Chapter 33
Chapter 32
and the rational mind does so after his likeness. Now if he under stands himself eternally, he utters himself eternally. And if he utters himself eternally, his Word exists with him eternally.
Therefore, whether he is thought to exist without any other es sence existing, or along with other things that exist, his Word, coeternal with him, must exist with him.
Chapter 33 That by one Word he utters both himself and what he made But behold! While I was asking about the Word by which the Creator utters all the things he made, it was the Word by which he utters himself, who made all things, that presented itself to me.
Does he utter himself by one Word and the things he makes by some other Word? Or is the Word by which he utters whatever he makes the very same as the Word by which he utters himself? For the Word by which he utters himself must also be the very same thing that he is, just as was true of the Word by which he utters the things he made. For even if nothing other than the supreme spirit ever existed, reason nevertheless compels the conclusion that the Word by which he utters himself necessarily exists. And so what is truer than this: that his Word is nothing other than what he himself is? Therefore, if by a Word that is consubstantial* with himself he utters both himself and the things he makes, it is evident that the Word by which he utters himself and the Word by which he utters creation are one substance. So if there is one substance, how can there be two Words?
But perhaps the identity of the substance does not compel us to assert the unity of the Word. For he who utters by means of these words has the same substance they have, and yet he is not a word.
And of course the Word by which the supreme wisdom utters himself is most appropriately called his Word according to our earlier argument, since he bears a perfect likeness to him. For it cannot be denied by any argument that when the rational mind understands itself by thinking itself, an image of itself is born in its thought. Indeed, that very thinking of itself is its own image, formed to its own likeness as by its own impress. For whatever the mind desires to understand accurately, whether through corpo real imagination or through reason, it tries to impress a likeness of
Monologion that thing in its thought, so far as it can. And the more truly it does this, the more truly it thinks of that thing. This fact is of course observed more clearly when the mind thinks of something other than itself, especially when it thinks of some body.* For when I think of someone I know who is absent, the gaze of my thought is formed into an image of him like the one that I committed to memory through the vision of my eyes. This image in thought is the word of the man whom I utter by thinking of him. Therefore, when the rational mind understands itself by thinking itself, it has within itself its own image, born from itself—in other words, its thought of itself, formed to its own likeness as by its own impress—although it is reason alone that can distinguish the mind from this image of itself.43 This image of the mind is its word.
And so who could deny that in this way, when the supreme wisdom understands himself by uttering himself, he begets a likeness of himself that is consubstantial with himself: that is, his Word? Although nothing fully adequate can properly be said of such a uniquely excellent thing, he is not improperly called his likeness, and in the same way also his image4'1 and figure and character.45 By contrast, the Word by whom he utters crea tion is not the word of creation in a similar sense at all, since he is not a likeness of creation but rather its paradigmatic essence.46
It follows, therefore, that he does not utter creation by a word of creation. So if he does not utter creation by a word of creation, by whose word does he utter creation? For what he utters, he utters by a word, and a word is the word (that is, the likeness) of something. Now if he utters nothing other than himself and cre ation, he cannot utter anything except by his own Word or by a word of creation. Therefore, if he utters nothing by a word of creation, whatever he utters, he utters by his own Word. There fore, he utters both himself and whatever he made by one and the same Word.
43. That is, when the mind understands itself, there is no real distinction between the mind and its image of itself. The distinction is a purely conceptual one, one that is made by reason alone.
44. Cf. Colossians 1:15: "He is the image of the invisible God."
45. Cf. Hebrews 1:3: "He is the splendor of his glory and the figure of his substance." The Greek word translated 'figure' is %apaKTfjp ('character').
46. See the argument of chapter 31 for this distinction.
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Chapter 34 How he can be seen to utter creation by his own Word But how can such different things—namely, the creating and the created essence-be uttered by one Word, especially since that Word is coeternal with him who utters it, whereas creation is not coeternal with him? Perhaps it is because he is himself the su preme wisdom and the supreme reason, in which all created things exist. For any work that is made according to a craft always-not only when it is made, but even before it is made and after it is destroyed—exists in that craft as nothing other than the craft itself. Therefore, when that supreme spirit utters himself, he utters all created things. For before they were made, and once they have already been made, and when they are destroyed or in any way changed, they always exist in him, not as what they are in themselves, but as what he himself is. For in themselves they are a changeable essence created according to an unchangeable reason; in him, however, they are that first essence and first truth of existing, and the more they are in any way like him, the more truly and excellently do they exist. And so in this way it can reasonably be asserted that when the supreme spirit utters himself, he also, by one and the same Word, utters whatever was made.
Chapter 35 That whatever was made is life and truth in his Word and knowledge Now since it has been established that his Word is consubstantial with him and exactly like him, it follows necessarily that all the things that exist in him exist in his Word in just the same way. So whatever was made-whether it is living or non-living, or what ever it is in itself—is, in him, life and truth.47 And since for the supreme spirit there is no difference between knowing and under standing or uttering, he must know all the things he knows in the same way that he utters or understands them. Therefore, just as all things are life and truth in his Word, so are they also in his knowledge.
