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Monologion Chapter 22 How he exists in every place and time and in no place or time How, then, will these two conclusions, which are presented as so contrary but proved as so necessary, be reconciled? Perhaps the supreme nature exists in place or time in a way that does not prevent him from existing as a whole all at once in individual places or times, but so that there are not several* wholes, but only one whole, and so that his life, which is nothing other than true eternity, is not divided into past, present, and future. For this law of place and time seems to constrain only those things that exist in place or time in such a way that they do not transcend the expanse of space or the duration of time. Of such things, therefore, it is most truthfully asserted that one and the same whole cannot exist as a whole all at once in different places and times; but that conclusion does not apply with any necessity to things that are not of that sort.
For it seems correct to say that a thing has a place only if its quantity is circumscribed by a place that contains it and contained by a place that circumscribes it, and a thing has a time only if its duration is somehow bounded by a time that measures it and measured by a time that bounds it. Therefore, if something is such that its size or duration is not set against any boundary, whether by place or by time, no place or time properly applies to it. For since no place does to it what place does, and no time does to it what time does, we may reasonably say that no place is its place and no time is its time. Now if something is seen to have no place or time, it is certainly shown to be in no way sub ject to any law of place or time. Therefore, no law of place or time in any way constrains a nature that no place or time encloses in any confinement.
Does not every reasonable way of looking at this utterly exclude the possibility that the creating substance, supreme among all things—who is necessarily alien to and free from the nature and law of all the things that he himself made from nothing— is enclosed in the confines of any place or time, since instead his power, which is nothing other than his essence, encloses all the things he made by containing them under himself? And how is it anything but shameless folly to say that any place
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circumscribes the size of the supreme truth, or that any time bounds his duration, since absolutely no greatness or smallness of extension in place or time applies to him?
This, then, is the condition of place and time: whatever is enclosed within their boundaries does not escape being charac terized by parts, whether the sort of parts its place receives with respect to size, or the sort its time suffers with respect to duration; nor can it in any way be contained as a whole all at once by different places or times. By contrast, if something is in no way constrained by confinement in a place or time, no law of places or times forces it into a multiplicity of parts or prevents it from being present as a whole all at once in several places or times. And so, since this is the condition of place and time, the supreme sub stance, who is not enclosed by any confinement of place or time, is undoubtedly not constrained by any of their laws.
Therefore, since an inescapable necessity demands that the supreme essence be present as a whole in every place and time, and since no characteristic of place and time prevents him from being present as a whole in every place and time, he must be present as a whole all at once in each and every place and time. For the fact that he is present in a given place or time does not prevent him from being simultaneously and similarly present in this or that other place or time. Nor does the fact that he existed or exists or will exist mean that something of his eternity has vanished from the present time with the past, which no longer exists; or passes away with the present, which barely exists;29 or is yet to come with the future, which does not yet exist. For that which in no way confines its existence within place or time is not at all compelled or forbidden by the law of places or times to exist or not to exist anywhere or at any time.
For if that supreme essence is said to exist in a place or a time, even though the very same expression is used both of him and of localized or temporal natures because of our customary way of speaking, there is a different meaning because of the dissimilarity of the things themselves. When it comes to localized or temporal natures, this one expression signifies two things: that they are present at the times and places in which they are said to exist, and 29. The present, as Anselm is thinking of it, exists only for a moment, and so it no sooner exists than it passes away.
Monologion that they are contained by those times and places. But in the case of the supreme essence, only one of these meanings applies, namely, that he is present, not that he is contained by them.
Consequently, if our ordinary way of speaking permitted, it would seem more appropriate to say that he exists with a time or place rather than in a time or place. For saying that some thing exists in another thing implies more strongly that it is contained than does saying that it exists with that thing. And so he is properly said to exist in no place or time, since he is in no way contained by any other thing. And yet he can be said in his own way to exist in every place or time, since whatever else exists is sustained by his presence so that it does not fall into nothing ness. He exists in every place and time because he is absent from none; he also exists in none, because he has no place or time. Nor does he receive in himself the distinctions of places or times, such as here or there or somewhere, or now or then or sometime. Nor is it the case that he exists in the fleeting present time that we experience, or that he has existed or will exist in the past or future, since these are proper to circumscribed and changeable things, which he is not. And yet they can in some sense be said of him, since he is present to all circumscribed and changeable things just as if he were circumscribed by the same places and changed by the same times.
