Chapter 68
Chapter 66
Chapter 68 That the rational creature was made for loving him And so it seems to follow that the rational creature should strive for nothing else so much as to express through voluntary action this image that has been stamped on it through its natural ability.
For aside from the fact that it owes its very existence to the one who created it, if it recognizes that it can do nothing else so preeminent as to remember, understand, and love the supreme good, it will certainly be convinced that it ought to will nothing else so preeminently. For who would deny that whatever better things are in our power should be more in our will?
Furthermore, for the rational nature there is no difference be tween being rational and being able to discern the just from what is not just, the true from what is not true, the good from what is not good, and the greater good from the lesser good. But this ability is altogether useless for it, and utterly empty, unless it loves or repudiates what it discerns in accordance with the judgment of a true discernment. Hence, it is quite obvious that every rational thing exists in order that it might love something more or less, or reject it altogether, according as its rational discernment judges that the thing is more or less good, or not good at all. So nothing is more evident than that the rational creature was made in order that it might love the supreme essence above all other goods, since he is the supreme good—indeed, that it might love nothing but him or [what it loves] for his sake, since he is good through himself, and nothing else is good except through him.
Now it cannot love him unless it strives to remember and understand him. It is therefore clear that the rational creature ought to devote all its power and will to remembering and under standing and loving the supreme good, for which purpose it knows it has its very existence.
Chapter 69 That a soul that always loves him will at some time truly live happily Now there is no doubt that the human soul is a rational creature.
Therefore, it must have been made in order that it might love the supreme essence. So it must have been made either in order that it
Monologion might love without end or in order that it might at some time lose this love, whether willingly or by force. But it is impious to suppose that the supreme wisdom made it in order that it might at some time either disdain so great a good or lose him by force even though it wills to hold on to him. So the only remaining possibility is that it was made in order that it might love the supreme essence without end.
Now it cannot do this unless it will always live. Therefore, it has been made in such a way that it will always live if it always wills to do what it was made for. Furthermore, the supremely good and supremely wise and omnipotent Creator caused it to exist in order that it might love him, so it would be utterly absurd for him to cause it not to exist as long as it truly loved him; and he willingly gave life to something that did not love him in order that it might always love him, so it would be utterly absurd for him to take that life away, or to allow it to be taken away, from something that loves him in order that it will, necessarily, not love him-especially since there should be no doubt that he loves every nature that truly loves him. It is therefore evident that its life will never be taken away from a human soul if it always strives to love the supreme life.
So what sort of life will it have? After all, what good is a long life unless it is truly secure against the onslaught of troubles? For if someone as long as he lives is subject to troubles that he either fears or suffers, or else is deceived by a false security, is his life not miserable? By contrast, if someone's life is free from these things, he lives happily. But it is utterly absurd that any nature always leads a miserable life by always loving him who is supremely good and omnipotent. It is therefore clear that the human soul is such that if it preserves what it was made for, it will at some time live happily, truly secure from death itself and from all other troubles.
Chapter 69
Chapter 70 That he gives himself as a reward to the one who loves him Finally, it can in no way seem to be true that he who is most just and most powerful, who gave being to one that did not love him in order that it might be able to love him, would give no reward to one who loves him perseveringly. For if he gives no reward to one who loves him, he who is most just does not distinguish between one who loves what ought to be supremely loved and one who disdains it; nor does he love one who loves him—either that, or it does no good to be loved by him. But all those things are incompatible with his nature. Therefore, he rewards everyone who loves him perseveringly.
But what does he give as a reward? If he gave a rational essence to nothing in order that it might love him, what will he give to someone who loves him if he does not cease to love? If what serves love is so great, how great is that which repays love? And if such is the support of love, what will the benefit of love be like? For if the rational creature, which is useless to itself without this love, is so eminent among all creatures, surely nothing can be the reward of this love except that which is supereminent among all natures. For the very same good who thus demands to be loved compels the one who loves him no less to desire him. For who loves justice, truth, happiness, and incor ruptibility in such a way that he does not also desire to enjoy them? So what will the supreme goodness give as a reward to one who loves and desires him, if not himself? For anything else he might give would not be a reward, since it would not recompense the love, or console the one who loves him, or satisfy the one who desires him. Either that, or if he wills to be loved and desired so that he might give something else as a reward, he does not will to be loved and desired for his own sake, but for the sake of some thing else. But in that case he does not will that he himself be loved, but rather that something else be loved-which it is im pious to think.
