . .
CHAPTER 10 Wherefore, neither is that necessity to be feared, for dread of which the Stoics labored to make such distinctions among the causes of things as should enable them to rescue certain things from the dominion of necessity and to subject others to it. Among those things which they wished not to be subject to necessity they placed our wills, knowing that they would not be free if subject to necessity. For if that is to be called our necessity which is not in our power, but even though we be unwilling effects what it can effect—as, for instance, the necessity of death—it is manifest that our wills by which we live uprightly or wickedly are not under such a necessity; for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself—for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not—for we should not will if we were unwilling. But if we define necessity to be that according to which we say that it is necessary that anything be of such or such a nature, or be done in such and such a manner, I know not why we should have any dread of that necessity taking away the freedom of our will. For we do not put the life of God or the foreknowledge of God under necessity if we should say that it is necessary that God should live for ever and foreknow all things; as neither is His power diminished when we say that He cannot die or fall into error—for this is in such a way impossible to Him, that if it were possible for Him, He would be of less power. But assurely
He is rightly called omnipotent, though He can neither die nor fall into error. For He is called omnipotent on account of His doing what He wills, not on account of His suffering what He wills not; for if that should befall Him, He would by no means be omnipotent. Wherefore, He cannot do some things, for the very reason that He is omnipotent. So also, when we say that it is necssary that when we will, we will by free choice, in so saying we both affirm what is true beyond doubt, and do not still subject our wills thereby to a necessity which destroys liberty. Our wills, therefore, exist as wills, and do themselves whatever we do by willing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling.
But when anyone suffers anything, being unwilling, by the will of another, even in that case will retains its essentail validity—we do not mean the will of the party who inflicts the suffering, for we resolve it into the power of God. For if a will should simply exist, but not be able to do what it wills, it would be overborne by a more powerful will. Nor would this be the case unless there had existed will, and that not the will of the other party, but the will of him who willed, but was not able to accomplish what he willed.
"Therefore, whatsoever a man suffers contrary to his own will, he ought not to attribute to the will of men, or of angels, or of any created spirit, but rather to His will who gives power to wills.
It is not the case, therefore, that because God foreknew what would be in the power of our wills, there is for that reason nothing in the power of our wills. For he who foreknew this did not foreknow nothing. Moreover, if He who foreknew what would be in the power of our wills did not foreknow nothing, but something, assuredly, even though He did foreknow, there is something in the power of our wills. Therefore we are by no means compelled, either, retaining the prescience of God, to take away the freedom of the will, or, retaining the freedom of the will, to deny that He is prescient of future things, which is impious. But we embrace both. We faithfully and sincerely confess both. The former, that we may believe well; the latter, that we may live well. For he lives ill who does not believe well concerning God. Wherefore, be it far from us, in order to maintain our freedom, to deny the prescience of Him by whose help we are or shall be free. Consequently, it is not in vain that laws are enacted and that reproaches, exhortations, praises, and vituperations are had recourse to; for these also He foreknew, and they are of great avail, even as great as He foreknew that they would be of. Prayers, also, are of avail to procure those things which He foreknew that He would grant to those who offered them; and with justice have reao7 wards been appointed for good deeds and punishments for sins. For a man does not therefore sin because God foreknew that he would sin. Nay, it cannot be doubted but that it is the man himself who sins when he does sin, because He, whose foreknowledge is infallible, foreknew not that fate, or fortune, or something else would sin, but that the man himself would sin, who, if he wills not, sins not. But if he shall not will to sin, even this God did foreknow.
G RACE AND FREE WILL *k BOOK I *k CHAPTER 1 The occasion and argument of this work. With reference to those persons who preach up the liberty of the human will and maintain it with such pertinacity as boldly to deny, and endeavor to do away with, that grace of God which calls us to Him and delivers us from the evils we have deserved, whereby also we obtain the meritorious qualities which lead to everlasting life, we have already said a good deal in discussion and committed it to writing, so far as the Lord has vouchsafed to enable us. But since there are some persons who [take the Opposite course, and] so defend God's grace as to deny man's free will, or else suppose that free will is denied when grace is defended, I have determined to write some thoughts on this point to your love, my brother Valentinus, and the rest of you, who are serving God together under the impulse of a mutual charity. ...
BOOK II > CHAPTER 2 He proves the existence of free will in man from the precepts addressed to him by God; these precepts are given that there may be no excuse from ignorance. Now He has revealed to us, through His Holy Scriptures, that there is in man's will a liberty of choice. But how He has revealed this I do not attempt to explain by human testimony but by divine. There is, to begin with, the fact that God's precepts themselves would be of no use to a man unless his will were at full liberty to choose, so that by its assent he might obtain the promised reward as he obeys the precepts. For these are given that no one might be able to plead the excuse of ignorance, as the Lord . says concerning the Jews in the gospel: "If I had not-come and spoken unto them, they would not have sin; but now they have no cloak [or excuse] for their sin." (John 15:22) Of what sin does He speak but of that great one which He foreknew, while speaking thus, that they would make their own—that is, the death they were going to inflict upon Him? For they had no sin before Christ came to them in the flesh. The apostle also says: "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness; because that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shown them. For the invisible things of Him are from the creation of the world clearly seen—being understood by the things that are made—even his Eternal power and Godhead, so that they are without excuse." (Rom. 1:18-20) In what sense does he pronounce them to be "without excuse," except of such excuse as human pride is apt to allege in such words as, "If I had only known, I would have done it; I did not do it because I was ignorant of it"; or, "I would do it if I knew how; but I do not know, therefore I don't do it'? All such excuse is removed from them when the precept is given them, or the knowledge is made manifest to them how to avoid sin.
CHAPTER 3 Sinners are convicted when attempting to excuse themselves by blaming God, because they have free will. 'There are, however, persons who attempt to find excuse for themselves even from God. The Apostle James says to such: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be . tempted with evil, neither tempteth He any man. But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then, when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." (Jas. 1:13-15 ... And in the book of Ecclesiasticus we read: "Say not thou, It is through the Lord that I fell away; for thou oughtest not to do the things that He hateth: nor do thou say, He hath caused me to err; for He hath no need of the sinful man. The Lord hateth all abomination, and they that fear God love it not. He himself made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of His counsel.
If thou be willing, thou shalt keep His commandments, and _perform true fidelity. He hath set fire and water before thee: stretch forth thine hand to which thou wilt. Before man is life and death, and whichsoever pleaseth him shall be given to him." (Ecclus. 15: 11-17) Observe how very plainly is set before our view the liberty of the human will.
CHAPTER 4 The divine commands which are most suited to the
will itself illustrate its freedom. What is the import of the fact that in so many passages God requests His commandments to be kept and fulfilled and of the way in which He makes this request, if the will is not free? What means "the happy man," of whom the Psalmist says that "his pleasure [or will] has been in the law of the Lord?" (Ps. 1:2) Does he not clearly enough show that a man, by his own will and choice, takes his stand in the law of God? Then, again, there are so many commandments which in a certain way expressly adapt themselves to the human will; for instance, there is, "Be not overcome of evil," (Rom. 12:1) and others of similar import, such as, "Be not like a horse or a mule, which have no understanding"; (Ps. 32:9) and "Reject not the counsels of thy mother'; (Prov. 1:8) and "Be not wise in thine own conceit"; (Prov. 3:11) and "Forget not my law'; (Prov. 3:1) and "Forbear not to do good to the poor"; (Prov. 3:27)... with numberless other passages of the inspired Scriptures. And what do they all show us but the liberty of man's will in its preferences and choice? .
BOOK IV + CHAPTER 6 God's grace to be maintained against the Pelagians; the Pelagian heresy not an old one. There is, however, a fear of all these and similar testimonies of Holy Scripture being understood, in the maintenance of free will, in such a way as to leave no room for God's assistance and grace in leading a godly life and a good conversation, to which the eternal reward is due; and a fear, moreover, of a poor wretched man so misunderstanding his own case, when he leads a good life and _performs good works (or rather thinks that he leads a good life and performs good works), as to dare to glory in himself, and not in the Lord, and to put his entire hope of righteous living in himself alone; so that the prophet Jeremiah's malediction follows him when he says, "Cursed is the man who trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the Lord."
(Jer. 17:5) Understand, my brethren, I pray you, this passage of the prophet. For the prophet did not say, "Cursed is the man who puts his hope in his own self." It might seem to some that the passage "Cursed is the man who trusteth in man" was spoken in the sense that no man should have any confidence in any other person, but in himself. In order, therefore, to show that his advice to a man was not to have any confidence in himself, even after, saying, "Cursed is the man who trusteth in man" he immediately added, "And maketh flesh his arm" [or strengthened the flesh of his arm'']. He used the word "arm" to designate power in operation. By the term "flesh," however, must be understood human frailty. And therefore he strengthens the flesh of his arm who supposes that a power which is frail and weak (in a word, human) is sufficient for him to perform good works, and therefore puts not his trust in God for help. This is the reason why he subjoined the further clause "And whose heart departeth from the Lord." Of this character is the Pelagian heresy, which is not an ancient one, but has only lately come into existence. Against this system of error there was first a good deal of discussion; then, as the ultimate resource, it was referred to sundry episcopal councils, the proceedings of which, not, indeed, in every instance, but in some, I have despatched to you for your perusal. In order, then, to our performance of good works, let us not put our trust in man, strengthening the flesh of our own arm; nor let our heart ever depart from the Lord, but let it say to him, "Be Thou my helper; forsake me not, nor despise me, O God of my salvation." (Ps. 27:9)
CHAPTER 7 Grace is necessary along with free will to lead a good life. Continence the result of God's gift and free will. They to whom it is given order their will so as to accomplish its desire. Therefore, my dearly beloved, as we have now proved by our former quotations of Holy Scripture that there is in man's will a freedom of choice and determination in order to lead a good life and perform right actions, so now let us see what inspired passages there also are concerning the grace of God, without which we are not able to do any good thing. And first of all, I will say something about the very profession which you make in your brotherhood. Now your society, in which you are leading lives of continence, could not hold together unless you forbore the pleasure of matrimony. Well, the Lord was one day conversing on this very topic, when His disciples remarked to Him, "If such be the case of a man with his wife, it is not good to marry." He then answered them, "All men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given." (Matt. 19:10) And was it not to Timothy's free will that the apostle appealed, when he exhorted him in these words: "Keep thyself pure" [Contine te ipsum, Exercise continence]?
(I Tim. 5:22) He also explained the power of the will in this matter when He said, "He standeth stedfast in heart—having no necessity, but possessing power over his own will—to keep his virgin." (I Cor. 7:37) And yet all men do not receive this saying, except those to whom the power is given. Now they to whom this is not given either are unwilling or do not fulfil their will; whereas they to whom it is given so order their will as to accomplish what they wish. In order, therefore, that this saying, which is not received by all men, may yet be received by some, God's grace and free will combine in securing to them the gift... .