And thus it is evident— enough so to dissolve the contradiction that arose earlier—how the supreme essence of all exists every where and always, as well as nowhere and never, that'is, both in every place and time and in no place or time, according to a harmonious truth understood in different ways.
Chapter 23 How he can be better understood as existing every where, rather than as existing in every place
Indeed, since it has been established that the supreme nature does not exist in all places any more than in all existing things, not as if he were contained by them, but because he contains them all by pervading them all, why should he not be said to exist everywhere in the sense that he is understood as existing in all existing things, rather than merely as existing in all places? For the truth of the matter bears out this interpretation, and the proper way of speak-
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ing about place in no way prevents it. For we often quite properly use place-words for things that are not places and are not confined within any boundaries of place. For example, I might say "Under standing is there in the soul, where rationality is." 'There' and 'where' are place-words, and yet the soul does not confine any thing, and understanding and rationality are not confined, within any boundaries of place. Therefore, the truth of the matter is that the supreme nature would be more aptly said to exist everywhere according to this interpretation, so that he is understood as exist ing in all existing things rather than merely as existing in all places. And since, as the arguments laid out above show, this cannot be otherwise, he necessarily exists in all existing things in such a way that he exists completely as one and the same whole all at once in each of them individually.
Chapter 24 How he can be better understood as existing always, rather than as existing at every time It has also been established that this supreme substance exists without beginning and without end,30 and that he has no past or future, or even a temporal—that is, a fleeting-present such as we experience,31 since his life or eternity, which is nothing other than himself, is unchangeable and without parts. So when 'always', which seems to designate all of time, is said of him, is it not much more truly understood to signify eternity, which is never unlike itself, rather than the variation of times, which is always in some respect unlike itself?
Now for him, to exist is the same as to live. Therefore, if he is said to exist 'always', this is best understood as meaning that he exists or lives eternally; in other words, that he enjoys illimitable life as a whole, perfectly, and all at once.32 For his eternity appears to be an illimitable life existing as a whole all at once and perfectly.
30. Anselm argues for this claim in chapter 18.
31. Anselm argues for this claim in chapters 21 and 22.
32. Anselm is here echoing the famous definition of eternity found in Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, Book 5, prose 6: "Eternity is the whole and perfect possession of illimitable life all at once."
Monologion For, since it became perfectly clear earlier33 that this same sub stance is nothing other than his own life and his own eternity, and that he is in no way limitable, nor exists otherwise than as a whole all at once and perfectly, what else is true eternity, which belongs to him alone, but an illimitable life existing as a whole all at once and perfectly? For by this alone is it evidently seen that true eternity exists in that substance alone, who alone has been found to be not made, but the Maker. For true eternity is understood as lacking the boundaries of a beginning and an end. But this is not true of any created thing, as is shown by the very fact that they were made from nothing.
Chapter 25 That he cannot be changed by any accidents* But that essence, who has been shown34 to be in every respect the same as himself substantially: is he not sometimes different from himself, at least accidentally? But then how is he supremely un changeable if he can-I will not say, be changeable, but at least be understood as changeable through accidents? And on the other hand, how is he not subject to accidents, when the very fact that he is greater than all other natures, and that he is unlike them, seems to be accidental to him?
But why would susceptibility to certain of those things that are called accidents be inconsistent with natural immutability, if tak ing on those accidents causes no change in the substance? And in fact, among all the things that are called accidents, it is understood that some — all colors, for example — cannot be present or absent without some variation in the thing that participates in them. But there are others—some relations, for example —that are known to bring about no change at all in the thing of which they are said by beginning or ceasing to be present in it. For example, it is evident that I am not taller than, shorter than, equal to, or similar to a human being who will be born after this year. But once he has been born, I will be able — without any change on my part—to have and to lose all these relations with respect to him as he grows or is changed by various qualities. And so it becomes clear that among 33. In chapter 17.