Therefore, nothing is truer than this: that every rational soul, if it strives to love and desire the supreme happiness as it ought, at some time perceives him so as to enjoy him. Thus, what it now
Monologion sees as if "in a mirror, in a riddle," it will then see "face to face."69
Now it is utterly foolish to doubt whether one will enjoy him without end, since one who enjoys him cannot be tortured by fear or deceived by a false security; nor, having once experienced being without him, could one fail to love him; nor will he abandon one who loves him; nor will there be anything else more powerful than he that might separate them against their will. Therefore, any soul that has once begun to enjoy the supreme happiness will be happy eternally.
Chapter 71 That one who disdains him will be eternally miserable From this of course it follows that a soul that disdains the love of the supreme good will incur eternal misery. One might say that for such disdain it would be more justly punished if it lost its very existence or life, since it did not use itself for what it was made for; but reason in no way allows that after so great a fault it should receive as its punishment the existence it had before any fault at all.70 Certainly before it existed it could neither be at fault nor experience punishment. Therefore, if a soul that disdains what it was made for dies, so that it experiences nothing, or is nothing at all, it will be in the same state both when it is most greatly at fault and when it is without any fault; nor would the supremely wise justice distinguish between what is capable of no good and wills no evil, and what is capable of the greatest good and wills the greatest evil. Now it is quite obvious how absurd that is. So nothing could seem more logical, and nothing should be believed more certainly, than this: the human soul was made in such a way that if it disdains to love the supreme essence, it will suffer eternal misery. Thus, just as one who loves him will rejoice in an eternal reward, one who disdains him will suffer under an eternal punishment. And just as the former will experience immutable plenty, so the latter will experience incon solable poverty.
69. 1 Corinthians 13:12.
70. In other words, non-existence, which is the "existence" the soul had before it was guilty of any fault.
Chapter 70
Chapter 72 That every human soul is immortal But if the soul is mortal, it need not be the case that one who loves him is eternally happy or one who disdains him miser able. Therefore, whether it loves or disdains him whom it was created to love, it must be immortal. But if there are some rational souls that must be judged neither to love him nor to disdain him, as the souls of infants appear to be, what are we to hold about them? Are they mortal or immortal? Undoubtedly all human souls are of the same nature. Therefore, since it is established that some are immortal, it must be the case that every human soul is immortal.
Chapter 73 That it is either always miserable or at some time truly happy Now since everything that lives is either never or at some time truly secure from all trouble, it must be no less true that every human soul is either always miserable or at some time truly happy.
Chapter 74 That no soul is unjustly deprived of the supreme good, and that it should strive after him with all its might But I think it is undoubtedly most difficult, if not impossible, for any mortal to be able to comprehend through disputation which souls are to be unhesitatingly judged as so loving him whom they were made for loving that they deserve to enjoy him at some time, and which ones as so disdaining him that they deserve to be deprived of him for ever, and how or by what merit those who apparently can be said neither to love nor to disdain him are assigned to eternal happiness or misery. Nevertheless, one should hold with absolute certainty that the supremely just and supremely good Creator of things does not unjustly deprive any soul of the good for which it was made, and that every human being ought to
Monologion strive after that good by loving and desiring him with all his heart, and with all his soul, and with all his mind.71
Chapter 75 That one ought to hope for the supreme essence But the human soul could in no way exert itself in this effort if it despaired of being able to attain what it is striving for. Therefore, the hope of success is as necessary to it as persistence in struggling is useful.
