Chapter 7
Monologion subsisting.* Therefore, 'supreme essence' and 'supremely to be' and 'supremely being', i.e., supremely existing or supremely subsisting, are related to each other not unlike 'light' and 'to shine' and 'shining'.4
Chapter 7 In what way all other things exist through him and from him It now remains for us to discuss the sense in which all those things that exist through another exist through the supreme substance: whether because he made them all, or because he was the matter of them all. For there is no need to ask whether they all exist through him merely because he in some way helped all things to exist, whereas some other thing made them or some other matter existed, since it is inconsistent with what became evident above if all existing things exist through him only in some secondary way and not principally.
And so I think I should first ask whether all things that exist through another exist from some matter. Now I have no doubt that the whole mass of this world with its parts, as we see it formed, consists of earth, air, fire, and water. These four elements can in some way be understood apart from the forms that we observe in formed things, in such a way that the unformed or even confused nature of the elements is seen to be the matter of all the bodies* that are made distinct by their own forms.5 As I say, I have no doubt about that. But I ask where this thing of which I have spoken, the matter of the mass of the world, comes from. For if it in turn comes from some other matter, then that is more truly the matter of the physical universe.
4. The Latin words for 'light', 'to shine', and 'shining' ('lux', 'lucere', and 'lucens') are a noun, an infinitive, and a participle from the same stem. The same relation holds among the Latin words for 'essence', 'to be', and 'being' ('essentia', 'esse', and 'ens').
5. In other words, what makes one body different from another is the particular form or configuration that the elements have in that body. But you can conceive of the elements by themselves, in isolation from this or that particular configuration. When you do, you realize that the elements in this unformed state are the building blocks of all bodies.
Chapter 6
If, then, the totality of things, whether visible or invisible, exists from some matter, it cannot exist—more than that, it cannot even be said to exist—from any matter other than the supreme nature, or from itself, or from some third essence that is neither. But of course nothing can even be thought to exist other than he who is supreme among all things, who exists through himself, and the totality of those things that do not exist through themselves but through that same supreme being. Therefore, that which is in no way something is not the matter of anything. But the totality of things, which does not exist through itself, cannot exist from its own nature. For if it did, it would in some way exist through itself, and through something other than the one through whom all things exist, and he would not be the only thing through which all things exist— all of which is false. Moreover, everything that exists from matter exists from another thing and is posterior* to that thing. And since nothing is other than itself or posterior to itself, it follows that nothing exists from itself materially.
But if something less than the supreme nature can exist from the matter of the supreme nature, the supreme good can be changed and corrupted—which it is impious to say. Therefore, since every thing that is other than the supreme good is less than he is, it is impossible for anything else to be from him in this way. Further more, anything through which the supreme good is changed or corrupted is, without a doubt, in no way good. Now if any lesser nature exists from the matter of the supreme good, the supreme good is changed or corrupted through himself, since nothing exists from any source other than the supreme essence. There fore, the supreme essence, who is himself the supreme good, is in no way good-which is a contradiction. So no lesser nature exists materially from the supreme nature. Since, therefore, it has been established that the essence of those things that exist through another does not exist from the supreme essence as its matter, nor from itself, nor from some other thing, it is evident that it exists from no matter.
Therefore, since all existing things exist through the supreme essence, and nothing can exist through him unless he either makes it or is the matter for it, it follows necessarily that nothing but him exists unless he makes it. And since nothing exists or has existed except him and the things made by him, he could not make anything at all through any instrument or assistance other
Monologion than himself. Now whatever he made, he certainly made it either from something as its matter or from nothing. Therefore, since it is perfectly obvious that the essence of all things that exist, other than the supreme essence, was made by that same supreme essence, and that it does not exist from any matter, there is undoubtedly nothing more evident than this: the supreme essence alone, through himself, produced so great a mass of things—so numerous a multitude, so beautifully formed, so orderly in its variety, so fitting in its diversity — from nothing.
Chapter 8 In what sense it is to be understood that he made everything from nothing But something occurs to me about this 'nothing'. Whatever a thing is made from is a cause of the thing that is made from it, and, necessarily, every cause contributes some help towards the exis tence of the effect. This fact is so obvious to everyone from experi ence that no one can be talked out of it in debate, and hardly anyone can be tricked out of it through deception. Therefore, if something was made from nothing, then nothing itself was a cause of the thing that was made from nothing. But how could that which had no existence help bring something into existence?
And if, on the contrary, nothing did not help bring anything into existence, who could be persuaded — and in what way—that some thing is brought about from nothing?