34. In chapter 17.
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the things that are called accidents, some do imply a degree of mutability, whereas others in no way destroy immutability.
Therefore, just as the supreme nature never yields a place in his simplicity for accidents that bring about change, in the same way he does not reject being sometimes described in accordance with those accidents that in no way oppose his supreme immutability.
And yet his essence is not subject to any accident by which it can be understood to be changeable. From this it can also be con cluded that he is not susceptible of any accident. For surely, those accidents that cause a change in something by beginning or ceas ing to be present in it are judged, in virtue of that very effect, to be truly accidents of the thing they change; and by the same token, those that lack a similar effect are perceived to be improperly called accidents. Therefore, just as he is always in every respect the same as himself substantially, so he is never in any respect different from himself, even accidentally. But however things stand with the proper use of the word 'accident', it is undoubtedly true that nothing can be said of the supremely unchangeable nature from which he could be understood to be changeable.
Chapter 26 In what sense he is to be called a substance, and that he is beyond every substance, and uniquely is whatever he is But if what I have observed about the simplicity of this nature is certain, in what sense is he a substance? For although every substance is capable of taking on an admixture of differences or a change from accidents, his unchangeable purity is altogether inac cessible to admixture or change. Therefore, how will it be the case that he is a substance at all, unless 'substance' is used to mean
'essence',35 and he is just as much beyond as he is above every substance? For however great the difference is between the being who is through himself whatever he is and makes every other being from nothing, and a being that through another is made
35. Anselm's point here is that we cannot call God a substance in the sense in which a substance is distinguished from its accidents. But we can use the word 'substance' as interchangeable with 'essence', in which case God is indeed a substance (that is, an essence or being) that is beyond and above all other substances.
Monologion from nothing to be whatever it is, the difference is every bit as great between the supreme substance and those that are not the same thing that he is. And since he alone among all natures has from himself whatever existence he has, without the help of any other nature, is he not uniquely whatever he is, having nothing in common with his creatures? Accordingly, if any word is ever applied to him in common with others, it must undoubtedly be understood to have a very different meaning.
Chapter 27 That he is not included in a common classification of substances, and yet he is a substance and an individual spirit
And so it is established that this substance is not included in any common classification of substances, since every other nature is excluded from having an essence in common with him. Indeed, every substance is classified as either universal or individual. A universal substance is essentially common to several* substances, as being-a-man is common to individual men; an individual sub stance has a universal essence in common with others, as individ ual men have in common with other individual men the fact that they are men. So how would someone understand the supreme nature as being included in this classification of other substances, since he is neither divided into several substances nor conjoined with any other through a common essence? Nevertheless, since he not only most assuredly exists but also exists in the highest way of all things, and the essence of any given thing is generally called a substance, surely, if he can worthily be called anything at all, there is nothing to prevent us from calling him a substance.
Now since we know of no worthier essence than spirit or body, * and of these, spirit is worthier than body, we must of course declare that he is a spirit and not a body. But since that spirit can have no parts, and there cannot be more than one spirit like him, he is necessarily an altogether individual spirit. For since (as was established earlier) he is not composed of parts,36 and he cannot be understood as capable of being changed by any differences or 36. Anselm argues for this claim in chapter 17.
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accidents,37 it is impossible for him to be divisible by any sort of division.
Chapter 28 That this spirit exists in an unqualified* sense, and creatures do not exist at all compared to him
It seems, therefore, to follow from our earlier conclusions that this spirit, who thus exists in his own wonderfully unique and uniquely wonderful way, is in a certain sense the only thing that exists, whereas all the other things that appear to exist do not exist at all compared to him. For if we look at this carefully, he alone will be seen to exist in an unqualified sense and perfectly and abso lutely, whereas all other things nearly do not exist at all, and barely do exist. For because of his unchangeable eternity, it can in no way be said of that spirit because of any alteration that he existed or will exist; instead, he exists in an unqualified sense. Nor does he exist changeably, so that he is now something that at some time he was not or will not be. Nor does he fail to be now what at some other time he was or will be. Rather, whatever he is, he is once and for all, all at once, and inimitably. And since his exis tence is like this, he is rightly said to exist in an unqualified sense and absolutely and perfectly.