Chapter 76 That one ought to believe in him72 But one cannot love or hope for what one does not believe. And so it is beneficial for the human soul to believe the supreme essence and those things without which he cannot be loved, so that by believing them it might strive for [in] him. I think the same thing can be signified fittingly and more briefly if one says "believe in [in] the supreme essence" instead of "by believing to strive for [in] the supreme essence." For if someone says that he believes in [in] him, he seems to make it quite clear both that he strives unto [ad] the supreme essence through the faith he professes and that he believes those things that pertain to this striving. For someone who believes what does not pertain to striving for [in] him, or who does not strive unto [ad] him in virtue of what he believes, does not appear to believe in [in] him. And perhaps it would make no difference whether we say that someone believes "in [in] him" or "on [ad] him," just as "by believing to strive for [in] him" and "by believing to strive unto [ad] him" can be regarded as meaning the same thing, except for the fact that whoever comes to him by 71. Cf. Matthew 22:37: "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind."
72. Much of the argument in this chapter turns on the question of which of two prepositions is most suitably used with the verbs 'tendere' (to strive) and 'credere' (to believe). Unfortunately in English we have to use four different prepositions if we are not to outrage idiom, and the point is thus lost in translation. So in order to show what Anselm is doing, I have indicated the Latin preposition in brackets after each occurrence in the English.
Chapter 74
striving unto [ad] him will not remain outside him but will abide within him for ever. This is more explicitly and readily signified by saying that one ought to strive "for [m] him" rather than "unto
[ad] him."73 And so by this argument I think it can be more fittingly said that one ought to believe "in [in] him" rather than
"on [ad] him."
Chapter 77 That one ought to believe equally in the Father, the Son, and their Spirit, both in each individually and in all three together
Therefore one ought to believe equally in the Father, the Son, and their Spirit, both in each individually and in all three together. For the Father, the Son, and their Spirit are each individually the supreme essence, and the Father and the Son along with their
Spirit are together one and the same supreme essence, in whom alone every human being ought to believe, since he alone is the end at which they ought to aim through love in their every thought and action. From this it is evident that just as no one can strive for him unless he believes him, so also it does no one any good to believe him unless he strives for him.
Chapter 78 What is a living and what a dead faith Therefore, with however great a certainty so great a thing is believed, that faith will be useless and like something dead unless through love it is strong and alive. For a faith that is accompanied and attended by love will by no means be idle when it has the opportunity to act; instead, it will exert itself to act quite fre quently, which it could not do without love. That this is so can be proved by just this one fact: one who loves the supreme justice cannot disdain anything just or tolerate anything unjust. There fore, since whatever acts, shows that it has life, without which it could not act, it is not absurd to say that an active faith is living, since it has the life of love without which it would not act, and that an idle faith is not living, since it lacks the life of love with which it
73. Since 'in' suggests the idea of motion into something, whereas 'ad' merely suggests the idea of motion toward something.
Monologion would not be idle. Therefore, if not only one who has lost his sight is called blind, but also one who, though he ought to have it, does not, why cannot faith without love similarly be called dead,74 not because it has lost its life (that is, its love), but because it does not have what it ought always to have? So, just as a faith that through love is active75 is recognized as living, a faith that through disdain is idle is proved to be dead. And so it can quite appropriately be said that a living faith believes in what it ought to believe in,76 whereas a dead faith merely believes what it ought to believe.
Chapter 79 What the supreme essence can in a certain sense be said to be three of Behold! Clearly it is beneficial for every human being to believe in an ineffable threefold Unity and unified Trinity. They are indeed one and a Unity in virtue of one essence, but I do not know what it is in virtue of which they are three and a Trinity. For although I can say 'Trinity' because of the Father, the Son, and the Spirit of both, who are three, I cannot express by any one word what it is in virtue of which they are three, as if I were to say [they are a Trinity] in virtue of being three persons in the same way that I would say they are a Unity in virtue of being one substance. For they are not to be thought of as three persons, since whenever there are two or more persons, the persons subsist* separately from each other in such a way that there must be as many substances as there are persons. This is known to be true in the case of human beings, who are as many individual substances as they are persons.
Therefore, just as there is not more than one substance in the supreme essence, so also there is not more than one person.77
74. Cf. James 2:26: "Faith without action is dead."
75. Cf. Galatians 5:6: "Faith, which through charity is active."
76. Because, as was argued in chapter 76, believing in [m] God implies striving for [in] God.
77. The standard definition of 'person' was from Boethius, Contra Eutychem 4.4-5: "an individual substance of a rational nature." Anselm is arguing that in this sense of the word God cannot be three persons, since if he were, he would be three substances, and therefore three gods.