BOOK V + CHAPTER 10 Free will and God's grace are simultaneously commended. The error of the Pelagians that grace is given according to men's merits. When God says, "Turn ye unto me, and I will turn unto you," (Zech. 1:3) one of these clauses—that which invites our return to God—is evidently addressed to our free will; while the other, which promises His return to us, appertains to His grace. Here, possibly, the Pelagians think they have a justification for their opinion which they so prominently advance, that God's grace is given in proportion to our merits. In the East, indeed, that is to say in the province of Palestine, in which is the city of Jerusalem, Pelagius, when examined in person by the bishop, did not venture to affirm this. For it happened that among the objections which were brought up against him, this in particular was alleged, that he maintained that the grace of God was bestowed according to our merits—an opinion which was so diverse from Catholic doctrine and so hostile to the grace of Christ, that unless he had anathematized it, as laid to his charge, he himself must have left the council under anathema. He pronounced, indeed, the required condemnation of the dogma but how insincerely, his later books show; for in them he maintains absolutely no other opinion than that the grace of God is bestowed in proportion to our own deserts. Such deductions do they make out of the Scriptures—like the one which I just now quoted, '"Turn ye unto me, and I will turn unto you"—as if it were owing to the merit of our conversion to God that His grace were given us, wherein He Himself even turns unto us. Now the persons who hold this opinion fail to observe that unless our conversion to God were itself God's gift, it would not be said to Him in prayer, '""Turn us again, O God of hosts"; (Ps. 80:7) and, "Thou, O God, wilt turn and quicken us"; (Ps. 85:6) and again, "Convert us, O God of our salvation," (Ps. 85:4) —with other passages of similar import, too numerous to mention here. For, with respect to our coming unto Christ, what else does it mean than our being turned and converted to Him upon our believing? And yet He says: "No man can come unto me, €xcept it were given unto him of my Father." . . . (John 6:65)
CHAPTER 12 He proves out of St. Paul that grace is not given according to men's merits. Now there was, no doubt, a decided merit in the Apostle Paul, but it was an evil one, while he persecuted the Church, and he says of it: "I am not meet to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the Church of God" (I Cor.
15:9) And it was while he was in possession of this evil merit that a good one was rendered to him instead of the evil; and therefore, he went on at once to say, "But by the grace of God I am what I am." (I Cor. 15:10) Then, in order to exhibit the action of his free will besides, he added in the next clause, "And His grace within me was not in vain, but I labored more abundantly than they all." This freedom of will in man he consistently appeals to in the case of others also, as when he says to them, "We beseech you that ye receive not the grace of God in vain" [so as to be idle]. (II Cor. 6:1) Now, how could he enjoin any effort on them, if they received God's grace in such a manner as to merge in it, and lose their own will? However [there was the other extreme to guard against], the will itself must not be deemed capable of doing any good thing without the grace of God; therefore, after saying, "His grace within me was not in vain," or idle, 'but I labored more abundantly than they all," he immediately added the qualifying clause, "Yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me." In other words, Not I alone, but only the grace of God. Nor was he himself solitary in action, but God's grace operated along with him. For the accomplishment, however, of the radical change within him—his call from heaven and his conversion by that great and most effectual call—God's grace operated alone, because his merits, though great were yet evil... .
BOOK VI * CHAPTER 13 From these and similar passages of Scripture, we gather the proof that God's grace is not given according to our merits. The truth is, we see that it is bestowed not only when there are no good deserts, but when even evil ones precede; and we still observe the same unmerited gifts conferred day after day. But it is plain that when grace has been given, even our merits begin to be good—only it is by grace; for, were that only to withdraw itself, man falls, not raised up but only precipitated by his free will. Wherefore no man ought, even when he begins to possess good merits, to attribute them to himself, but to God, who is thus addressed by the Psalmist: "Be Thou my helper, forsake me not." (Ps. 27:9) By saying, "Forsake me not," he shows that if he were to be forsaken, he is unable of himself to do any good thing. . . . So necessary is it for a man that he should be not only justified when unrighteous by the grace of God —that is, to be changed from unholiness to righteousness—when he is requited with good for his evil; but that, even after he has become justified by faith, grace should accompany him on his way afterwards, and he should lean upon it, lest he stumble and fall. On this account it is written concerning the Church herself in the book of Canticles: "'Who is this that cometh up in white raiment, leaning upon the arm of her beloved kinsman?"
(Cant. 8:5) She, who could by no possibility have been so pure in vesture by herself alone, has become clad in white. And by whom has she been thus whitened, except by Him who says by the prophet, "Though your sins be as purple, I will make them white as snow'? (Isa. 1:18) At the time she was made white, she deserved nothing good; but now that she is white, she walketh rightly; but it is only by her continuing ever to lean upon Him by whom she was whitened. Wherefore, Jesus Himself, on whom the Church leans in her raiment of white, said to His disciples, "Without me ye can do nothing." (John 15:5)
CHAPTER 14 Let us return now to the Apostle Paul, who,
as we have observed, obtained God's grace, who recompenses good for evil, when, so far from having any good deserts of his own, he was really involved in many evil ones. Let us see what he says when his sufferings at the end of his life were approaching. These are his words, writing to Timothy: "I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. I have fought a good fight; I have finished my course, I have kept the faith."
(II Tim. 4:6-7) He enumerates these as being now his good merits; that, as after his ill deserts he obtained grace, so now, after his good merits, he might receive the crown. Observe, therefore what follows: "There is henceforth laid up for me," he says, "a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous Judge, shall give me at that day." (II Tim. 4:8) Now, to whom could the righteous Judge award the crown, except to him on whom the merciful Father had bestowed grace? And how could the crown be one "of righteousness," unless the grace had preceded which "justifieth the ungodly?" How, moreover, could the one now be awarded as a debt, unless the other had been before bestowed as a free gift?
CHAPTER 15 The Pelagians profess that the only grace which is . Siven according to our merits is that of the forgiveness of sins; God crowns in us His own gifts, not our merits. When, however, the Pelagians say that the only grace which is not awarded according to our merits is that whereby a man has his sins forgiven him, that the final grace which is bestowed upon us, even eternal life, is given in return for preceding merits, they must not be allowed to go without an answer. If, indeed, they understand our merits in such a sense as to acknowledge even them to be the gifts of God, then their opinion would not deserve reprobation. But inasmuch as they preach up human merits to such an extent as to declare that a man has them of his own very self, then the apostle's reply becomes an absolutely correct one: "Who maketh thee to differ from another? And what hast thou, that thou didst not receive? Now, if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it? (I Cor. 4:7) To a man who holds such views, it is perfect truth to say: It is His own gifts that God crowns, not your merits, although you hold these as done by your own self, not by Him. If, indeed, they are of such a character, they are evil, and God does not crown them; but if they are good, they are God's gifts, because, as the Apostle James says,""Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights." (Jas. 1:17) In accordance with which John also, the Lord's forerunner, declares: ""A man can receive nothing, except it be given him from heaven" (John 3:27) —from heaven, of course, for from thence came also the Holy Ghost, when Jesus ascended up on high, led captivity captive, and give gifts to men. Inasmuch, then, as your merits are God's gifts, God does not crown your merits as such, but only as His own gifts. .
CHAPTER 17 Faith the free gift of God..... "I have kept the faith." But he who says this is the same who declares in another passage, "I have obtained mercy of the Lord to be faithful."
(I Cor. 7:25) He does not say, I obtained mercy because I was faithful, but "in order that I might be faithful," thus showing that even faith itself cannot be had without God's exercise of mercy, and that consequently it is the gift of God. This he very expressly teaches us when he says, "For by grace are ye saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God."
(Eph. 2:8) They might say, We received grace because we believed; as if they would attribute the faith to themselves, and the grace to God. Therefore, to prevent such an error, the apostle having said, "Ye are saved through faith," added the correcting clause, "And that not of yourselves, but it is the gift of God."
And then, lest they should claim to have deserved so great a gift by any works of their own, he immediately added, "Not of works, lest any man should boast." (Eph. 2:9) Not that he meant to deny good works, or to empty them of their value, because he says that God renders to every man according to his works; but he would have works proceed from faith, and not faith from works. Therefore it is from Him that we have works of righteousness, from whom also comes faith itself, concerning which it is written, ""The just shall live by faith." (Hab. 2:4)
CHAPTER 18 Faith without good works is not sufficient for
salvation. Unintelligent persons, indeed, with regard to the apostle's statement: "We conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law," (Rom. 3:28) have thought him to mean that faith is sufficient for a man, even if he lead a bad life and has no good deeds to allege. Impossible is it that such a character should be deemed a "vessel of election" by the apostle, who, after declaring that "in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision," (Gal. 5:6) adds the important statement, 'but faith which worketh by love." It is such faith which severs the faithful children of God from unclean devils— for even these "believe and tremble," (Jas. 2:19) as the Apostle James says, but they do no good works. Therefore they possess not the faith by which the just man lives—the faith which operates through love in such wise that God recompense it according to its works with eternal life. But inasmuch as we have even our good works from God, from whom likewise comes our faith and our love, therefore the selfsame great teacher of the Gentiles has designated "eternal life" itself as His gracious "gift."
BOOK VIII *k CHAPTER 19 How is eternal life both a reward for service and a free gift of grace? And hence there arises no small question, which must be solved with the Lord's permission. If eternal life is bestowed as a recompense for good works, as the Scripture most openly declares: "Then He shall reward every man according to his works," (Matt. 16:27) how can eternal life be a matter of grace, seeing that grace is not given in return for works, but is a gratuitous award, as the apostle himself tells us: "To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt": (Rom. 4:4) and again: "There is a remnant saved according to the election of grace"; with these words immediately subjoined: "And if of grace, then is it no more of works; otherwise grace is no more grace"? (Rom. 11:5-6) How, I ask again, is eternal life a matter of grace, when it is received after works? Does the apostle happen not to have given the designation of grace to eternal life?
Nay, he has so called it, with a clearness which none could gainsay.
