Section 840
I. The examination begins with the foundation principle of the Supralapsarians
As he calls it, that "God chose his people without considering them as fallen creatures." He does well to begin with their foundation-doctrine; for if he can demolish the foundation, the superstructure must fall; if he can pluck up what he supposes to be the root of many false opinions, the branches which grow from it will die in course. But though this received opinion of theirs, as our author styles it, is a denomination one, or that from which they are called Supralapsarians, yet it is far from being a foundation principle, or a fundamental article of faith with them; nor do they consider this point, in which they differ from others, as the principal one in the doctrine of election: They and the Supralapsarians are agreed in the main points respecting that doctrine; as, that it is an eternal act of God; that it is of certain particular persons; that it is unconditional, irrespective of faith, holiness, and good works, as causes and conditions of it; and that it entirely springs from the good-will and pleasure of God. The Contra-Remonstrants were not all of a mind concerning the object of predestination, but did not think it worth their while to divide upon that account. Nay, some of them were of opinion that it was not necessary to be determined, whether God, in choosing men, considered them as fallen, or as not yet fallen provided it was but allowed that God in choosing considered men in an equal state, so as that he that is chosen was not considered by God either of himself, or by his own merit, or by any gracious estimation, more worthy than he who is not chosen. That famous Supralapsarian, Dr. Twiss, declares that "as for the ordering of God's decrees, upon which only arise the different opinions touching the object of predestination, it is merely apex logicus, a point of logic." The decrees of God may be distinguished into the decree of the end, and the decree of the means, that they may the better be conceived of by our finite understandings; which are not able to consider all things at once, and together, as they lie in the divine mind, but of one thing after another; and that without dividing and separating of God's decrees, or supposing any priority or posteriority in him. Now the decree of the end must be considered before the decree of the means; and that what is first in intention, is last in execution, and so vice versa. Let then eternal life and glory, or a state of everlasting communion with God, be the end of election, as it is with respect to man, then the creation, permission of Adam's fall, and the recovery out of it, are the means in order to that end. It follows, that in the decree of the end, man could not he considered as a fallen creature, but as yet not created; because the creation and the permission of the fall belong to the decree of the means, which is an order of nature after the decree of the end. For if God first decreed to create man, and to permit him to fall, and then decreed to bring him to a state of eternal life and happiness; according to this known rule, that what is first in intention is last in execution, this strange absurdity will follow, that man will be first brought into a state of eternal life and happiness, and then created and permitted to fall. Let the end be the manifestation of God's glory, which certainly is the supreme end of election, then the means are creation, permission of sin, redemption, sanctification, and in a word, complete salvation; which though they are materially many, yet make up but one formal decree, called the decree of the means. Now according to the former rule, the intention of the end must be first, and then the intention of the means; and, consequently, man cannot be considered in the decree of the end, the manifestation of God's glory, as yet created and fallen; because the creation and permission of sin belong to the decree of the means, which in order of nature is after the decree of the end. But if, on the contrary, God first decreed to create man and permit him to fall, and then decreed to manifest the glory of his grace and mercy, in his eternal salvation; according to the above rule, that what is first in intention is last in execution, and so vice versa, it will follow, that the glory of God's grace and mercy are first manifested in the eternal salvation of man, and then he is created and suffered to fall. Likewise it is to be observed, that the several things mentioned in the decree of the means, creation, permission of sin, and salvation, are not to be considered as subordinate, but as co-ordinate means, or as making up an entire, complete medium. We are not to suppose that God decreed to create man that he might permit him to fall, or that he decreed to permit him to fall, that he might save him: but that he decreed to create him, permit him to fall, and to save him notwithstanding his fall, that he might glorify his grace and mercy. Nor are we to conceive of them after this manner, that God first