47. John 1:3-4, as Anselm read it (following Augustine), says, "All things were made through him [i.e., the Word], and without him was nothing made. That which was made is, in him, life."
Monologion Chapter 36 In what an incomprehensible way he utters or knows the things he made From this it can be most clearly comprehended that no human knowledge can comprehend how that spirit utters or knows the things that were made. For no one doubts that created substances exist in themselves quite differently from how they exist in our knowledge. After all, in themselves they exist through their own essence, whereas in our knowledge it is not their essences but their likenesses that exist. So it follows that they exist more truly in themselves than in our knowledge to the extent that they exist more truly somewhere through their essence than through their likeness. And it is also clear that every created substance exists more truly in the Word, that is, in the understanding of the Creator, than in itself, to the extent that the creating essence exists more truly than a created essence. So if our knowledge is as much surpassed by created substances as their likeness falls short of their essence,48 how will the human mind understand what that utterance and that knowledge are like, since they are far higher and truer than created substances?
Chapter 37 That whatever he is with respect to creation, his Word is also; nevertheless, the two of them together are not so in more than one way
Now since the arguments above clearly show that the supreme spirit made all things through his Word, did not the Word himself also make all things? For since he is consubstantial with him whose Word he is, he must be the supreme essence. But there is only one supreme essence, who is the only Creator and only origin of all created things. For he alone made all things from nothing, not through another, but through himself. So whatever the supreme spirit makes, his Word also makes, and in the same
48. Anselm explains in chapter 62 that what is present in our minds when we think of some external object is not the thing itself (its essence) but merely an image of the thing (its likeness).
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way.49 Therefore, whatever the supreme spirit is with respect to creation, his Word is also, and in the same way. Nevertheless, the two of them together are not so in more than one way, for there is not more than one supreme creating essence. Therefore, just as he is the Creator and origin of things, so also is his Word; and yet they are not two, but one Creator and one origin.
Chapter 38 That one cannot say what they are two of, and yet they must be two And so one must pay close attention to something that is quite unusual in the case of other things but seems to happen in the case of the supreme spirit and his Word. For it is certain that whatever they are in their essence, and whatever they are with respect to creation, is present in each of them individually, and in both of them together, in such a way as to be complete in both and yet not introduce any plurality into the two of them. For although the supreme spirit individually is completely the supreme truth and the Creator, and his Word individually is also the supreme truth and the Creator, nevertheless, the two of them together are not two truths or two Creators.
But although this is so, it is nevertheless in a strange way quite clear that the one whose Word exists cannot be his own Word, and the Word cannot be the one whose Word he is. Thus, in that which signifies either what they are substantially or what they are with respect to creation, they always keep an individual unity; but in virtue of the fact that the supreme spirit does not exist from the Word, whereas the Word exists from him, they admit an ineffable plurality.
Ineffable indeed—for although necessity compels that they be two, there is no way to express what they are two of. For even if they can be said to be two equals (or something else like that) in relation to each other, if it is asked what the thing is of which these relatives* are said, one will not be able to answer in the plural, as when two lines are said to be equal or two human beings to be similar. Certainly they are not two equal spirits, or two equal
49. Cf. John 5:19: "For whatever [the Father] made, the Son also makes in the same way."
Monologion Creators, or two of anything that signifies either their essence or their relationship to creation. Nor are they two of anything that signifies the distinguishing relationship of one to the other; they are not two Words or two images. After all, the Word's being a Word or image implies a relationship to another: he must be the Word or image of something. These are the distinguishing charac teristics of the Word, so much so that they cannot in any way be shared by the other. For he whose Word or image he is, is neither an image nor a Word.
So it is established that one cannot express what the supreme spirit and his Word are two of50 although they must be two because of their individual properties. For it is the distinguishing characteristic of the second that he exists from the first, and it is the distinguishing characteristic of the first that the second exists from him.
Chapter 39 That the Word exists from the supreme spirit by being born This can, it seems, be expressed in no more familiar terms than by saying that it is the distinguishing characteristic of the second that he is born from the first, and it is the distinguishing charac teristic of the first that the second is born from him. For it has certainly been established already51 that the Word of the supreme spirit does not exist from him in the same way as the things that were made by him, but rather as Creator from Creator, supreme from supreme, and-to express their likeness in the briefest way possible—the very same from the very same, and in such a way that he in no way exists except from him. Therefore, since it is evident that the Word of the supreme spirit exists from him alone in such a way that he bears a perfect likeness to him as offspring to parent, and that he does not exist from him in the sense that he is made by him, he is indeed most appropriately thought of as existing from him by being born. Indeed, if we do not hesitate to say that countless things are born from the things from which they have their existence, even though they bear no likeness, as 50. In chapter 79 Anselm takes up this question again.