It requires no acute intellect, but only an attentive reader to discover this. For after saying, "The wages of sin is death," he at once added, "The gift of God [gratia Dei] is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord." (Rom. 6:23)
CHAPTER 20 The question answered. In what sense the apostle says that we are not saved by works. Justification is grace simply and entirely. Eternal life is reward and grace. Now this question seems to me to be by no means capable of solution, unless we understand that even those good works of ours, which are recompensed with eternal life, are occasioned by the grace of God, because of what is said by the Lord Jesus: "Without me ye can do nothing." (John 15:5) The apostle himself undoubtedly [felt the difficulty of the subject] after saying, "By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the gift of God: not of works, lest any man should boast"; (Eph. 2:8-9) he evidently saw the possibility of men's concluding from such a statement that good works are not necessary to those who believe, but that faith alone is sufficient for them. Then, again, there was the possibility, as he perceived, of men's boasting of their good works, as if they were of themselves capable of performing them. To meet, therefore, these erroneous opinions on both sides, he immediately added, "We are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." (Eph. 2:10) [And here question after question arises.] What is the purport of his saying, "Not of works, lest any man should boast," while commending the grace of God? And then why does he afterwards, when giving a reason for using such works, say, "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works"? Why, therefore, does it run, "Not of works, lest any man should boast"? Now, hear, and understand the point. The excluding phrase, "Not of works," is spoken of the works which you suppose have their origin in yourself alone; but you have to think of works to which God has moulded (that is, has formed and created) you. For of these he says, "We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works." Now he does not here speak of that creation which made us human beings, but of that in reference to which one said who was already in full manhood, "Create in me a clean heart, O God"; (Ps. 1:12) concerning which also the apostle says, "Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new. And all things are of God." (II Cor. 5:17-18) We are moulded, therefore, that is, formed and created, "unto the good works, which" we have not ourselves prepared, but "God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." It follows, then, dearly beloved, beyond all doubt, that as your good life is nothing else than God's gift and grace, so also the eternal life which is the recompense of a good life is the gift and grace of God; moreover it is a free and gratuitous gift, even as that was a free and gratuitous gift of which it is the recompense. But the good life, thus rewarded, is solely and simply grace; therefore the eternal life, which is its reward—and because it is its reward—is grace for grace, as if it were the remuneration of righteousness; in order that that may be realized, because it is true, that God 'shall reward every man according to his works." . . . (Matt. 16:27)
BOOK XIV *k CHAPTER 27 Grace effects the fulfilment of the law, the deliverance of nature, and the suppression of sin's dominion. Subterfuge of the Pelagians. It has, however, been shown to demonstration that instead of really maintaining the freedom of will, they have only inflated a theory of it, which, having no stability, has fallen to the ground. Neither the knowledge of God's law, nor nature, nor the remission of sins represents [as they pretend] that grace which is given to us through our Lord Jesus Christ; but it is this very grace which accomplishes the fulfilment of the law, and the liberation of nature, and the removal of the dominion of sin. Being, therefore, frustrated on these points, they resort to another expedient and endeavor to show in the best way they can that the grace of God is given us according to our merits. For they say: "Granted that it [grace ] 1s not given to us in proportion to the merits of our good works, inasmuch as it is through it that we do any good thing, still it is bestowed upon us in proportion to our merits of a good will; for," say they, "the good will of him who prays precedes his prayer, even as the good will of the believer preceded his faith, so that in proportion to these deserts the grace of God follows, as He hears [and answers the prayer]."
CHAPTER 28 Faith is the gift of God. I have already discussed
the point concerning the faith, that is, the disposition and will of the man who believes; and I went so far as to show that it appertains to grace—so that the apostle did not tell us that he obtained mercy because he was faithful; but he said, "I have obtained the mercy of the Lord in order to be faithful." (I Cor. 7:25) And there are many other passages of similar import—among them that in which he bids us "think soberly, according as God hath dealt to every man the proportion of faith'; (Rom. 12:3) and that which I have already quoted; "By grace are ye saved through faith; and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God"; (Eph. 2:8). . Then, again, there is the passage, especially noticeable, in which he says, "We, having the same spirit of faith," (II Cor. 4513) for his phrase is not the knowledge of faith, but "the spirit of faith"; and he expressed himself thus in order that we might understand how that faith is given to us, even when it is not sought, so that other'blessings may be granted to it at its request.
For "how," says he, "'shall they call upon Him in whom they have not believed?" (Rom. 10:14) The spirit of grace, therefore, causes us to have faith, in order that through faith we may, on praying for it, obtain the ability to do what we are commanded. On this account the apostle himself constantly puts faith before the law; since we are not able to do what the law commands unless we obtain the strength to do it by the prayer of faith.
CHAPTER 29 God is able to convert opposing wills, and to take away from the heart its hardness. Now if faith is simply the property of man's free will, and is not the gift of God, why do we pray for those who will not believe that they may have faith? This it would be absolutely useless to do, unless we believe with perfect propriety that Almighty God can turn to the practice of belief men's wills, however perverse and opposed to faith they may be. Man's free will is addressed when it is said, "Today, if ye will hear His voice, harden not your hearts." (Ps. 95:7-8) But if God were not able to remove from the human heart even its obstinacy and hardness, He would not commission the prophet to say, "I will take from them their heart of stone, and will give them a heart of flesh." (Ezek. 11:19) That all this was foretold in reference to the New Testament is shown clearly enough by the apostle when he says, "Ye are our epistle, . . . written not with ink, but with the Spirit of the living God; not in tables of stone, but in fleshly 'tables of the heart'. (II Cor. 3:2-3) We tee) must not, of course, suppose that such a pharse as this is used as if those might live fleshly who ought to lead spiritual lives; but inasmuch as a stone has no feeling, with which man's hard heart is compared, what was there left Him to compare man's intelligent heart with but the flesh, which possesses feeling? God, speaking by the mouth of the prophet Ezekiel, says, "I will you then another heart, and I will put a new spirit within you; and I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them a heart of flesh; that they may walk in my statutes, and keep mine ordinances, and do them: and they shall be my people, and I will be their God, saith the Lord." (Ezek. 11:19-20) Now can we possibly, without extreme absurdity, maintain that there has previously existed in any man the meritorious recommendation of a good will, to entitle him to the removal of his stony heart, when all the while this very heart of stone signifies nothing else than the harshest will, such as is absolutely inflexible against God? For wherever a good will precedes, there is, of course, no longer existing a heart of stone. .
BOOK XV *k CHAPTER 31 Free will does something in the heart's conversion; God gives what He commands. In what sense it is said, "If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments." Lest, however, it should be thought that men themselves in this matter do nothing by their free will, it is said in the Psalm, 'Harden not your hearts;" (Ps. 95:8) and in Ezekiel himself "Cast away from you all your transgressions, which ye have impiously committed against me; and make you a new heart and a new spirit; and keep all my commandments. For why will ye die, O house of Israel, saith the Lord? for I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God: wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye." We should remember that it is He who says, "Turn yourselves and live,' to whom it is said in prayer, "Turn us again, O God." (Ps. 79:4) We should not forget that He says, "Cast away from you all your transgressions," when it is even He who justifies the ungodly. We should bear in mind that He says, "Make you a new heart and a new spirit," who also promises, "I will give you a new heart, and a new spirit will I put within you." How is it then, that He who says, "Make you," also says, "I will give you"? Why does He command, if He means Himself to give? Why does He give if man is to make, except it be that He gives what He commands when He helps him to obey upon whom He lays His command? There is, however, always within us a free will—but it is not always good; for it is either free from righteousness when it serves sin—and then it is evil—or else it is free from sin when it is the servant of righteousness—and then it is good. But the grace of God is evermore good; and by its means it comes to pass that a man is under the influence of a good will, though he was previously possessed by an evil one. By the same grace it also comes to pass that the very will, which has now begun to be good, is enlarged and grows so great as to be able to fulfil whatever divine commandments it may wish, when it has once firmly and completely formed its desire. This is the purport of what the Scripture says: "If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the commandments'; so that the man who has the will but not the power discovers that he does not yet possess a perfect will, and prays that he may have it so perfected that it may be sufficient for keeping the commandments; and then, indeed, he receives assistance enough to perform what he is commanded. The will is then of use when we have the power; just as the power is also then of use when we have the will. For what does it profit us if we possess will without power, or else lack the will when we possess the power? ...
BOOK XVII - CHAPTER 33 A good will, when small and weak; an ample will, great love. Operating and cooperating grace.
The burden of human sufferings a heavy weight for an infirm will; a light one for charity. He who wishes to keep God's commandment, but is unable to do so, already possesses a good will, but as yet a small and weak one; he will, however, become able when he shall have acquired a great and robust will. When the martyrs kept the great commandments which they obeyed, they acted under a mighty will—that is, with a great love. Of this intense charity the Lord Himself thus speaks: "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." (John 15:13) In accordance with this, the apostle also says, "He that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law. For this: Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not covet; and if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Love worketh no ill to his neighbor: therefore love is the fulfilling of the law." (Rom. 13:8-10) This perfection of love the Apostle Peter did not yet possess, when he for fear thrice denied the Lord. "There is no fear in love," says the Evangelist
John in his first Epistle, "but perfect love casteth out fear."
(I John 4:18) But yet, however, small and imperfect his love was, it was not wholly wanting when he said to the Lord, "I will lay down my life for Thy sake"; (John 13:37) for he supposed himself able to effect what he felt himself willing to do. And who was it that had begun to give him his love, however small, but He who prepares the human will and perfects by His cooperation what He initiates by His operation? Forasmuch as He begins His influence by working in us that we may have the will and completes it by working with us when we have the will. . . . He operates, therefore, without us, in order that we may become willing; but when we once possess the will and so use it as to act, He cooperates with us. We can, however, ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety without Him either working that we may will or cooperating when we will. Now, concerning the former point—His operation to produce will in us—it is said: "It is God which worketh in you, even to will." (Phil. 2:13) While of His cooperation with us, when we possess the will and proceed to put it into action, the apostle says, "We know that all things work together for good
[or, He cooperates in all things for good] to them that love God."
CHAPTER 36 Love commended by our Lord Himself. Moreover, the Lord Jesus Himself teaches us that the whole law and the prophets depend upon the two precepts which enjoin love to God and love to our neighbor. Concerning these two commandments the following is written in the Gospel according to St. Mark: "And one of the scribes came, and having heard them reasoning together, and perceiving that He had answered them well, asked Him: Which is the first commandment of all? And Jesus answered him: The first of all the commandments is, Hear, O Israel! the Lord our God is one Lord; and thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength. (Deut. 6:4-5) And the second is like unto it: Thou shalt love they neighbor as thyself. (Lev. 19:18) There is none other commandment greater than these." (Mark 12:28-31) Also, in the Gospel according to St. John, He says, "A new commandment I give unto you that ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another. By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love to one another." (John 13:34-35)
BOOK XVIII + CHAPTER 37 The love which fulfils the commandments is not of ourselves, but of God. The law without grace is the letter that killeth. All these commandments, however, respecting love or charity (which are so great, and such that whatever action a man may think he does well is by no means well done if done without charity) would be given to men in vain if they possess not a will to choose freely. But forasmuch as these precepts are given in the law, both old and new (although in the new came the grace which was promised in the old, the law, moreover, being without grace the letter which killeth, but under grace the Spirit which giveth life), from what source is there in men the love of God and of one's neighbor but from God Himself? For indeed, if it be not of God but of men, the Pelagians have gained the victory; but if it come from God, then we have vanquished the Pelagians. Let, then, the Apostle John sit in judgment between us; and let him say to us, "Beloved, let us love one another." (I John 4:7) Now, when they begin to extol themselves on these words of John and to ask why this precept is addressed to us at all if we have no ability of our own selves to love one another, the same apostle proceeds at once, to their confusion, to add, 'For love is of God." (I John 4:7) It comes not of ourselves, therefore, but it is of God. Wherefore, then, is it said, "Let us love one another, for love is of God," unless it be as a precept to our free will, admonishing it to seek the gift of God? Now, this would be indeed a thoroughly fruitless admonition if the will did not previously receive some donation of love, which might seek to be enlarged with such completeness as might fulfil whatever injunction was laid upon it. When it is said, "Let us love one another," it is law; when it is said, "For love is of God," it is grace. For God's "wisdom carries law and mercy upon her tongue."