decreed to create man, and then decreed to permit him to fall; for it would follow that man, in the execution of these decrees, is first permitted to fall, and then he is created: Nor thus, that God first decreed to create man, and permit him to fall, and then decreed to save him; for, according to the former rule, man would first be saved, and then created and permitted to fall. These are some of the reasonings of the Supralapsarians; particularly of Dr. Twiss, as may be seen in his Vindiciæ'dipus, and in his Riches of God's love, against Hord. This poor man, that takes upon him to write against the Supralapsarians, would do well to try his skill in unraveling and destroying this kind of reasoning: But alas his capacity will never reach it. I am afraid the very mention of these things will increase his surprise and fright. However, since he has taken upon him to object to this opinion of the Supralapsarians, it will be proper to hear what he has to say. And,
1. He proposes to shew, that this doctrine is destitute of support from the scripture, and tells us, he has often wondered what part of sacred writ can be produced to support it; and that he has been searching and trying to know the language of the divine word concerning election; and shall therefore mention, and in a few words, comment upon those scriptures which, says he, I judge, are only necessary to be considered in this dispute; and these are, 1 Peter 1:2, Ephesians 1:3, 4 and Romans 8:29. If the man is really ignorant, as I am inclined to think he is, and does not know what parts of sacred writ the Supralapsarians have produced to support their doctrine, he has acted a weak part in meddling with the controversy; if he does know, he has acted a worse in concealing of them. He promises to mention and comment on those scriptures, which he judges are only necessary to be considered in this dispute; but he ought to have mentioned the scriptures, which the men he opposes judge necessary to be considered in this dispute; and to have shewn the misapplication of them, and that they are not pertinent to their purpose; is this impartially to try and examine, by the word of God, the Supralapsarian scheme, as his title promises? every one knows, that knows any thing of this controversy, that the scriptural part of it is about the sense of the ninth chapter of the epistle to the Romans; and the question is, whether the Sublapsarian, or the Supralapsarian scheme, concerning the objects of election and reprobation, is most agreeable to the sense of the apostle in that chapter; particularly, whether the Supralapsarian scheme, of God's choosing some, and leaving others, considered as unfallen, as having done neither good nor evil, does not best agree with the account the apostle gives in verses 11-13 of the election of Jacob, and rejection of Esau; and more especially whether it does not best agree with the same apostle's account in verse 21, of the potter's making of the same lump one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? This author should have mentioned these scriptures, and commented upon them, and answered the arguments of the Supralapsarians from them; in particular, those of that eminent Supralapsarian, Theodore Beza, in his notes upon the last of these texts, which I shall transcribe for this man's sake; and he may try whether he is capable of answering of them. "Those who, by the mass, or lump, says this great man, understand mankind corrupted, do not satisfy me in the explanation of this place: for first, it seems to me, that the phrase of informed matter, neither sufficiently agrees with mankind, either made or corrupted. Moreover, if the apostle had considered mankind as corrupted, he would not have said, that some vessels were made to honour, and some to dishonour but rather, that seeing all the vessels would be fit for dishonour, some were left in that dishonour, and others translated from that dishonour to honour. Lastly, if Paul had not rose to the highest degree, he had not satisfied the question objected; for it would always have been queried, whether that corruption came by chance, or whether, indeed, according to the purpose of God, and therefore the same difficulty would recur. I say, therefore, Paul using this most elegant simile, alludes to the creation of Adam, and rises up to the eternal purpose of God, who, before he created mankind, decreed of his own mere will and pleasure, to manifest his glory, both in saving of some whom he knew, in a way of mercy, and in destroying others, whom he also knew, in righteous judgment. And verily, unless we judge this to be the case, God will be greatly injured; because he will not be sufficiently wise, who first creates men, and looks upon them corrupt, and then appoints to what purpose he has created them: nor sufficiently powerful, if when he has taken up a purpose concerning them, he is hindered by another, so that he obtains not what he willed; nor sufficiently constant, if, willingly and freely he takes up a new purpose, after his workmanship is corrupted."
