Chapter 63
Chapter 61
Chapter 63 How in him there is only one of one59 Now certainly the Father, the Son, and their Spirit—about whom it is already most certain that they truly exist—are not three who utter, even though each of them individually utters. Nor is there more than one thing uttered when each utters himself and the other two. For just as knowledge and understanding are present in the supreme wisdom, even so it is natural for that eternal and immutable knowledge and understanding always to behold as present that which it knows and understands. Now for the su preme spirit there is no difference between uttering something in this sense and beholding it in thought, as it were, just as the utterance of our mind is no different from the thinker's observa tion. Now the arguments we have already considered have made one thing quite certain: whatever is essentially present in the supreme nature belongs completely to the Father, the Son, and their Spirit individually; and yet if the same thing is said of the three of them together, it does not admit of plurality.60
Now it is established that just as knowledge and understanding belong to his essence, even so his knowing and understanding are nothing other than his uttering—that is, his always beholding as present-that which he knows and understands. Furthermore, the Father individually and the Son individually and their Spirit individually know and understand, and yet the three of them together are not several* who know and understand, but one who knows and one who understands. In the same way, there fore, it must be the case that each of them individually utters, and yet the three of them together are not three who utter, but one who utters.
From this we can also clearly recognize that when the three of them are uttered, whether by themselves or by one another, it
59. That is, despite how things looked in the previous chapter, it is not the case that in God there are many sons born from many divine persons.
Rather, in God there is only one Son born from one divine person (namely, the Father).
60. In other words, for any perfection you choose (call it p), if p belongs to God essentially, then the Father is fully p, the Son is fully p, and the Holy
Spirit is fully p. And yet you cannot say that there are three things that are p; there is only one. See the argument in chapter 38.
Monologion is not the case that more than one thing is uttered. After all, what is uttered there except their essence? So if that essence is only one, that which is uttered is only one. Therefore, if in them that which utters is one, and that which is uttered is one
(for in them there is one wisdom that utters and one substance that is uttered), it follows that there are not several words there, but only one. So although each of them utters himself and all of them utter one another, it is impossible for there to be any
Word in the supreme essence other than the one concerning whom it has been established61 that he is born from him whose
Word he is in such a way that he can be called his true image and is truly his Son.
I see in this something wonderful and inexplicable. For behold!
Although it is evident that each of them-that is, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son-equally utters himself and the other two, and that there is only one Word there, nevertheless, it appears that the Word can in no way be called the Word of all three, but of only one of them. For it has been established that he is the image and Son of him whose Word he is, and obviously he cannot sensibly be called the image or Son of himself or of the Spirit who proceeds from him. For he is not born from himself or from the one who proceeds from him; nor does he by existing imitate himself or the one who proceeds from him. He certainly does not imitate himself, or bear to himself a likeness of existing, since imitation or likeness does not exist in just one thing; it requires more than one. And he does not imitate the Spirit or exist after his likeness, since he does not have his exis tence from the Spirit; rather, the Spirit has his existence from him.
So the only remaining possibility is that he is the Word only of him from whom he is born and thereby has his existence, and after whose perfect likeness he exists.
Therefore, one Father, not several fathers; one Son, not several sons; and one proceeding Spirit, not several proceeding spirits, exist in the supreme essence. So although they are three in such a way that the Father is never the Son or the proceeding Spirit, the Son is never the Father or the proceeding Spirit, and the Spirit of the Father and the Son is never the Father or the Son; and al though each individually is so complete that he needs no one,
61. In chapters 33 and 42.
Chapter 63 nonetheless, that which they are is so much one that, just as it cannot be said in the plural of each of them individually, so also it cannot be said in the plural of the three of them together. And although each equally utters himself, and all of them equally utter one another, nonetheless there are not several words there, but only one; and that Word is not the Word of each individually or of all of them together, but of only one.
Chapter 64 That although this cannot be explained, it must nevertheless be believed The mystery of so sublime a thing seems to me to transcend every power of human understanding, and for that reason I think one should refrain from attempting to explain how this is true.
After all, I think someone investigating an incomprehensible thing ought to be satisfied if his reasoning arrives at the knowl edge that the thing most certainly exists, even if his understand ing cannot fathom how it is so. Nor should we withhold any of the certainty of faith from beliefs that are asserted on the basis of necessary proofs and are contradicted by no other argument, simply because, owing to the incomprehensibility of their natural sublimity, they do not yield to explanation. Now what is as in comprehensible, as ineffable, as the one who is above all things?