(Prov. 3:16) Accordingly, it is written in the Psalm, "For He who gave the law will give blessings." (Ps. 84:6)
CHAPTER 38 We should not love God unless He first loved us
The apostles chose Christ because they were chosen; they were not chosen because they chose Christ. Let no one, then, deceive you, my brethren, because we should not love God unless he first loved us. John again gives us the plainest proof of this when he says, "We love Him because He first loved us." (I John 4:19) Grace makes us lovers of the law; but the law itself, without grace, makes us breakers of the law. And nothing else than this is shown us by the words of our Lord when He says to His disciples, "Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you." (John
15:16) For if we first loved Him, in order that by this merit He might love us, then we first chose Him that we might deserve to be chosen by Him. He, however, who is the Truth says another thing, and flatly contradicts this vain conceit of men. "You have not chosen me," He says. If, therefore, you have not chosen me, undoubtedly you have not loved me (for how could they choose one whom they did not love?) "But I," says He, "have chosen you." And then could they possibly help choosing Him themselves afterwards, and preferring Him to all the blessings of this world? But having been themselves chosen, they chose Him; yet it was not because they chose Him that they were themselves chosen. There could be no merit in men's choice of Christ, if it were not that God's grace was prevenient in His choosing them. Whence the Apostle Paul pronounces in the Thessalonians this benediction: "The Lord make you to increase and abound in love one toward another, and toward all men." (ei hess 12) ee
BOOK XIX + CHAPTER 40 The dark ignorance of the Pelagians in maintaining that the knowledge of the law comes from God, but that love comes from ourselves. It is no wonder that light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehendeth it not. In John's Epistle the Light declares, "Behold what manner of love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the sons of God." (I John 3:1) And in the Pelagian writings the darkness says, "Love comes to us of our own selves." Now, if they only possessed the true love, that is, Christian charity, they would also know whence they obtained possession of it; even as the apostle knew when he said, "But we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God, that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God." (I Cor. 2:12) John says, "God is love." (I John 4:16) And thus the Pelagains affirm that they actually have, not God Himself from God, but from their own selves; and although they allow that we have the knowledge of the law from God, they will yet have it that love springs out of our very selves. Nor do they listen to the apostle when he says, "Knowledge puffeth up, but charity edifieth." (I Cor.
8:1) Now what can be more absurd, nay, what more insane and more alien from the very sacredness of love itself, than to maintain that from God proceeds the knowledge which, apart from love, puffs us up, while love which prevents the possibility of this inflation of knowledge springs from ourselves? And again, when the apostie speaks of "the love of Christ as surpassing knowledge," (Eph. 3:19) what can be more insane than to suppose that the knowledge which must be subordinated to love comes from God, while the love which surpasses knowledge comes from man? The true faith, however, and sound doctrine declare that both graces are from God; the Scripture says, "From the presence [of the Lord] cometh knowledge and understanding." (Prov. 2:6) And another Scripture says, "Love is of God." (I John 4:7) We read of "the Spirit of wisdom and understanding." (Isa. 11:2) Also of "the Spirit of power, and of love, and of a sound mind." (I 'Tim. 1:7) But love is a greater gift than knowledge; for whenever a man has the gift of knowledge, love is necessary by the side of it, that he be not puffed up. For "charity envieth not, vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up." (I Cor. 13:4) ...
BOOK XXIV -k CHAPTER 46 Understanding and wisdom must be sought from God. Peruse attentively this treatise, and if you understand it give God the praise; but where you fail to understand it, pray for understanding, for God will give you this faculty. Remember what the Scriptures say: "If any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God, who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth not; and it shall be given to him." (Jas. 1:5) Wisdom itself cometh down from above, as the Apostle James himself tells us. There is, however, another wisdom, which you must repel from you, and pray against its remaining in you; this the same apostle expressed his detestation of when he said, "But if ye have bitter envying and strife in your hearts, ... this is not the wisdom which descendeth from above, but is earthly, sensual, devilish. For wherever there is envying and strife, there is also confusion, and every evil work. But the wisdom which is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good works, without partiality, and without hypocrisy." (Jas. 3:13-17) What blessing, then, will that man not have who has prayed for this wisdom and obtained it of the Lord? And from this you may understand what grace is; because if this wisdom were of ourselves, it would not be from above; nor would it be an object to be asked for of the God who created us. Brethren, pray he also for us, that we may live "soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world; looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ," (Titus 2:12) to whom belong the honor, and the glory, and the kingdom, with the Father and the Holy Ghost, for ever and ever. Amen. i PREDESTINATION OF THE SAINTS *k BOOK VIII + CHAPTER 16 Why the gift of faith is not given to all. Faith, then, as well in its beginning as in its completion, is God's gift; and let no one have any doubt whatever, unless he desires to resist the plainest sacred writings, that this gift is given to some, while to some it is not given. And why it is not given to all ought not to disturb the believer, who believes that all have gone from one into a condemnation, which undoubtedly is most righteous; so that even if none were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault with God. Whence it is plain that it is a great grace for many to be delivered, and to acknowledge in those that are not delivered what would be due to themselves; so that he that glorieth may glory not in his own merits, which he sees to be equalled in those that are condemned, but in the Lord. And why He delivers one rather than another, "His judgments are unsearchable, and His ways past finding out." (Rom. 11:33) For it is better in this case for us to hear or to say, "O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" (Rom. 9:20) than to dare to say, as if we could know what He has chosen to be kept secret. Since, moreover, He could not will anything unrighteous. . . .
BOOK X > CHAPTER 19 In what respects predestination and grace differ. Moreover, that which I said, "That the salvation offered by this religion has never failed him who was worthy of it, and that he whom it failed was not worthy." If it be discussed and asked whence any man can be worthy, there are not wanting those who say by human will. But we say, by divine grace or predestination. Further, between grace and predestination there is only this difference, that predestination is a preparation for grace, while grace is actually the endowment itself. When, therefore, the apostle says, "Not of works, lest any man should boast. For we are His workmanship, created in Christ Jesus in good works," (Eph. 2:9-10) it is grace; but what follows—"which God hath prepared that we should walk in them'"—is predestination, which cannot exist without foreknowledge, although foreknowledge may exist without predestination; because God foreknew by predestination those things which He was about to do, whence it was said, "He made those things that shall be." (Isa. 45:11 ) Moreover, He is able to foreknow even those things which He does not Himself do—as all sins whatever; because, although there are some which are in such wise sins as they are also the penalties of sins, whence it is said, "God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient," (Rom. 1:28) it is not in such a case the sin that is God's, but the judgment. Therefore God's predestination in respect of good is, as I have said, the preparation of grace; which grace is the effect of that very predestination. Therefore when God promised to Abraham in his seed the faith of the nations, saying, "I have established thee a father of many nations," (Gen. 17:5) whence the apostle says, ""Therefore it is of faith, that the promise, according to grace, might be established to all the seed," (Rom. 4:16) He promised not concerning the power of our will, but concerning His own predestination. For He promised what He Himself would do, not what men would do. Because, although men do those good things which pertain to God's worship. He Himself makes them to do what He has commanded; it is not they that cause Him to do what He has promised. Otherwise the fulfilment of God's promises would not be in the power of God, but in that of men; and thus what was promised by God to Abraham would be given to Abraham by men themselves. Abraham, however, did not believe thus, but "he believed, giving glory to God, that what He promised He is able also to perform.'"" (Rom. 4:21) He does not say, "to foretell." He does not say, "to foreknow"; for He can foretell and foreknow the doings of strangers also; but He says, "He is able also to do"; and thus He is speaking not of the doings of others, but of His own. eS GIFT OF PERSEVERANCE *k BOOK I ** CHAPTER 1 Of the nature of the perseverance here discoursed of. I have now to consider the subject of perseverance with greater care... I assert, therefore, that the perseverance by which we persevere in Christ even to the end is the gift of God; and I call that the end by which is finished that life wherein alone there is a risk of falling. Therefore it is uncertain whether any one has received this gift so long as he is still alive. For if he fall before he dies, he assuredly is said not to have persevered; and most truly is it said. . . . But how should he who has not persevered have ever been persevering, since it is only by persevering that any one shows himself persevering—and this he has not done? But lest any one should struggle against this, and say, If from the date at which any one became a believer he has lived—for the sake of argument—ten years, and in the midst of them has fallen from the faith, has he not persevered for five years? I am not contending about words. If it be thought that this also should be called perseverance, as it were for so long as it lasts, assuredly he is not to be said to have had in any degree that perseverance of which we are now discoursing, by which one perseveres in Christ even tosthevend 2:6%
CHAPTER 9 When perseverance is granted to a person, he can
not but persevere. Now, moreover, when the saints say, 'Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil," (Matt. 6:13) whatever do they pray for but that they may persevere in holiness? For, assuredly, when that gift of God is granted to them—which is sufficiently plainly shown to be God's gift, since it is asked of Him—that gift of God, then, being granted to them that they may not be led into temptation, none of the saints fails to keep his perseverance in holiness even to the end. For there is not any one who ceases to persevere in the Christian purpose unless he is first of all led into temptation. If, therefore, it be granted to him according to his prayer that he may not be led
[into temptation], certainly by the gift of God he persists in that sanctification which by the gift of God he has received... .
BOOK VII - CHAPTER 138 Temptation the condition of man.
If, then, there were no other proofs, this Lord's prayer alone would be sufficient for us on behalf of the grace which I am defending; because it leaves us nothing wherein we may, as it were glory as in our own, since it shows that our not departing from God is not given except by God, when it shows that it must be asked for from God. For he who is not led into temptation does not depart from God. This is absolutely not in the strength of free will, such as it now is; but it had been in man before he fell... . But, after the fall of man, God willed it to pertain only to His grace that man should approach to Him; nor did He will it to pertain to aught but His grace that man should not depart from Him... .
CHAPTER 15 Why God willed that He should be asked for that which He might give without prayer. On which account also He willed that He should be asked that we may not be led into temptation, because if we are not so led, we by no means depart from Him. And this might have been given to us even without our praying for it, but by our prayer He willed us to be admonished from whom we receive these benefits. For from whom but from Him do we receive from whom it is right for us to ask? Truly in this matter let not the Church look for laborious disputations, but consider its own daily prayers. It prays that the unbelieving may believe; therefore God converts to the faith. It prays that believers may persevere; therefore God gives perseverance to the end. God foreknew that He would do this. THIS IS THE VERY
PREDESTINATION OF THE SAINTS, "whom He has chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world, that they should be holy and unspotted before Him in love; predestinating them unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the good pleasure of His will, to the praise of the glory of His grace, in which He hath shown them favor in His beloved Son, in whom they have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of sins according to the riches of His grace, which has abounded towards them in all wisdom and prudence; that He might show them the mystery of His will according to His good pleasure which He hath purposed in Him, in the dispensation of the fulness of times to restore all things in Christ which are in heaven and which are in earth; in Him, in whom also we have obtained a share, being predestinated according to His purpose who worketh all things,' (Eph. 1:4-11) Against a trumpet of truth so clear as this, what man of sober and watchful faith can receive any human arguments?
BOOK VIII -k CHAPTER 16 Why is not grace given according to merit? But why, says one, is not the grace of God given according to men's merits? I answer, Because God is merciful. Why, then, it is asked is it not given to all? And here I reply, Because God is a Judge. And thus grace is given by Him freely; and by His righteous judgment it is shown in some what grace confers on those to whom it is given. Let us not then be ungrateful, that according to the good pleasure of His will a merciful God delivers so many to the praise of the glory of His grace from such deserved perdition; as, if He should deliver no one therefrom, He would not be unrighteous. Let him, therefore, who is delivered love His grace. Let him who is not delivered acknowledge his due. If, in remitting a debt, goodness is perceived, in requiring it, justice— unrighteousness is never found to be with God.