By contrast, all other things exist changeably in some respect, so that at some time they were or will be something that they are not now, or they are now something that at some time they were not or will not be. What they once were no longer exists, and what they will be does not yet exist, and what they are in the fleeting, utterly brief, and barely-existing present barely exists. Therefore, since they exist so changeably, it is not unreasonable to deny that they exist in an unqualified sense and perfectly and absolutely, and to assert that they nearly do not exist, and barely do exist.
Further, all things whatsoever that are different from him came from non-being to being, not through themselves but through another; and as far as their own power goes, they return to nonbeing unless they are sustained through another. How, then, can it be characteristic of them to exist in an unqualified sense or perfectly or absolutely, rather than barely to exist, or nearly not to 37. Anselm argues for this claim in chapter 25.
Monologion exist? And only that ineffable spirit can in no way be understood to have begun from non-being, or to be capable of undergoing any degeneration from what he is into non-being; and whatever he is, he is not through anything other than himself, i.e., through what he himself is. So is not his existence rightly understood to be the only unqualified, perfect, and absolute existence?
Now surely that which is thus in an unqualified sense and in every respect the only perfect, unqualified, and absolute existence can in a certain sense rightly be said to be the only thing that exists. And on the other hand, whatever is known through the above argument as not existing in an unqualified sense or per fectly or absolutely, but instead as barely existing or nearly not existing, is indeed in a certain sense rightly said not to exist. So according to this argument, only that Creator Spirit exists, and all created things do not exist. And yet it is not the case that they utterly do not exist, since they have been made from nothing by him who alone exists absolutely.
Chapter 29 That his utterance38 is the very same thing as himself; and yet they are not two spirits, but one
Now, having examined those things regarding the properties of the supreme nature that have occurred to me up to this point as I follow the guidance of reason, I think it is appropriate, if I can do so, to examine his utterance, by which all things were made.39
And although everything I was able to ascertain about it above has the unbending rigor of reason, the fact that it is proved to be the very same thing as the supreme spirit himself especially compels me to discuss that utterance more carefully. For if the supreme spirit made nothing except through himself, and whatever was
38. His "utterance" is discussed in chapters 10-12.
39. Anselm's discussion in chapters 29-63 is meant to provide a philosoph ical explication of certain elements of the Christian understanding of God as a Trinity. Since some of Anselm's points, as well as much of the language that he uses, will not be fully clear unless the reader already has some knowledge of Trinitarian doctrine, I have provided the necessary explana tions in notes as well as in the Glossary. See the entries for consubstantial* and Word.*
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made by him was made through his utterance, how can that utterance be anything other than what he himself is?
Moreover, the things we have already discovered declare irre futably that nothing at all ever could or can subsist* other than the creating spirit and what he creates.40 Now it is impossible for the utterance of that spirit to be included among created things, since every subsistent created thing was made through it, and it could not have been made through itself. Indeed, nothing can be made through itself, since whatever is made is posterior* to that through which it was made, and nothing is posterior to itself. And so, since the utterance of the supreme spirit cannot be a creature, the only remaining possibility is that it is nothing other than the supreme spirit.
Finally, this utterance cannot be understood as anything other than the understanding of that spirit, by which he understands all things. For what is it for him to utter something, in this sense of "uttering," other than to understand it? For unlike a human being, he never fails to utter what he understands. Therefore, if that supremely simple* nature is nothing other than what his understanding is, just as he is the same as what his wisdom is, then it must be that in the same way he is nothing other than what his utterance is. But since it is already evident that the supreme spirit is only one, and in every way individual,41 his utterance must be consubstantial* with him, so that they are not two spirits, but one.
Chapter 30 That this utterance does not consist of several words, but rather is one Word* Why, then, should I hesitate over the question I left open earlier, namely, whether this utterance consists in several* words or in one?42 For if this utterance is consubstantial with the supreme nature in such a way that they are not two, but one spirit, then of course that utterance is supremely simple,* just as the supreme
40. Anselm argues for this claim in chapter 7.
41. Anselm argues for this claim in chapter 27.
42. Anselm raised this question in passing in chapter 12.