Therefore, if the conclusions we have reached thus far concerning the supreme essence have been asserted on the basis of necessary reasons, their solid certainty is in no way shaken even though the understanding cannot fathom them so as to be able to explain them in words. For if our earlier reflection62 rationally com prehends that it is incomprehensible how that supreme wis dom knows the things he made, about which we ourselves must know so many things, who will explain how he knows or utters himself, about whom nothing, or scarcely anything, can be known by a human being? Therefore, if in uttering himself the Father generates and the Son is generated, "Who will tell of his generation?"63
62. In chapter 36.
63. Isaiah 53:8.
Monologion Chapter 65 How a true conclusion has been reached regarding an ineffable thing But once again, if the nature of his ineffability is like this— or rather, since it is indeed like this—how will any of our con clusions concerning the relation of the Father, the Son, and him who proceeds from them, remain intact? For if that has been explained by a sound argument, in what way is he ineffable? Or, if he is ineffable, how can our conclusions be correct? Is it that he could to some extent be explained, and therefore nothing pre vents our conclusions from being true, but since he could not be thoroughly understood, he is therefore ineffable? But how could one reply to the point that was made earlier in this very discus sion:64 that the supreme essence is so much above and beyond every other nature that even if sometimes words are applied to him that are common to other natures, their meanings are in no way common? For what meaning did I understand in all the words
I thought, if not the common and familiar one? So if the familiar meaning of words is foreign to him, none of my reasoning applies to him. How then is it true that something has been discovered about the supreme essence if what has been discovered is vastly different from him?
What then? Is it that in one way something has been discovered about an incomprehensible thing, and in another way nothing about it has been fully seen? After all, we often say many things that we do not properly express as they really are; rather, we signify through some other thing what we are either unwilling or unable to express properly, as when we speak in riddles. And we often do not see something properly as the thing itself actually is, but through some likeness or image, as when we look at some one's face in a mirror. In this way we do indeed both say and not say, or both see and not see, one and the same thing. We say and see through some other thing; we do not say or see through its own distinctive character.65
64. In chapter 26.
65. "Distinctive character" represents the Latin 'proprietas'. The proprietas of a thing is whatever it is in itself, by its very nature. Anselm is arguing that we do not know God by knowing his very nature. We do not have direct
Chapter 65
And so by this argument it is perfectly possible for our conclu sions thus far about the supreme nature to be true and yet for that nature himself nevertheless to remain ineffable, if we suppose that he was in no way expressed through the distinctive character of his essence, but somehow designated through some other thing. For all the words that seem applicable to that nature do not show him to me through his distinctive character so much as they hint at him through some likeness. For when I think of the meanings of these words I more readily conceive in my mind what
I observe in created things than what I understand to transcend all human understanding. For by their meaning they produce some thing in my mind that is much less than—that is in fact vastly different from-that which my mind is trying to come to under stand through their tenuous signification. For the word 'wisdom' does not suffice to show me the one through whom all things were made from nothing and are preserved from nothingness. Nor can the word 'essence' express to me the one who through his unique exaltedness is far above all things and through his natural distinc tive character is vastly beyond all things. So this is how it is the case both that his nature is ineffable, because words can in no way express him as he is, and that if reason can teach us to form any judgment about him through some other thing, as in a riddle, that judgment is not false.
Chapter 66 That through the rational mind one comes closest to knowing the supreme essence
Therefore, since it is evident that nothing about this nature can be perceived through his own distinctive character, but only through something else, it is certain that one comes closer to knowing him through that which is nearer to him because it is more like him.
For whatever among created things is shown to be more like him must be more excellent by nature. Hence, because of its greater likeness such a thing gives more help to the investigating mind in coming closer to the supreme truth, and because of its more excellent created essence it more fully teaches what that mind intellectual access to what he is in himself. Instead, whatever we know about God must be inferred indirectly through some likeness.
Monologion ought to believe about the Creator. And so there is no doubt that the creating essence is known in a more profound way the more he is investigated through a creature that is closer to him. For the argument already considered above66 leaves no room for doubt that every essence is like the supreme essence to the extent that it exists.
And so it is evident that just as the rational mind is the only thing among all creatures that can rise up to seek him, it is no less true that the rational mind is the only thing through which the mind itself can best make progress in finding him. For we have already realized that it comes especially close to him through the likeness of its natural essence. So what is more obvious than this: that the more diligently the rational mind tries to come to know itself, the more efficaciously it rises up to know him; and the more it neglects to look upon itself, the more it falls away from seeing him?
Chapter 67 That the mind itself is a mirror and image of him The mind can therefore most fittingly be said to be like a mirror for itself, in which it might see (if I may put it that way) the image of him whom it cannot see face to face.67 For if the mind alone among all created things can remember and understand and love itself, I do not see why one would deny that there is in it a true image of that essence who in virtue of remembering, understanding, and loving himself constitutes an ineffable Trinity. Or certainly it proves itself to be more truly his image by the fact that it can re member, understand, and love him. For that by which it is greater and more like him is that by which it is recognized as a truer image of him. Now it is altogether impossible to think that the ra tional creature was naturally given anything so preeminent and so much like the supreme wisdom as its ability to remember and understand and love that which is best and greatest of all things.
Therefore, no creature was endowed with anything else that thus displays an image of the Creator.
66. In chapter 31.
67. Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:12: "For now we see in a mirror, in a riddle, but then face to face."