Chapter 1
Chapter 1 That there is something that is best and greatest and supreme among all existing things If anyone does not know, either because he has not heard or because he does not believe, that there is one nature,* supreme among all existing things, who alone is self-sufficient in his eternal happiness, who through his omnipotent goodness grants and brings it about that all other things exist or have any sort of well-being, and a great many other things that we must believe about God or his creation, I think he could at least convince himself of most of these things by reason alone, if he is even moderately intelligent.
There are many ways in which he could do this, but I shall set forth the one that I think would be easiest for him. After all, everyone desires only those things that he thinks good. It is therefore easy for him to turn the eye of his mind sometimes toward investigating the source of the goodness of those things that he desires to enjoy only because he judges that they are good.
Then, with reason leading and him following, he will rationally advance toward those things of which he is irrationally ignorant.
But if in this I say anything that a greater authority does not teach, I wish to be understood in this way: even if I present a con clusion as necessary on the basis of arguments that seem com pelling to me, I mean only that it can seem necessary for the time being, not that it is therefore in fact altogether necessary.
So, then, someone might easily speak silently within himself in this way: Since there are countless goods, whose great diver sity we both experience through our bodily senses and discern through the reasoning of our mind, are we to believe that there is some one thing through which all goods whatsoever are good? Or are different goods good through different things? Indeed, to all who are willing to pay attention it is clear and quite certain that all things whatsoever that are said to be more or less or equally a certain way as compared to each other are said to be so through something that is not understood as different but rather as the same in diverse things, whether it is detected equally or un equally in them. For whatever just things are said to be equally or more or less just by comparison with other just things, they must be understood to be just through justice, which is not different in
Chapter 1
diverse things. Therefore, since it is certain that all goods, if they are compared to each other, are either equally or unequally good, it must be that they are all good through something that is understood to be the same in diverse good things, even though it seems that sometimes different goods are said to be good through different things.
For it seems that a horse is called good through one thing because it is strong and through another because it is fast. After all, though it seems that the horse is called good through its strength and good through its speed, it does not seem that strength is the same thing as speed. Yet, if a horse is good because it is strong or fast, how is it that a strong and fast robber is bad?
So instead, just as a strong and fast robber is bad because he is harmful, so too a strong and fast horse is good because it is useful. And indeed nothing is ordinarily considered good except either because of some usefulness, as health and things that con tribute to health are called good, or because of some intrinsic value, as beauty and things that contribute to beauty are re garded as good.
But since the argument we have already considered cannot be refuted in any way, it must also be the case that all useful or intrinsically valuable things, if they are genuinely good, are good through the very same thing—whatever that is—through which all goods must exist. Now who would doubt that this thing, through which all goods exist, is itself a great good? Therefore, he is good through himself, since every good exists through him. It follows, therefore, that all other things are good through some thing other than what they themselves are, and he alone is good through himself. Now no good that exists through another2 is equal to or greater than that good who is good through himself.
And so only he who alone is good through himself is supremely good. For something is supreme if it surpasses others in such a 2. The expression "through another" is frequent throughout the Mono logion. Wherever it appears, it should be regarded as a shorthand form of "through something other than itself." Thus, when Anselm says that something "is good (or exists) through another," he means that the source of its goodness (or existence) is something other than itself. The contrast, sometimes merely implied but often expressed, is with God, who is whatever he is, not through another, but through himself.
Monolog ion way that it has neither peer nor superior. Now that which is supremely good is also supremely great. There is, therefore, some one thing that is supremely good and supremely great-in other words, supreme along all existing things.
Chapter 2 On the same thing Now just as it has been found that there is something supremely good, since all good things are good through some one thing that is good through itself, in the same way it is inferred with necessity that there is something supremely great, since whatever great things exist are great through some one thing that is great through itself. Now I do not mean great in size, as a given body* is great; rather, [I mean great in the sense] that the greater something is, the better or worthier it is, as wisdom is great. And since only what is supremely good can be supremely great, there must be something greatest and best, that is, supreme among all exist ing things.
Chapter 3 That there is a certain nature through whom all existing things exist, and who exists through himself and is supreme among all existing things
Furthermore, not only are all good things good through the same thing, and all great things great through the same thing, but it seems that all existing things exist through some one thing. For every existing thing exists either through something or through nothing. But nothing exists through nothing. For it is not so much as conceivable that any existing thing does not exist through something. So whatever exists, exists through something. Since this is so, either there is one thing, or there are several* things, through which all existing things exist.
Now if there are several, either they are traced back to some one thing through which they [all] exist, or each of them exists through itself, or they exist through each other. But if they exist through one thing, it is no longer true that all things exist through several things; rather, all things exist through that one thing through which the several things exist.