51. In chapter 29.
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offspring to parent, to the things from which they are said to be born—for we say that hair is born from the head and fruit from a tree, although hair is not like the head and fruit is not like the tree — ; if, I say, many such things are not absurdly said to be born, it is as much more fittingly said that the Word of the supreme spirit exists from him by being born, as he more perfectly bears a likeness to him, like that of offspring to parent, by existing from him.
Chapter 40 That most truly he is the parent and the Word his offspring But if the Word is most appropriately said to be born and is so much like the one from whom he is born, why is he regarded as like him in the way that offspring is like a parent? Should it not rather be asserted that one is parent and the other is off spring the more truly, the more that the one by himself suffices completely for the birth of the other and he who is born expresses his likeness? For in other things that certainly have a relation ship of parent to offspring, none of them begets in such a way that it needs no help and is by itself completely sufficient to beget its offspring, and none of them is begotten in such a way that it is exactly like its parent, with no admixture of unlikeness. Therefore, given that the Word of the supreme spirit exists so completely from his essence alone, and is like him in such a unique way, that no other offspring exists so completely from the essence of its parent alone or is so much like its parent, the relationship of parent to offspring certainly seems not to apply to anything so fittingly as it does to the supreme spirit and his Word. Therefore, the distin guishing characteristic of the supreme spirit is to be most truly parent, and the distinguishing characteristic of the Word is to be most truly offspring.
Chapter 41 That he most truly begets and the Word is begotten Now this could not be the case unless it were equally true that he most truly begets and the Word is most truly begotten. Therefore,
Monologion just as the earlier claim is clearly true, this claim must be abso lutely certain. Therefore, the supreme spirit most truly begets and his Word is most truly begotten.
Chapter 42 That he is most truly begetter and Father, and the other is begotten and Son At this point I should like to conclude (and perhaps I could) that he is most truly the Father, while the other is mostly truly the Son.
But I think one should not overlook the question whether they are more properly called 'Father' and 'Son' or 'Mother' and 'Daugh ter', since there is no distinction of sex in them. For if it is appropri ate to call him 'Father' and his offspring 'Son' because they are both spirit, why would not a parallel argument show that it is appropriate for one to be Mother and the other Daughter, since they are both truth and wisdom?52 Or is it because in those natures that do have a distinction of sexes, being a father or son is charac teristic of the better sex, whereas being a mother or daughter is characteristic of the lesser sex? This is indeed naturally the case in most, but in some it is just the opposite, as in certain kinds of birds, in which the female sex is always larger and stronger, whereas the male is smaller and weaker.
But surely the real reason why it is more appropriate for the supreme spirit to be called Father rather than Mother is that the first and principal cause of offspring is always in the father. For since the paternal cause always in some way precedes the mater nal, it would be quite incongruous to apply the word 'mother' to that parent who begets his offspring without any other cause that either accompanies or precedes him. Therefore, it is most true that the supreme spirit is the Father of his offspring.
Now given that a son is always more like his father than a daugh ter is, and nothing is more like another than his offspring is like the supreme Father, it is most true that this offspring is not a daughter but a Son. Therefore, just as it is the distinguishing characteristic of the one that he most truly begets and of the other that he is most truly begotten, so it is the distinguishing characteristic of the one
52. This argument relies on the fact that in Latin the word for 'spirit' is masculine and the words for 'truth' and 'wisdom' are feminine.
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I that he is most truly begetter and of the other that he is most truly begotten. And just as the one is most truly parent and the other most truly offspring, so the one is most truly Father and the other most truly Son.
Chapter 43 A reconsideration of what is common to both and the distinguishing characteristics of each
Having discovered so many and so great distinguishing charac teristics of each, by which it is proved that there is a marvelous plurality-as ineffable as it is inevitable - in the supreme unity, it seems to me most delightful to reconsider so impenetrable a mystery again and again. For behold, it is impossible for him who begets to be the same as him who is begotten, and for the parent to be the same as the offspring—so much so that it is necessary that the begetter be one thing and the begotten some thing else, and that the Father be one thing and the Son some thing else. Nevertheless, it is necessary that he who begets be the same as him who is begotten, and that the parent be the same as the offspring—so much so that it is impossible for the begetter to be other than what the begotten is, and for the Father to be other than what the Son is.
Now the Father is one thing and the Son is another, so much so that it is altogether obvious that they are two; and yet that which they both are is so much one and the same thing that it is completely obscure what they are two of. For the Father is one thing and the Son another, so much so that when I speak of both, I see that I have spoken of two things; and yet that which is both Father and Son is so much one and the same thing that I do not understand what two things I have spoken of.
For although the Father individually is completely the supreme spirit, and the Son individually is completely the supreme spirit, nevertheless, the Father-spirit and the Son-spirit are so much one and the same that the Father and the Son are not two spirits, but one spirit.
Thus, just as the individual distinguishing characteristics of each do not admit of plurality, since they do not belong to both of them, so what is common to both keeps its individual unity, even though it belongs wholly to each. For just as there are not two