As for the scriptures mentioned by our author, as opposing the Supralapsarian scheme, I shall not trouble the reader, by observing the mangled work he makes with them, and the low and mean comments he makes upon them; I shall only say, that it will he readily owned, that sanctification, obedience, and conformity to the image of God and Christ, are things included in the decree of election: but do these things necessarily suppose, that the persons whom they concern, were in that decree considered as impure, unholy, disobedient, and in a want of conformity to the image of God and Christ? were not the elect angels chosen to sanctification, obedience, and conformity to the image of God? will any one say, that these things supposed them to be, or that in the decree of election, they were considered as impure, unholy, disobedient, and in a want of conformity to the image of God? But, admitting that these things, with respect to men, suppose them in such a case; it should be observed that they belong to the decree of the means, and therefore fall short of proving that God, in the decree of the end, or in decreeing men to eternal life and happiness, for the glorifying of himself, considered them in such a state; since the decree of the end, in order of nature, is before the decree of the means; unless we can suppose the all-wise being to act in such manner as no wise man would, namely, first fix upon the means, and then appoint the end. Now if God first decreed to create man, permit his fail, and then sanctify and conform him to the image of his Son, before he decreed to glorify himself in his salvation, the consequence will be, that God is first glorified in the salvation of man; and after that, man is created, suffered to fall, is sanctified, and conformed to the image of Christ; because what is first in intention, is last in execution. There is one thing more I would observe, and that is, that this author delivers it as the settled opinion of the Supralapsarians, "that we were not elected as holy and obedient beings, but to the end we might be such:" And I am much mistaken if this is not the settled opinion of all Sublapsarians, except such as are in the Arminian scheme. But what is this mentioned for? why, to shew that the Supralapsarians are inconsistent with themselves, and guilty of so flagrant a contradiction, as is not to be reconciled by any. But where does it lie? "why, whereas they affirm, that we were not the Almighty's choice, because we were holy; but that he did choose us to be made holy, and yet in that choice, beheld us free front all defilements and deformity." But this author must be told, if he does not know it, that the Supralapsarians, in considering men not yet created, and so not fallen, as the objects of election, suppose them neither good nor had, righteous or wicked, holy or unholy, but in the pure, that is in the mere mass of creature-ship, not yet made, much less corrupted, and as having done neither good nor evil; now is this such a flagrant contradiction, never to be reconciled, that men considered neither as holy or unholy, as obedient or disobedient, should be chosen to holiness and obedience?
2. This author proceeds to shew, that "the doctrine of the Supralapsarians is repugnant to their own opinion of God's eternal foreknowledge, according to which he was pleased to make his choice." To which I reply; that the Supralapsarians will readily own, that the omniscient Jehovah did, at one view, see, and perfectly behold, whatsoever would come to pass, throughout all ages of time; and that he has an universal prescience of all creatures and things, in their different states and circumstances; but then they will deny that election proceeds upon, or that God has been pleased to make his choice according to this his general and eternal prescience. It is true, that those who are elected, are elected according to the foreknowledge of God the Father; (1 Peter 1:2; Romans 8:29) and whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son. But these passages are not to be understood of the universal prescience and foreknowledge of God; for then all men would be elected and predestinated, for whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate; but all men are neither conformed to the image of Christ, nor predestinated to be so; it remains, that the foreknowledge, according to which election and predestination proceed, is God's special foreknowledge of his own people, and which is no other than his everlasting love to them, which is the source and spring of his choice of them; and the meaning is, that whom he foreknew, that is, in his eternal mind knew, owned, approved of, loved with an everlasting love; he chose them to salvation, and predestinated them to be conformed to the image of his Son.
