Chapter 16
Chapter 15
better than supreme. I shall not stop to ask whether some relatives do fall under it, since for our present purposes what is already known about them is enough: none of them designates the sim ple* substance of the supreme nature.
As for everything else, if each is considered individually, either is better than not- , or notis in some respect better than Therefore, just as it is impious to think that the sub stance of the supreme nature is something that it is in some way better not to be, so he must be whatever it is in every respect better to be than not to be. For he alone is that than which absolutely nothing else is better, and he alone is better than all things that are not what he is.
Therefore, he is not a body,* or any of the things that the bodily senses perceive. Indeed, there is something better than all of these things that is not what they are. For the rational mind
(concerning which no bodily sense perceives what, or what sort of thing, or how great it is) is greater than any of those things that are in the domain of the bodily senses, in proportion as it would be less if it were one of them. For the supreme essence must not at all be said to be any of those things to which something that is not what they are is superior; and, as reason teaches, he absolutely must be said to be any of those things to which whatever is not what they are is inferior. He must therefore be living, wise, power ful and all-powerful, true, just, happy, eternal; and whatever similarly it is absolutely better to be than not to be. Therefore, why should we seek any further for what that supreme nature is, since it is evident which of all things he is, and which he is not?
Chapter 16 That for him, to be iust is the same as to be justice, and the same tning holds for those things that can be said of him in a similar way, and that none of these designates what sort of thing or how great he is, but rather what he is12
But perhaps when he is said to be just or great or something like that, this does not reveal what he is, but rather what sort of thing
12. For an explanation of Anselm's point in this chapter, see the glossary entry for quality/quantity/quiddity.*
Monologion he is or how great he is. For it seems that all these things are said through a quality or a quantity. After all, everything that is just is just through justice, and so on for similar things. Therefore, that supreme nature is just precisely through justice. So it seems that the supremely good substance is said to be just in virtue of his participation in a quality, namely justice. But if that is the case, he is just through another and not through himself.
But that is contrary to the clearly discerned truth that whatever he is—whether good or great or subsistent*-he is through him self and not through another.13 So given that he is not just except through justice, and he cannot be just except through himself, what is more obvious, what is more necessary, than that this same nature is justice itself; and that when he is said to be just "through justice," this is the same as "through himself"; and that when he is said to be just "through himself," this means nothing other than
"through justice"? Therefore, if someone asks, "What is this su preme nature you are discussing?" what truer answer could be given than "Justice"?
So we must see what is meant when that nature, which is justice itself, is said to be just. Now a human being cannot be justice, but he can have justice. Consequently, a just human being is not understood as existent justice, but rather as having justice.
Now the supreme nature cannot properly be said to have justice, but rather to exist as justice. Therefore, when he is said to be just, he is properly understood as existent justice, not as having justice.
Now if, when he is said to be existent justice, this does not express what sort of thing he is, but rather what he is, it follows that when he is said to be just, this too does not express what sort of thing he is, but what he is. Further, since to say of that supreme essence that he is just, is the same as to say that he is existent justice, and to say that he is existent justice is no different from saying that he is justice, there is no difference between saying that he is just and saying that he is justice. Therefore, when someone asks what he is, "Just" is no less fitting an answer than "Justice."
Now reason constrains the intellect to recognize that what we have discovered to be certain in the case of justice applies to all the things that are said of the supreme nature in a similar way. So whichever of them is said of him designates neither what sort of 13. Anselm argues for this claim in chapters 1-4.
Chapter 16
thing he is nor how great he is, but rather what he is. Now it is clear that whatever good thing the supreme nature is, he is that supremely. And so he is the supreme essence, supreme life, supreme reason, supreme salvation, supreme justice, supreme wisdom, su preme truth, supreme goodness, supreme greatness, supreme beauty, supreme immortality, supreme incorruptibility, supreme immutability, supreme beatitude, supreme eternity, supreme power, supreme unity, which is none other than supremely be ing, supremely living, and other similar things.
Chapter 17 That he is simple* in such a way that all the things that can be said of his essence are one and the same thing in him, and none of them can be said substantially of him except with respect to what he is What then? If that supreme nature is so many good things, will he not be composed of several* good things? Or are they in fact not several good things, but one good thing signified by several words? For every composite needs the things of which it is composed if it is to subsist, and it owes what it is to them, since whatever it is, it is through them, whereas those things are not through it what they are. And consequently a composite is abso lutely not supreme. So then, if that nature is composed of several good things, all these features, which hold true of every compo site, must apply to him.
But the whole necessity of truth, which became evident above, destroys and overwhelms such impious falsehood by a clear argu ment. Therefore, since that nature is in no way a composite and yet is in every way those many good things, it must be that all those things are not several, but one. So each of them is the same as all the others, whether all at once or individually. Thus, when he is said to be justice or essence, those words signify the same thing that the others do, whether all at once or individually. And therefore, just as whatever is said essentially* of the supreme substance is one, so whatever he essentially is he is in one way and under one aspect.
For when a human being is said to be body and rational and human, these three things are not said in one way or under one aspect. For he is body according to one, rational according to
Monologion another, and neither of these individually is the whole of the fact that he is human. By contrast, the supreme essence is in no way like this. Whatever he is in any way, he is in every way and under every aspect. For whatever he in any way essentially is, that is the whole of what he is. Therefore, whatever is truly said of his essence is not understood as expressing what sort of thing or how great he is, but rather as expressing what he is. For whatever is a thing of a certain quality or quantity is something else with respect to what it is, and so it is not simple, but composite.
Chapter 18 That he exists without beginning and without end So from what time has this so simple nature, the Creator and Sustainer* of all things, existed? And until what time will he continue to exist? Or does he instead exist, not from some time and until some time, but rather without beginning and without end?
For if he has a beginning, either he has it from himself or through himself, or he has it from another or through another, or he has it from nothing or through nothing. But through the truth that has already been clearly discerned, it has been established14 that he in no way exists from another or from nothing, or through another or through nothing. So no beginning was in any way allotted to him through another or from another, or through nothing or from nothing. But he cannot have a beginning from himself or through himself, although he does exist from himself and through himself.
For he exists from himself and through himself in such a way that the essence he is through himself and from himself is in no way different from the essence through which and from which he exists.
By contrast, whatever begins to exist from something or through something is not in every respect the same as that from which or through which it begins to exist. Therefore, the supreme nature did not begin to exist through himself or from himself. Therefore, since he has no beginning through himself or from himself, or through another or from another, or through nothing or from nothing, he in no way has a beginning.
But neither will he have an end. For if he is going to have an end, he is not supremely immortal and supremely incorruptible. But it
14. In chapters 3, 5, and 6.