Furthermore, 'nothing' either signifies something or does not signify anything. Now if nothing is something, whatever was made from nothing was made from something. On the other hand, if nothing is not anything, then, since it is inconceivable that something is made from what does not exist at all, nothing is made from nothing-as the saying goes, "Nothing comes from nothing." From this it seems to follow that whatever exists was made from something, since it was made either from something or from nothing. Therefore, whether nothing is something or is not something, it seems to follow that whatever was made was made from something. But if this is admitted to be true, it contradicts everything that was settled above. Hence, since what was nothing will be something, what was in the greatest degree something will be nothing. After all, having found that there is a substance
Chapter 7 existing most greatly of all things, I proceeded by argument to the claim that all things were made by him in such a way that there was nothing from which they were made. Therefore, if that from which they are made—which I had thought was nothingis in fact something, then whatever I thought I had discovered about the supreme being is nothing.
So then how is this 'nothing' to be understood? For I have already undertaken not to neglect any possible objection, foolish though it may be, in this meditation. And so it seems to me that if a substance is said to have been made from nothing, there are three ways of explaining this that would suffice to remove this present obstacle. One way is that we mean that what is said to have been made from nothing has not in fact been made at all.
It is like a case in which someone asks what a silent person is talking about. "About nothing," is the answer—that is, he is not talking at all. In this sense, if someone were to ask about the supreme essence himself, or about something that did not and does not exist at all, "What was it made from?" one could correctly answer, "From nothing"—that is, it was not made at all.
This sense cannot be properly applied to anything that actually has been made.
There is another meaning that can indeed be expressed but cannot be true: if something is said to have been made from nothing in the sense that it was made from nothing itself, that is, from what does not at all exist—as if nothing itself were some existing thing from which something could be made. Now since this is always false, some absurd impossibility will follow when ever it is assumed.
The third sense in which something is said to have been made from nothing is when we understand that it has indeed been made, but there was not anything from which it was made. It seems we use a similar meaning when we say that someone who is upset for no reason is upset about nothing. So if we understand our earlier conclusion in this sense, that all existing things other than the supreme essence were made by him from nothing—i.e., not from anything-then just as this conclusion follows logically from our previous conclusions, so nothing illogical will follow from it later on.
Nonetheless, it would also be logical and free from any ab surdity to say that the things that were made by the creating
Monologion substance were made from nothing in the sense in which we often say that someone has come from poverty to wealth or from sick ness to health-that is, he who once was poor is now rich, which he was not before, and he who once was sick is now healthy, which he was not before. So if it is said that the creating es sence made all things from nothing, or that all things were made by him from nothing, these statements can quite sensibly be understood in this sense-that is, the things that once were nothing are now something. And the expression "he made them" or "they were made" is understood to mean that when he made them, he made something, and that when they were made, they were indeed made to be something. For in the same way, when we see someone whom some man has raised from a very lowly state to great riches or honors, we say, "Look! That man made him from nothing" or "He was made from nothing by that man" —that is, he who once was regarded as nothing is now thought to be truly something, because that man has made him so.
Chapter 9 That with respect to the reason of their maker, the things that were made from nothing were not nothing before they were made But I seem to see something that forces me to distinguish carefully the sense in which the things that were made can be said to have been nothing before they were made. After all, there is no way anyone could make something rationally unless something like a pattern (or, to put it more suitably, a form or likeness or rule) of the thing to be made already existed in the reason of the maker.
And so it is clear that what they were going to be, and what sorts of things, and how they were going to be, was in the reason of the supreme nature before all things were made.
Therefore, it is clear that the things that were made were noth ing before they were made, in the sense that they were not what they now are and there was not anything from which they were made. Nonetheless, they were not nothing with respect to the reason of their maker, through which and in accordance with which they were made.
Chapter 8
Chapter 10 That this reason is an utterance of things, as a craftsman says within himself what he is going to make Now what is that form of things that existed in his reason before the things to be created, other than an utterance of those things in his reason, just as, when a craftsman is going to make some work of his art, he first says it within himself by a conception of his mind? Now by an "utterance" of the mind or reason, I do not mean what happens when one thinks of the words that signify those things, but what happens when the things themselves (no matter whether they are yet to exist or already exist) are examined within the mind by the gaze of thought.
For we know from frequent experience that we can say one and the same thing in three ways. For we say a thing either by making perceptible use of perceptible signs, i.e., signs that can be per ceived by the bodily senses; or by thinking imperceptibly within ourselves the very same signs that are perceptible when they are outside ourselves; or by not using these signs at all, whether perceptibly or imperceptibly, but rather by saying the things themselves inwardly in our mind by either a corporeal image or an understanding of reason that corresponds to the diversity of the things themselves. For example, in one way I say a man when I signify him by the word 'man', in another way when I think that same word silently, and in yet another way when my mind sees the man himself either through an image of a body (as when it imagines his sensible appearance) or through reason (as when it thinks his universal essence, which is rational, mortal animal).
Each of these three kinds of utterance corresponds to its own kind of word. But the words of the kind of utterance that I put third and last, when they are about things that are not unknown, are natural; they are the same among all peoples. Now all other words were invented on account of these natural words. There fore, where there are natural words, no other word is necessary to know a thing; and where natural words are impossible, no other word will serve to make a thing known. And it makes good sense to say that words are truer the more similar they are to, and the more distinctly they signify, the things of which they are words.