CHAPTER 17 The difficulty of the distinction made in the choice of one and the rejection of another. "But why," it is said, "in one and the same case, not only of infants, but even of twin children, is the judgment so diverse?" Is it not a similar question, Why in a different case is the judgment the same? Let us recall, then, those laborers in the vineyard who worked the whole day, and those who toiled one hour. Certainly it is a differing case of labor expended, and yet there was the same judgment in paying the wages. Did the murmurers in this case hear anything from the householder except, Such is my Will? Certainly such was his liberality towards some, that there could be no injustice towards others. And both these classes, indeed, are among the good. Nevertheless, in what refers to justice and grace, it may be truly said to the guilty who is condemned, even concerning the guilty who is delivered, "Take what is thine, and go thy way"; (Matt. 20:14) "I will give unto this one that which is not due"; "is it not lawful for me to do what I will? is thine eye evil because I am good?" And how if he should say, why not to me also? he will hear, and with reason, "Who art thou, O man, that repliest against God?" (Rom. 9:20) And although assuredly in the one case you see a most benignant benefactor and in your own case a most righteous exactor, in neither case do you behold an unjust God. For although He would be righteous even if He were to punish both, he who is delivered has good ground for thankfulness, he who is condemned has not any ground for finding fault.
CHAPTER 18 But why should one be punished more than another? "But if,' it is said, "it was necessary that, although all were not condemned, He should still show what was due to all, and so that He should commend His grace more freely to the vessels of mercy; why in the same case will He punish me rather than another, or deliver him rather than me?" | Say not this. If you ask wherefore, [I say] that I confess that I can find no answer to make. And if you further ask why is this, it is because in this matter even as His anger is righteous and as His mercy is great, so His judgments are unsearchable. .. .
BOOK XIV -k CHAPTER 34 The doctrine of predestination not opposed to the advantage of preaching. But they say that the explanation of predestination is opposed to the advantage of preaching—as if, indeed, it were opposed to the preaching of the apostle! Did not that teacher of the heathen so often, in faith and truth, as well commend predestination, as without ceasing preach the word of God? Because he said, "It is God that worketh in you both to will and to do for His good pleasure," (Phil. 2:13) Did he not also exhort that we should both will and do what is pleasing to God? or because he said, "He who hath begun a good work in you shall carry it on even unto the day of Christ Jesus," (Phil. 1:6) did he on that account cease to persuade men to begin and to persevere unto the end? Doubtless, our Lord Himself commanded men to believe, and said, "Believe in God, believe also in me": (John 14:1) and yet His judgment is not therefore false, nor is His explanation idle when He says, ""No man cometh unto me"— that is, no man believeth in me—''except it were given him of my Father." (John 6:66) Nor, again, because this explanation is true, is the former precept vain. Why, therefore, do we think the explanation of predestination useless to preaching, to precept, to exhortation, to rebuke,—all which things the divine Scripture repeats frequently—seeing that the same Scripture commends this docEYE? 5.
CHAPTER 35 What predestination is. Will any man dare to say that God did not foreknow those to whom He would give to believe, or whom He would give to His Son, that of them He should lose none? And, certainly, if He foreknew these things, He as certainly foreknew His own kindness, wherewith He condescends to deliver us. This is THE PREDESTINATION OF THE SAINTS—nothing else; to wit, the foreknowledge and the preparation of God's kindnesses, whereby they are most certainly delivered, whoever they are that are delivered. But where are the rest left by the righteous divine judgment except in the mass of ruin, where the Tyrians and the Sidonians were left? who, moreover, might have believed if they had seen Christ's wonderful miracles. But since it was not given to them to believe, the means of believing also was denied them. From which fact it appears that some have in their understanding itself a naturally divine gift of intelligence, by which they may be moved to the faith, if they either hear the words or behold the signs fitted for their minds; and yet if, in the more lofty judgment of God, they are not by the predestination of grace separated from the mass of perdition, neither those very divine words nor deeds are applied to them by which they might believe if they only heard or saw such things. Moreover, in the same mass of ruin the Jews were left, because they could not believe such great and eminent mighty works as were done in their sight. For the gospel has not been silent about the reason why they could not believe, since it says: "But though He had done such great miracles before them, yet they believed not on Him; that the saying of Esaias the prophet might be fulfilled which he spake, Lord, who hath believed our report, and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed? And, therefore, they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their heart, that they should not see with their eyes nor understand with their heart, and be converted, and I should heal them." (John 12:37-40) Therefore the eyes of the Tyrians and Sidonians were not so blinded nor was their heart so hardened, since they would have believed if they had seen such mighty works as the Jews saw. But it did not do them any good that they were able to believe, because they were not predestinated by Him whose judgments are inscrutable and His ways past finding out. Neither would it have been a hindrance to them that they could not believe, if they had been so predestinated as that God should illuminate those blind eyes and should will to take away the stony heart from those hardened ones. But what the Lord said of the Tyrians and Sidonians may perchance be understood in another Way: yet that no one comes to Christ unless it were given him, and that it is given to those who are chosen in Him before the foundation of the world, he confesses beyond a doubt who hears the divine utterance, not with the deaf ears of the flesh but with the ears of the heart; and yet this predestination, which is plainly enough unfolded even by the words of the gospels, did not prevent the Lord's saying as well in respect of the commencement, what I have a little before mentioned, "Believe in God: believe also in me; ; as in respect of perseverance, "A man ought always to pray, and not to faint." (Luke 18:1) For they hear these things and do them to whom it is given; but they do them not, whether they hear or do not hear, to whom it is not given. Because, "To you," said He, "it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given." (Matt. 13:11) Of these, the one refers to the mercy, the other to the judgment, of Him to whom our soul cries, "I will sing of mercy and judgment unto Thee, O Lord." ... (Ps. 101:1)
CHAPTER 41 He proves that what is alleged against the preaching of predestination may be said against God's grace. For either predestination must be in such wise preached, in the way and degree in which the Holy Scripture plainly declares it, that in the predestinated the gifts and calling of God are without repentance; or it must be avowed that God's grace is given in respect of our merits—which is the opinion of the Pelagians; although that opinion of theirs, as I have often said already, may be read in the doings of the Eastern bishops to have been condemned by the lips of Pelagius himself. Further, from the heretical perversity of the Pelagians, those on whose account I am discoursing, are only removed, inasmuch as, although they will not confess that they who by God's grace become obedient and so abide are predestinated, they still confess, nevertheless, that this grace prevents their will to whom it is given; in such a way certainly as that grace may not be thought to be given freely, as the truth declares, but rather according to the merits of a preceding will, as the Pelagian error says in contradiction to the truth. Therefore, also, grace precedes faith; otherwise, if faith precedes grace, beyond a doubt will also precedes it, because there cannot be faith without will. But if grace precedes faith because it precedes will, certainly it precedes all obedience; it also precedes charity, by which alone God is truly and pleasantly obeyed. And all these things grace works in him to whom it is given, and in whom it precedes all these things. Among these benefits there remains perseverance unto the end, which is daily asked for in vain from the Lord, if the Lord by His grace does not effect it in him whose prayers He hears. See now how foreign it is from the truth to deny that perseverance even to the end of this life is the gift of God; since He Himself puts an end to this life when He wills, and if He puts an end before a fall that is threatening, He makes the man to persevere even unto the end. But more marvellous and more manifest to believers is the liberality of God's goodness, that even to infants, although there is no possibility of giving obedience to that age, this grace is given. To whomsoever, therefore, God gives those gift of His, beyond a doubt He has foreknown that He will bestow them on him, and in His foreknowledge He has prepared them for him. Therefore, those whom he predestinated, them He also called with that calling which I am not reluctant often to make mention of, of which it is said, '""Che gifts and calling of God are without repentance." (Rom. 11:29) For in His foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived and changed, the ordering of His future doings is absolutely, and is nothing but, predestination. But, as he whom God has foreknown as being chaste, although he may regard it as uncertain, so acts as that he may be chaste, although he may regard that as uncertainty, does not, therefore not act in such a manner as to be chaste because he hears that he will be what he will be by the gift of God. Nay, rather, his love rejoices, and he is not puffed up as if he had not received it. Not only, therefore, is he not hindered from this work by the preaching of predestination, but he is even assisted to it. So that although he glories he may glory in the Lord. .. .
CHAPTER 68 Conclusion. Let those who read this, if they under
stand, give God thanks, and let those who do not understand, pray that they may have the inward teacher from whose presence comes knowledge and understanding. But let those who think that I am in error consider again and again carefully what is here said, lest perchance they themselves may be mistaken. And when, by means of those who read my writings, I become not only wiser, but even more perlectsal acknowledge God's favor to me; and this I especially look for at the hands of the teachers of the Church, if what I write comes into their hands, and they condescend to acknowledge it.
Ie CITY OF GOD BOOK XIV & CHAPTER 28 Ac. cordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly; by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience. . . . In the one, the princes and the nations it subdues are ruled by the love of ruling; in the other, the princes and the subjects serve one another in love, the latter obeying, while the former take thought for all. The one delights in its own strength, represented in the persons of its rulers; the other says to its God, "I will love Thee, O Lord my strength." (Ps. 18:1) And therefore the wise men of the one city, living according to man, have sought for profit to their own bodies or souls, or both, and those who have known God "glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened; professing themselves to be wise"—that is, glorying in their own wisdom, and being possessed by pride—'they became fools, and changed the glory of the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things." For they were either leaders or followers of the people in adoring images "and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever." (Rom. 1:21-25) But in the other city there is no human wisdom, but only godliness, which offers due worship to the true God, and looks for its reward in the society of the saints, of holy angels as well as holy men, "that God may be all in all." (I Cor. 15:28)
BOOK XV + CHAPTER 1... I trust we have already done justice to these great and difficult questions regarding the beginning of the world, or of the soul, or of the human race itself. This race we have distributed into two parts, the one consisting of those who live according to man, the other of those who live according to God. And these we also call mystically the two cities, or the two communities of men, of which the one is predestined to reign eternally with God and the other to suffer eternal punishment with the devil. This, however, is their end, and of it we are to speak afterwards. At present .. . it seems suitable to attempt an account of their career, from the time when our two first parents began to propagate the race until all human generation shall cease. For this whole time or world-age, in which the dying give place and those who are born succeed, is the career of these two cities concerning which we treat.