3. This writer goes on to observe, that "this doctrine of God's choosing his people without considering them as fallen creatures, tends to lessen the infinite grace and mercy of God in their election." I reply; that though it has been a matter of controversy between the Supralapsarians, and others, whether election is an act of mercy, yet not whether it is an act of grace; they, with the scriptures, (Romans 11:5, 6) affirm, that election is of grace, springs from the sovereign grace and good pleasure of God, and is not influenced by, or to be ascribed to the works of men; but then they cannot observe, that it is ever said to be of mercy. Regeneration is ascribed to the mercy of God, 1 Peter 1:3, so is forgiveness of sins, Luke 1:77, yea, our whole salvation, Titus 3:5, but never election, nor that, but salvation is said to he of God, that sheweth, mercy, Romans 9:15. Their reasons, among many others, too many to mention, why it cannot be an act of mercy, are, because the angels are elected, but not of mercy; the human nature of Christ is elected, but not of mercy. They argue, that supposing it should be admitted, that election is an act of mercy, it must either be actus elicitus, an actual will of being merciful, or actus imperatus, the act of shewing mercy itself; not the latter, because that supposes persons not merely foreknown as miserable, but in actual being, and in real misery, and is a transient act upon them; whereas election puts nothing in the persons chosen: if it is an act of mercy, it must be the former, God's actual will of being merciful; but this does not necessarily presuppose misery, or miserable objects, it being internal, and immanent in God, and the same with his mercy itself; and would have been the same, nor would God have been the less merciful, if the world had not been, and there had never been a miserable object on whom to display it. The act of election does not presuppose men sinners and in miserable, nor indeed can it; for should it presuppose sin, it would presuppose the decree of the permission of sin; and the permission of sin would be first in God's intention, than man's salvation of God's mercy, and consequently would he last in execution; than which nothing can be thought of more absurd. Besides though election is not an act of mercy, yet it is far from having any tendency to lessen the mercy of God, and does, even according to the Supralapsarian scheme, abundantly provide for the glorifying of it; since, according to that, the decree of the end is, the glorifying of the grace and mercy of God, tempered with justice; The decree of the means provides for the bringing about of this end, which includes creation, the permission of sin, the mission of Christ, sanctification, and complete salvation; so that the elect of God may well be called vessels of mercy; since through such means, they are brought to eternal life and glory; though, in the decree of the end, they are considered as not yet created and fallen, than which nothing can more tend to advance the free grace and mercy of God.
4. This author urges, that "this way of stating election strikes severely against the justice of God, in passing by the rest of mankind, not included in this decree; for hereby they are rejected as creatures only, and not as sinful creatures." It is very strange, that election should severely strike against the justice of God, when, according to this way of stating it, it is a choice of persons to eternal life and happiness for the glorifying of the grace and mercy of God, mixed with his justice; and so as much provides in end and means, for the honour of divine justice, as for the glory of grace and mercy: and it is stranger still, that election should be a passing by the rest of mankind, not included in this decree: I suppose he means reprobation; for he has an extraordinary hand at putting one thing for another. Now let it be observed, that though the Supralapsarians do not consider reprobation as an act of justice, but of sovereignty, yet not of injustice; nor does their way of stating it at all strike at the justice of God. They suppose, that God, in the act of preterition, considered the objects of it as not yet created and fallen; and determined, when created, to leave them to their own will, and deny them that grace which he is not obliged to give: and where is the justice of all this? But then, though they do not premise sin to the consideration of the act or preterition, yet they always premise it to the decree of damnation; which this author, as is generally done, confounds together. They say, that as God damns no man, but for sin, so he decreed to damn no man but for sin: and surely this cannot be thought to strike severely against the justice of God. It is true, they do not look upon sin to be the cause of the decree of reprobation, quoad actum volentis, which can only be the will of God; but quoad res volitas, the cause of the thing willed, damnation. Besides, this way of stating the decrees of election and reprobation, respecting men, can no more strike at the justice of God, than the way of stating these decrees, respecting angels, does: which can not be done in another way: for the elect angels could never he considered as fallen; and therefore the other angels, who were passed by, and rejected at the same time, must be rejected as creatures only, and not as sinful creatures; unless it can be thought that the angels were not chosen and passed by at the same time, nor then considered in a like state; and that God chose some of them upon their foreseen holiness and obedience, and rejected the rest upon their foreseen rebellion and disobedience: and if so, why may not the election and rejection of men be thought to proceed upon the same foot? which none, that I know of, will come in to, but such that are in the Arminian scheme. This theme our author says he has been at ways cautious of meddling with, lest he should darken counsel for want of knowledge; and it is pity he meddled with it now, since he discovers so much ignorance of it: who can forbear thinking of the common proverb? Thus having considered what he calls the foundation doctrine of the Supralapsarians, he proceeds,