Now except for those things that we use as their own names in
Monologion order to signify themselves (like certain sounds: for example, the vowel 'a')-except for those, I say, no other word seems as similar to the thing of which it is a word, or expresses it in the same way, as the likeness that is expressed in the gaze of the mind of someone who is thinking the thing itself.6 And so that should by right be called the most proper and principal word for the thing.
So no utterance of anything whatsoever comes as close to the thing as that which consists of words of this sort. Furthermore, no other word in anyone's reason can be as similar to the thing, whether it is yet to exist or already exists. It therefore quite rightly seems that such an utterance of things not only existed in the supreme substance before the things existed, in order that through it they might be made, but also exists in him now that they have been made, in order that through it they might be known. '
Chapter 11 That nonetheless there is much dissimilarity in this comparison So it has been established that the supreme substance first said (as it were) all of creation in himself and then created it in accordance with and through that innermost utterance of his, in the way that a craftsman first conceives in his mind what he afterwards makes into a completed work in accordance with the conception of his mind. Nonetheless, I see much dissimilarity in this comparison.
After all, the supreme substance collected nothing at all from any other source from which he would either assemble within himself
6. Anselm's point here is that natural words resemble the things of which they are words, whereas conventional words do not. For example, the natural word (that is, the concept) of a lion actually resembles the lion, since it is simply the mind's conception of the lion itself. The word 'lion', by contrast, does not resemble the lion much at all. It is only by convention that the word 'lion' calls up an image of a lion rather than of some other thing.
There is one sort of case, however, in which conventional words do resem ble the things of which they are words, and that is when we use a thing as its own name. To take Anselm's example, we use the letter 'a' as its own name. Obviously, the letter 'a' is like the letter 'a', and so the word is like the thing. But this is a limited and fairly uninteresting class of exceptions to the general rule that it is natural words that most closely resemble and most distinctly express the things of which they are words.
Chapter 10
the form of the things he was going to make or bring it about that the things themselves exist. The craftsman, by contrast, cannot even imagine a physical object and thus conceive it in his mind unless he has somehow already come to know the object, either as a whole all at once or part by part through various things; nor can he complete the work that he has conceived in his mind if he lacks either the material or something without which the planned work cannot be made. For although a man could invent an animal the likes of which never existed, either by thinking it or by painting it, he could do this only by putting together parts stored in his memory from things he knew at another time.
Therefore, the creating substance's inward utterance of the work he is going to make differs from that of the craftsman in this respect: the Creator's utterance was not collected from or assisted by some other source; rather, as the first and sole cause it was sufficient for its Artisan to bring his work to completion. By contrast, the craftsman's utterance is neither the first nor the sole cause, and it is not sufficient for him even to get his work started.
So the things that are created through the Creator's utterance are nothing at all but what they are through his utterance, whereas the things that are made through the craftsman's utterance would not be anything at all unless they were something other than what they are through his utterance.
Chapter 12 That the utterance of the supreme essence is the supreme essence Now since by the teaching of reason it is equally certain that, whatever the supreme substance made, he did not make it through anything other than himself, and that whatever he made, he made it through his innermost utterance (whether by saying individual things by means of individual words or instead by saying all things at once by means of one word7), what could be seen to be any more necessary than this: the utterance of the supreme es sence is nothing other than the supreme essence? And so I do not think we should carelessly neglect to consider this utterance. But 7. In chapter 30 Anselm resolves this question, maintaining that this utterance consists of one word, not of many words.
Monologion before we can discuss it carefully, I think we must earnestly investigate certain properties of the supreme substance.8
Chapter 13 That, just as all things were made through the supreme essence, so also they remain in existence through him Therefore, it has been established that whatever is not the same as the supreme nature was made through him. Now only an irrational mind could doubt that all created things remain and continue in existence, as long as they do exist, because they are sustained by the very same being who made them from nothing, so that they exist in the first place. For by an exactly similar argument to the one that shows that all existing things exist through some one thing, and so he alone exists through himself and all other things exist through another—by a similar argument, I say, it can be proved that every thing that remains in existence does so through some one thing, and so he alone remains in existence through himself and all other things remain in existence through another. Now since it can only be the case that created things remain in existence through another, and he who created them remains in existence through himself, it must be the case that, just as nothing was made except through the presence of the creating essence, so nothing remains in existence except through his conserving presence.
Chapter 14 That he exists in all things and through all things, and all things exist from him and through him and in him If this is the case—or rather, since this is necessarily the case—it follows that where he does not exist, nothing exists. Therefore, he exists everywhere, both through all things and in all things. Now no created thing can in any way pass beyond the immensity of the Creator and Sustainer, * but it would be absurd to claim that in the same way the Creator and Sustainer cannot in any way go beyond the totality of the things he made. It is therefore clear that he
8. Anselm discusses the properties of the supreme substance in chapters 13-28 and then resumes discussion of his utterance in chapter 29.