Of these two first parents of the human race, then, Cain was the first-born and belonged to the city of men; after him was born Abel, who belonged to the city of God. For as in the individual the truth of the apostle's statement is discerned, "that is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual," (I Cor. 15:46) whence it comes to pass that each man, being derived from a condemned stock, is first of all born of Adam evil and carnal and becomes good and spiritual only afterwards by regeneration through Christ: so was it in the human race as a whole. When these two cities began to run their course by a series of deaths and births, the citizen of this world was the first-born, and after him the stranger in this world, the citizen of the city of God, predestinated by grace, elected by grace, by grace a stranger below, and by grace a citizen above. By grace—for so far as regards himself he is sprung from the same mass, all of which is condemned in its origin; but God like a potter. of the same lump made one vessel to honor, another to dishonor. But first the vessel to dishonor was made, and after it another to honor. For in each individual, as I have already said, there is first of all that which is reprobate, that from which we must begin, but in which we need not necessarily remain; afterwards is that which is well approved, to which we may by advancing attain, and in which, when we have reached it, we may abide. Not, indeed, that every wicked man shall be good, but that no one will be good who was not first of all wicked; but the sooner any one becomes a good man, the more speedily does he receive this title and abolish the old name in the new. Accordingly, it is recorded of Cain that he built a city, but Abel, being a sojourner, built none. For the city of the saints is above, although here below it begets citizens, in whom it sojourns till the time of its reign arrives, when it shall gather together all in the day of the resurrection; and then shall the promised kingdom be given to them, in which they shall reign with their Prince, the King of the ages, time without end... .
BOOK XIX +k CHAPTER 4 If, then, we be asked what the city of God has to say... regarding the supreme good and evil, it will reply that life eternal is the supreme good, death eternal the supreme evil, and that to obtain the one and escape the other we must live rightly. And thus it is written, "The just lives by faith," for we do not as yet see our good and must therefore live by faith; neither have we in ourselves power to live rightly; we can do so only if He who has given us faith to believe in His help do help us when we believe and pray. As for those who have supposed that the sovereign good and evil are to be found in this life and have placed it either in the soul or the body, or in both, or, to speak more explicitly, either in pleasure or in virtue, or in both; in repose or in virtue, or in both; in pleasure and repose, or in virtue, or in all combined—all these have, with a marvellous shallowness, sought to find their blessedness in this life and in themselves...
For what flood of eloquence can suffice to detail the miseries of this life? Cicero, in the Consolation on the death of his daughter, has spent all his ability in lamentation; but how inadequate was even his ability here? For when, where, how in this life can these primary objects of nature be possessed so that they may not be assailed by unforeseen accident? Is the body of the wise man exempt from any pain which may dispel pleasure, from any disquietude which may banish repose? The amputation or decay of the members of the body puts an end to its integrity, deformity blights its beauty; weakness, its health; lassitude, its vigor; sleepiness or sluggishness, its activity—and which of these is it that may not assail the flesh of the wise man? Comely and fitting attitudes and movements of the body are numbered among the prime natural blessings; but what if some sickness makes the members tremble? what if a man suffers from curvature of the spine to such an extent that his hands reach the ground, and he goes upon all fours like a quadruped? Does not this destroy all beauty and grace in the body, whether at rest or in motion? What shall I say of the fundamental blessings of the soul, sense and intellect, of which the one is given for the perception, and the other for the comprehension of truth? But what kind of sense is it that remains when a man becomes deaf and blind? Where are reason and intellect when disease makes a man delirious? We can scarcely, or not at all, refrain from tears, when we think of or see the actions and words of such frantic persons and consider how different from, and even opposed to, their own sober judgment and ordinary conduct their present demeanor is. And what shall I say of those who suffer from demoniacal possession? Where is their own intelligence hidden and buried while the malignant spirit is using their body and soul according to his own will? And who is quite sure that no such thing can happen to the wise man in this life? ...
In fine, virtue itself . . . though it holds the highest place among human good things, what is its occupation save to wage perpetual war with vices—not those that are outside of us, but within; not other men's, but our own—a war which is waged especially by that virtue which the Greeks call cudpoodvyn, and we temperance, and which bridles carnal lusts, and prevents them from winning the consent of the spirit to wicked deeds? For we must not fancy that there is no vice in us, when, as the apostle says, "The flesh lusteth against the spirit'; (Gal. 5:17) for to this vice there is a contrary virtue, when, as the same writer says, "The spirit lusteth against the flesh." "For these two," he says, "are contrary one to the other, so that you cannot do the things which you would." But what is it we wish to do when we seek to attain the supreme good, unless that the flesh should cease to lust against the spirit, and that there be no vice in us against which the spirit may lust? ... Far be it from us, then, to fancy that while we are still engaged in this intestine war, we have already found the happiness which we seek to reach by victory. And who is there so wise that he has no conflict at all to maintain against his vices?
What shall I say of that virtue which is called prudence? Is not all its vigilance spent in the discernment of good from evil things, so that no mistake may be admitted about what we should desire and what avoid? And thus it is itself a proof that we are in the midst of evils, or that evils are in us; for it teaches us that it is an evil to consent to sin and a good to refuse this consent. And yet this evil, to which prudence teaches and temperance enables us not to consent, is removed from this life neither by prudence nor by temperance. And justice, whose office it is to render to every man his due . . . does not this virtue demonstrate that it is as yet rather laboring towards its end than resting in its finished work? . . . Then that virtue which goes by the name of fortitude is the plainest proof of the ills of life, for it is these ills which it is compelled to bear patiently. And this holds good, no matter though the ripest wisdom coexists with it. And I am at a loss to understand how the Stoic philosophers can presume to say that these are no ills, though at the same time they allow the wise man to commit suicide and pass out of this life if they become so grievous that he cannot or ought not to endure them. But such is the stupid pride of these men who fancy that they can become happy by their own resources, that their wise man, or at least the man whom they fancifully depict as such, is always happy, even though he become blind, deaf, dumb, multilated, racked with pains, or suffer any conceivable calamity such as may compel him to make away with himself; and they are not ashamed to call the life that is beset with these evils happy. O happy life, which seeks the aid of death to end it! If it is happy, let the wise man remain in it; but if these ills drive him out of it, in what sense is it happy? Or how can they say that these are not evils which conquer the virtue of fortitude and force it not only to yield but so to rave that it in one breath calls life happy and recommends it to be given up? For who is so blind as not to see that if it were happy it would not be fled from? And if they say we should flee from it on account of the infirmities that beset it, why then do they not lower their pride and acknowledge that it is miserable? .. .
CHAPTER 5 We give a much more unlimited approval to their idea that the life of the wise man must be social. For how could the city of God . . . either take a beginning or be developed, or attain its proper destiny, if the life of the saints were not a social life? But who can enumerate all the great grievances with which human society abounds in the misery of this mortal state? Who can weigh them? Hear how one of their comic writers makes one of his characters express the common feelings of all men in this matters: "I am married; this is one misery. Children are born to me; they are additional cares." (Terence, Adelphi, V, 4) What shall I say of the miseries of love which Terence also recounts— "slights, suspicions, quarrels, war today, peace tomorrow?" (Eunuchus, I, 1) Is not human life full of such things? On all hands we experience these slights, suspicions, quarrels, war, all of which are undoubted evils; while, on the other hand, peace is a doubtful good, because we do not know the heart of our friend, and though we did know it today, we should be as ignorant of what it might be tomorrow. Who ought to be, or who are more friendly than those who live in the same family? And yet who can rely even upon this friendship, seeing that secret treachery has often broken it up and produced enmity as bitter as the amity was sweet, or seemed sweet by the most perfect dissimulation? ... If, then, home, the natural refuge from the ills of life, is itself not safe, what shall we say of the city, which, as it is larger, is so much the more filled with lawsuits, civil and criminal, and is never free from the fear, if sometimes from the actual outbreak, of disturbing and bloody insurrections and civil wars?
CHAPTER 6 What shall I say of these judgments which men pronounce on men and which are necessary in communities, whatever outward peace they enjoy? Melancholy and lamentable judgments they are, since the judges are men who cannot discern the consciences of those at their bar and are therefore frequently compelled to put innocent witnesses to the torture to ascertain the truth regarding the crimes of other men. What shall I say of torture applied to the accused himself? He is tortured to discover whether he is guilty, so that, though innocent, he suffers most undoubted punishment for crime that is still doubtful, not because it is proved that he committed it, but because it is not ascertained that he did not commit it. Thus the ignorance of the judge frequently involves an innocent person in suffering. And what is still more unendurable . . . is this, that when the judge puts the accused to the question, that he may not unwittingly put an innocent man to death, the result of this lamentable ignorance is that this very person, whom he tortured that he might not condemn him if innocent, is condemned to death both tortured and innocent. ... If such darkness shrouds social life, will a wise judge take his seat on the bench or no? Beyond question he will. For human society, which he thinks it a wickedness to abandon, constrains him and compels him to this duty. And he thinks it no wickedness that innocent witnesses are tortured regarding the crimes of which other men are accused; or that the accused are put to the torture, and though innocent make false confessions regarding themselves and are punished; or that, though they be not condemned to die, they often die during, or in consequence of, the torture ... These numerous and important evils he does not consider sins; for the wise judge does these things, not with any intention of doing harm, but because his ignorance compels him, and because human society claims him as a judge. But though we therefore acquit the judge of malice, we must none the less condemn human life as miserable... .
CHAPTER 7 After the state or city comes the world, the third circle of human society—the first being the house and the second the city. And the world, as it is larger, so it is fuller of dangers, as the greater sea is the more dangerous. And here, in the first place, man is separated from man by the difference of languages. For if two men, each ignorant of the other's language, meet and are not compelled to pass but, on the contrary, to remain in company, dumb animals, though of different species, would more easily hold intercourse than they, human beings though they be. For their common nature is no help to friendliness when they are prevented by diversity of language from conveying their sentiments to one another; so that a man would more readily hold intercourse with his dog than with a foreigner. But the imperial city has endeavored to impose on subject nations not only her yoke but her language, as a bond of peace, so that interpreters, far from being scarce, are numberless., This is true; but how man y great wars, how much slaughter and bloodshed, have provided thi S$ unity!
And though these are past, the end of these miseries has not yet come. For though there have never been wanting, nor are yet wanting, hostile nations beyond the empire, against whom wars have been and are waged, yet, supposing there were no such nations, the very extent of the empire itself has produced wars of a more obnoxious description—social and civil wars—and with these the whole race has been agitated, either by the actual conflict or the fear of a renewed outbreak. If I attempted to give an adequate description of these manifold disasters, these stern and lasting necessities, though I am quite unequal to the task, what limit could I set? But, say they, the wise man will wage just wars. As if he would not at all the rather lament the necessity of just wars, if he remembers that he is a man; for if they were not just he would not wage them and would therefore be delivered from all wars. For it is the wrong-doing of the opposing party which compels the wise man to wage just wars; and this wrong-doing, even though it gave rise to no war, would still be a matter of grief to man because it is man's wrong-doing. Let every one, then, who thinks with pain on all these great evils, so horrible, so ruthless, acknowledge that this is misery. And if any one either endures or thinks of them without mental pain, this is a more miserable plight still, for he thinks himself happy because he has lost human feeling. . . .
CHAPTER 10 But not even the saints and faithful worshippers of the one true and most high God are safe from the manifold temptations and deceits of the demons. For in this abode of weakness and in these wicked days, this state of anxiety has also its use, stimulating us to seek with keener longing for that security where peace is complete and unassailable. There we shall enjoy the gifts of nature, that is to say, all that God the Creator of all natures has bestowed upon ours—gifts not only good but eternal— not only of the spirit, healed now by wisdom, but also of the body renewed by the resurrection. There the virtues shall no longer be struggling against any vice or evil but shall enjoy the reward of victory, the eternal peace which no adversary shall disturb. This is the final blessedness, this the ultimate consummation, the unending end. Here, indeed, we are said to be blessed when we have such peace as can be enjoyed in a good life; but such blessedness is mere misery compared to that final felicity. When we mortals possess such peace as this mortal life can afford, virtue, if we are living rightly, makes a right use of the advantages of this peaceful condition; and when we have it not, virtue makes a good use even of the evils a man suffers. But this is true virtue, when it refers all the advantages it makes a good use of, and all that it does in making good use of good and evil things, and itself also, to that end in which we shall enjoy the best and greatest peace possible.
CHAPTER 11 And thus we may say of peace, as we have said of
eternal life, that it is the end of our good; and the rather because the Psalmist says of the city of God, the subject of this laborious work, "Praise the Lord, O Jerusalem; praise they God, O Zion: for He hath strengthened the bars of thy gates; He hath blessed thy children within thee; who hath made thy borders peace."
(Ps. 147:12-14) For when the bars of her gates shall be strengthened, none shall go in or come out from her; consequently we ought to understand the peace of her borders as that final peace we are wishing to declare. For even the mystical name of the city itself, that is, Jerusalem, means, as I have already said, "Vision of Peace." But as the word peace is employed in connection with things in this world in which certainly life eternal has no place, we have preferred to call the end or supreme good of this city life eternal rather than peace. . . . But, on the other hand, as those who are not familiar with Scripture may suppose that the life of the wicked is eternal life, either because of the immortality of the soul, which some of the philosophers even have recognized, or because of the needless punishment of the wicked, which forms a part of our faith, and which seems impossible unless the wicked live for ever, it may therefore be advisable, in order that every one may readily understand what we mean, to say that the end or supreme good of this city is either peace in eternal life, or eternal life in peace. For peace is a good so great that even in this earthly and mortal life there is no word we hear with such pleasure, nothing we desire with such zest, or find to be more thoroughly gratifying. So that if we dwell for a little longer on this subject, we shall not, in my opinion, be wearisome to our readers, who will attend both for the sake of understanding what is the end of this city of which we speak and for the sake of the sweetness of peace which is dear to all.
CHAPTER 12 Whoever gives even moderate attention to human
affairs and to our common nature, will recognize that if there is . no man who does not wish to be joyful, neither is there any one who does not wish to have peace. For even they who make war desire nothing but victory—desire, that is to say, to attain to peace with glory. For what else is victory than the conquest of those who resist us? and when this is done there is peace. It is, therefore, with the desire for peace that wars are waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in command and battle. And hence it is obvious that peace is the end sought for by war. For every man seeks peace by waging war, but no man seeks war by making peace. For even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in which they are living have no hatred of peace but only wish it changed into a peace that suits them better. They do not, therefore, wish to have no peace but only one more to their mind. And in the case of sedition, when men have separated themselves from the community, they yet do not effect what they wish, unless they maintain some kind of peace with their fellow conspirators. And therefore even robbers take care to maintain peace with their comrades, that they may with greater effect and safety invade the peace of other men. And if an individual happen to be of such unrivalled strength and to be so jealous of partnership that he trusts himself with no comrades, but makes his own plots and commits depredations and murders on his own account, yet he maintains some shadow of peace with such persons as he is unable to kill, and from whom he wishes to conceal his deeds.
In his own home, too, he makes it his aim to be at peace with his wife and children and any other members of his household... .
For he sees that peace cannot be maintained unless all the members of the same domestic circle be subject to one head, such as he himself is in his own house. . . . And thus all men desire to have peace with their own circle whom they wish to govern as suits themselves. For even those whom they make war against they wish to make their own and impose on them the laws of their own peace....
. . the most savage animals encompass their own species with a ring of protecting peace. ... For what tigress does not gently purr over her cubs and lay aside her ferocity to fondle them? What kite, solitary as he is when circling over his prey, does not seek a mate, build a nest, hatch the eggs, bring up the young birds, and maintain with the mother of his family as peaceful a domestic alliance as he can? How much more powerfully do the laws of man's nature move him to hold fellowship and maintain peace with all men so far as in him lies, since even wicked men wage war to maintain the peace of their own circle and wish that, if possible, all men belonged to them, that all men and things might serve but one head, and might, either through love or fear, yield themselves to peace with him! It is thus that pride in its perversity apes God. It abhors equality with other men under Him; but, instead of His rule, it seeks to impose a rule of its own upon its equals. It abhors, that is to say, the just peace of God and loves its own unjust peace; but it cannot help loving peace of one kind or other. For there is no vice so clean contrary to nature that it obliterates even the faintest traces of nature.
He, then, who prefers what is right to what is wrong and what is well-ordered to what is perverted, sees that the peace of unjust men is not worthy to be called peace in comparison with the peace of the just. And yet even what is perverted must of necessity be in harmony with, and in dependence on, and in some part of the order of things, for otherwise it would have no existence at all. Suppose a man hangs with his head downwards, this is certainly a perverted attitude of body and arrangement of its members; for that which nature requires to be above is beneath, and vice versa. This perversity disturbs the peace of the body, and is therefore painful. Nevertheless the spirit is at peace with its body and labors for its preservation and hence the suffering; but if it is banished from the body by its pains, then, as long as the bodily framework holds together, there is in the remains a kind of peace among the members, and hence the body remains suspended. And inasmuch as the earthly body tends towards the earth, and rests on the bond by which it is suspended, it tends thus to its natural peace, and the voice of its own weight demands a place for it to rest; and though now lifeless and without feeling, it does not fall from the peace that is natural to its place in creation, whether it already has it, or is tending towards it. . . .
CHAPTER 13 The peace of the body then consists in the duly proportioned arrangement of its parts. The peace of the irrational soul is the harmonious repose of the appetites; and that of the rational soul, the harmony of knowledge and action. The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and harmonious life and health of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the wellordered obedience of faith to eternal law. Peace between man and man is well-ordered concord. Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family who rule and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in God. The peace of all things is the tranquillity of order. Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place. And hence, though the miserable, in so far as they are such, do certainly not enjoy peace but are severed from the tranquillity of order in which there is no disturbance. Nevertheless, inasmuch as they are deservedly and unjustly miserable, they are by their very misery connected with order. Thy are not, indeed, conjoined with the blessed, but they are disjoined from them by the law of order. And though they are disquieted, their circumstances are notwithstanding adjusted to them, and consequently they have some tranquillity of order and therefore some peace. But they are wretched because, although not wholly miserable, they are not in that place where any mixture of misery is impossible. They would, however, be more wretched if they had not that peace which arises from being in harmony with the natural order of things. When they suffer, their peace is in so far disturbed; but their peace continues in so far as they do not suffer and in so far as their nature continues to exist. As, then, there may be life without pain, while there cannot be pain without some kind of life, so there may be peace without war, but there cannot be war without some kind of peace, because war supposes the existence of some natures to wage it, and these natures cannot exist without peace of one kind or other.
And therefore there is a nature in which evil does not or even cannot exist; but there cannot be a nature in which there is no good. Hence not even the nature of the devil himself is evil, in so far as it is nature, but it was made evil by being perverted. 2%
God, then,... imparted to men some good things adapted to this life, to wit, temporal peace, such as we can enjoy in this life from health and safety and human fellowship, and all things needful for the preservation and recovery of this peace, such as the objects which are accommodated to our outward senses, light, night, the air, and waters suitable for us, and everything the body requires to sustain, shelter, heal, or beautify it: and all under this most equitable condition, that every man who made a good use of these advantages suited to the peace of his mortal condition, should receive ampler and better blessings, namely, the peace of immortality, accompanied by glory and honor in an endless life made fit for the enjoyment of God and of one another in God; but that he who used the present blessings badly should both lose them and should not receive the others.
CHAPTER 14 The whole use, then, of things temporal has a reference to this result of earthly peace in the earthly community, while in the city of God it is connected with eternal peace. And therefore, if we were irrational animals, we should desire nothing beyond the proper arrangement of the parts of the body and the satisfaction of the appetites—nothing, therefore, but bodily comfort and abundance of pleasures, that the peace of the body might contribute to the peace of 'the soul. ... But, as man has a rational soul, he subordinates all this which he has in common with the beasts to the peace of his rational soul, that his intellect may have free play and may regulate his actions, and that he may thus enjoy the well-ordered harmony of knowledge and action which constitutes, as we have said, the peace of the rational soul. . . . But, owing to the liability of the human mind to fall into mistakes, this very pursuit of knowledge may be a snare to him unless he has.a divine Master, whom he may obey without misgiving, and who may at the same time give him such help as to preserve his own freedom. And because, so long as he is in this mortal body, he is a stranger to God, he walks by faith, not by sight; and he therefore refers all peace, bodily or spiritual or both, to that peace which mortal man has with the immortal God, so that he exhibits the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. But as this divine Master inculcates two precepts—the love of God and the love of our neighbor—and as in these precepts a man finds three things he has to love—God, himself, and his neighbor— and that he who loves God loves himself thereby, it follows that he must endeavor to get his neighbor to love God, since he is ordered to love his neighbor as himself. He ought to make this endeavor in behalf of his wife, his children, his household, all within his reach, even as he would wish his neighbor to do the same:for him if he needed it; and consequently he will be at peace, or in well-ordered concord, with all men, as far as in him lies and this is the order of this concord, that a man, in the first place, injure no one, and in the second, do good to every one he can reach. . . . This is the origin of domestic peace, or the well-ordered concord of those in the family who rule and those who obey. But in the family of the just man who lives by faith and is as yet a pilgrim journeying on to the celestial city, even those who rule serve those whom they seem to command; for they rule not from a love of power but from a sense of duty they owe others—not because they are proud of authority, but because they love mercy.
CHAPTER 15 This is prescribed by the order of nature: it is
thus that God created man. For "let them," He says, "have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every creeping thing which creepeth on the earth." (Gen. 1:26) He did not intend that His rational creature, who was made in His image, should have dominion over anything but the irrational creation—not man over man but man over the beasts. And hence the righteous men in primitive times were made shepherds of cattle rather than kings of men, God intending thus to teach us what the relative position of the creatures is and what the desert of sin; for it is with justice, we believe, that the condition of slavery is the result of sin. And this is why we do not find the word "'slave" in any part of Scripture until righteous Noah branded the sin of his son with this name. It is a name, therefore, introduced by sin and not by nature. The origin of the Latin word for slave is supposed to be found in the circumstance that those who by the law of war were liable to be killed were sometimes preserved by their victors, and were hence called servants.
(Servus, a slave, from servare, to preserve.) And these circumstances could never have arisen save through sin. For even when we wage a just war, our adversaries must be sinning; and every victory, even though gained by wicked men, is a result of the first judgment of God, who humbles the vanquished either for the sake of removing or of punishing their sins. . . . The prime cause, then, of slavery is sin, which brings man under the dominion of his fellow—that which does not happen save by the judgment of God, with whom there is no unrighteousness, who knows how to award fit punishments to every variety of offence. But our Master in heaven says, "Every one who doeth sin is the servant of sin." (John 8:34) And thus there are many wicked masters who have religious men as their slaves, and who are yet themselves in bondage; "for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage." (II Pet. 2:19) And beyond question it is a happier thing to be the slave of a man than of a lust; for even this very lust of ruling, to mention no others, lays waste men's hearts with the most ruthless dominion. Moreover, when men are subjected to one another in a peaceful order, the lowly position does as much good to the servant as the proud position does harm to the master. But by nature, as God first created us, no one is the slave either of man or of sin. This servitude is, however, penal, and is appointed by that law which enjoins the preservation of the natural order and forbids its disturbance; for if nothing had been done in violation of that law, there would have been nothing to restrain by penal servitude. And therefore the apostle admonishes slaves to be subject to their masters and to serve them heartily and with good will, so that if they cannot be freed by their masters, they may themselves make their slavery in some sort free, by serving not in crafty fear but in faithful love, until all unrighteousness pass away, and all principality and every human power be brought to nothing, and God be all in all... .
CHAPTER 17... The earthly city, which does not live by faith, seeks an earthly peace, and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered concord of civil obedience and rule, is the combination of men's wills to attain the things which are helpful to this life. The heavenly city, or rather the part of it which sojourns on earth and lives by faith, makes use of this peace only because it must, until this mortal condition which necessitates it shall pass away. Consequently, so long as it lives like a captive and a stranger in the earthly city, though it has already received the promise of redemption and the gift of the Spirit as the earnest of it, it makes no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city, whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered; and thus, as this life is common to both cities, so there is a harmony between them in regard to what belongs to it... . This heavenly city, then, while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained but recognizing that, however various these are, they all tend to one and the same end of earthly peace. It, therefore, is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities that it even preserves and adapts them, so long only as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduced. Even the heavenly city, therefore, while in its state of pilgrimage, avails itself of the peace of earth, and, so far as it can without injuring faith and godliness, desires and maintains a common agreement among men regarding the acquisition of the necessaries of life and makes this earthly peace bear upon the peace of heaven; for this alone can truly be called and esteemed the peace of the reasonable creatures, consisting as it does in the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in God. When we shall have reached that peace, this mortal life shall give place to one that is eternal, and our body shall be no more this animal body which by its corruption weighs down the soul but a spiritual body feeling no want and in all its members subjected to the will. In its pilgrim state the heavenly city possesses this peace by faith; and by this faith it lives righteously when it refers to the attainment of that peace every good action towards
God and man; for the life of the city is a social life. .
CHAPTER 21 This, then, is the place where I should fulfil the promise I gave in the second book of this work and explain, as briefly and clearly as possible, that if we are to accept the definitions laid down by Scipio in Cicero's De Republica, there never was a Roman republic; for he briefly defines a republic as the weal of the people. And if this definition be true, there never was a Roman republic, for the people's weal was never attained among the Romans. For the people, according to his definition, is an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests. And what he means by a common acknowledgment of right he explains at large, showing that a republic cannot be administered without justice. Where, therefore, there is no true justice there can be no right. For that which is done by right is justly done, and what is unjustly done cannot be done by right. For the unjust inventions of men are neither to be considered nor spoken of as rights; for even they themselves say that right is that which flows from the fountain of justice and deny the definition which is commonly given by those who misconceive the matter, that right is that which is useful to the stronger party. Thus, where there is not true justice there can be no assemblage of men associated by common acknowledgment of right, and therefore there can be no people, as defined by Scipio or Cicero; and if no people, then no weal of the people but only of some promiscuous multitude unworthy of the name of people. Consequently, if the republic is the weal of the people, and there is no people if it be not associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and if there is no right where there is no justice, then most certainly it follows that there is no republic where there is no justice... . ... And it is when the soul serves God that it exercises a right control over the body; and in the soul itself the reason must be subject to God, if it is to govern as it ought the passions and other vices. Hence, when a man does not serve God, what justice can we ascribe to him, since in this case his soul cannot exercise a just control over the body, nor his reason over his vices? And if there is no justice in such an individual, certainly there can be none in a community composed of such persons. Here, therefore, there is not that common acknowledgment of right which makes an assemblage of men a people whose affairs we call a republic... .
CHAPTER 23 ... And therefore, where there is not this righteousness whereby the one supreme God rules the obedient city according to His grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him, and whereby, in all the citizens of this obedient city, the soul consequently rules the body and reason the vices in the rightful order, so that, as the individual just man, so also the community and people of the just, live by faith, which works by love, that love whereby man loves God as He ought to be loved and his neighbor as himself—there, I say, there is not an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests. But if there is not this, there is not a people, if our definition be true, and therefore there is no republic; for where there is no people, there can be no republic.
CHAPTER 24 But if we discard this definition of a people, and, assuming another, say that a people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love, then, in order to discover the character of any people, we have only to observe what they love. Yet whatever it loves, if only it is an assemblage of reasonable beings and not of beasts and is bound together by an agreement as to the objects of love, it is reasonably called a people; and it will be a superior people in proportion as it is bound together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it is bound together by lower. According to this definition of ours, the Roman people is a people, and its weal is without doubt a commonwealth or republic. But what its tastes were in its early and subsequent days, and how it declined into sanguinary seditions and then to social and civil wars, and so burst asunder or rotted off the bond of concord in which the health of a people consists, history shows, and in the preceding books I have related at large. And yet I would not on this account say either that it was not a people, or that its administration was not a republic, so long as there remains an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of love. But what I say of this people and of this republic I must be understood to think and say of the Athenians or any Greek state, of the Egyptians, of the early Assyrian Babylon, and of every other nation, great or small, which had a public government. For, in general, the city of the ungodly, which did not obey the command of God that it should offer no sacrifice save to Him alone, and which, therefore, could not give to the soul its proper command over the body, nor to the reason its just authority over the vices, is void of true justice... .
CHAPTER 25 For though the soul may seem to rule the body admirably and the reason the vices, if the soul and reason do not themselves obey God; as God has commanded them to serve Him, they have no proper authority over the body and the vices. For what kind of mistress of the body and the vices can that mind be which is ignorant of the true God and which, instead of being subject to His authority, is prostituted to the corrupting influences of the most vicious demons? It is for this reason that the virtues which it seems to itself to possess, and by which it restrains the body and the vices that it may obtain and keep what it desires, are rather vices than virtues, so long as there is no reference to God in the matter. For although some suppose that virtues which have a reference only to themselves and are desired only on their own account are yet true and genuine virtues, the fact is that even then they are inflated with pride and are therefore to be reckoned vices rather than virtues. For as that which gives life to the flesh is not derived from flesh but is above it, so that which gives blessed life to man is not derived from man but is something above him; and what I say of man is true of every celestial power and virtue whatsoever... .
CHAPTER 27 But the peace which is peculiar to ourselves we enjoy now with God by faith and shall hereafter enjoy eternally with Him by sight. But the peace which we enjoy in this life, whether common to all or peculiar to ourselves, is rather the solace of our misery than the positive enjoyment of felicity. Our very righteousness, too, though true in so far as it has respect to the true good, is yet in this life of such a kind that it consists rather in the remission of sins than in the perfecting of virtues. . . . In this, then, consists the righteousness of a man, that he submit himself to God, his body to his soul, and his vices, even when they rebel, to his reason, which either defeats or at least resists them; and also that he beg from God grace to do his duty and the pardon of his sins, and that he render to God thanks for all the blessings he receives. But, in that final peace to which all our righteousness has reverence, and for the sake of which it is maintained, as our nature shall enjoy a sound immortality and incorruption, and shall have no more vices, and as we shall experience no resistance either from ourselves or from others, it will not be necessary that reason should rule vices which no longer exist, but God shall rule the man, and the soul shall rule the body, with a sweetness and facility suitable to the felicity of a life which is done with bondage. And this condition shall there be eternal, and we shall be assured of its eternity; and thus the peace of this blessedness and the blessedness of this peace shall be the supreme good.
CHAPTER 28 But, on the other hand, they who do not belong to this city of God shall inherit eternal misery, which is also called the second death, because the soul shall then be separated from God its life and therefore cannot be said to live, and the body shall be subjected to eternal pains. And consequently this second death shall be the more severe, because no death shall terminate it. But war being contrary to peace, as misery to happiness and life to death, it is not without reason asked what kind of war can be found in the end of the wicked answering to the peace which is declared to be the end of the righteous? The person who puts this question has only to observe what it is in war that is hurtful and destructive, and he shall see that it is nothing else than the mutual opposition and conflict of things. And can he conceive a more grievous and bitter war than that in which the will is so opposed to passion and passion to the will that their hostility can never be terminated by the victory of either and in which the violence of pain so conflicts with the nature of the body that neither yields to the other? For in this life, when this conflict has arisen, either pain conquers and death expels the feeling of it, or nature conquers and health expels the pain. But in the world to come the pain continues that it may torment, and the nature endures that it may be sensible of it; and neither ceases to exist, lest punishment also should teases...
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WRITINGS OF ST. AUGUSTINE
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The following classification of the works of St. Augustine is taken with many omissions and some modifications from the Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, Vol. 1 of the Bibliothéque Augustinienne, in the Introduction by F. Cayré and F. Van Steenberghen, Desclée de Brouwer, Belgium, 1949, pp. 101-103.
I. First Period (386-396 A. D.)
A. Philosophical Dialogues.
Contra academicos (386); De beata vita (386); De ordine (386) ; Soliloquia (387); De immortalitate animae (387; De grammatica (87); De quantitate animae (387-88); De Musica (389-391) ; De magistro (389) ; De libero arbitrio (388-395) .
B. Anti-Manichean Writings.
De moribus Ecclesiae cath. et de moribus manichaeorum (388) ; De Genesi contra manichaeos (388-390); De duabus animabus (391) ; Disputatio contra Fortunatum (392).
C. Theological and Exegetical Writings.
De vera religione (389-391); De 83 diversis quaestionibus (389— 396); De utilitate credendi (391); De fide et symbolo (393). Letters and Sermons.
II. Second Period (396-411)
A. Last Anti-Manichean Writings.
Contra Epistolam Fundamenti (397); Contra Faustum (397-398) ; De natura boni (399).
B. Writings against the Donatists.
Contra Epistolam Parmeniani (400); De baptismo (400); Contra litteras Petiliani (401; 402; 405); De unitate Ecclesiae (405) .
C. Theological and Exegetical Writings.
Confessiones (398-99) ; De Trinitate (400-416) ; De Genesi ad litteram (400-415) ; De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum (396-
97) ; De doctrina christiana (B97; 426) ; De consensu evangelistarum (400) . Letters, Sermons, and Discourses on the Psalms.
III. Third Period (411-430) .
A. A nti-Pelagian Writings
De peccatorum meritis et remissione (411; 4V2\5 De spiritu et littera (412) ; De fide et operibus (413) ; De natura et gratia (AT5)): De gratia Christi et peccato originali (418); De anima et ejus origine (419-420) ; Contra Julianum, haer. pel. defensorem (421); Contra Julianum opus imperfectum (429-430) .
B. Writings against the Semi-Pelagians.
De gratia et libero arbitrio (426) ; De correptione et gratia (426) ; De praedestinatione sanctorum (428-429) ; De dono perseverantiae
C. Theological and Exegetical Writings.
De Civitate Dei (413-426) ; Tractatus in Joannem (416) ; Enchiridion (421); De doctrina christiana, Bk. IV. (426) ; Retractiones (426-427) . Letters, Sermons, and Discourses on the Psalms.