Chapter 21
Monologion never, and absolutely everything exists nowhere and never. Just how false that is, there is no need to say. Therefore, it is also false that he exists nowhere and never.
Therefore, he either exists determinately somewhere and some times, or everywhere and always. Now if he exists determinately in some place or time, it is only in that place and time, where and when he exists, that anything can exist. Absolutely no es sence exists where and when he does not exist, since without him nothing exists. From this it follows that there is some place and some time where and when nothing at all exists. But since that is false (after all, that place and that time are themselves something), the supreme nature cannot exist determinately some where or sometimes. And if it is said that through himself he exists determinately at a certain place and time, but through his power he exists wherever and whenever anything exists, that is not true. For since it is evident that his power is nothing other than himself, his power in no way exists apart from him. There fore, since he does not exist determinately somewhere and some times, he must exist everywhere and always—that is, in every place and time.
Chapter 21 That he exists in no place or time Now if this is so, either he exists as a whole in every place or time, or only part of him does, so that another part exists outside every place and time. But if he partly exists and partly does not exist in every place or time, he has parts, which is false. Therefore, he does not partly exist everywhere and always.
But then how does he exist as a whole everywhere and always?
This could be understood in two ways: either he exists as a whole all at once in all places and times and by parts in each individual place and time, or he exists as a whole even in each individual place and time. Now if he exists by parts in each individual place and time, he does not escape the composition and division of parts. And that, as we have found,21 is altogether foreign to the supreme nature. Therefore, he does not exist as a whole in all
21. In chapter 17.
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places and times in such a way that he exists by parts in each individual place or time.
The other possibility remains to be discussed, namely, how the supreme nature exists as a whole both in all places and times and in each of them individually. This of course can only be the case either all at once or at different times. Now up to this point a single pursuit has been able at once to trail both the argument about place and that about time, since they have followed the same tracks. But at this point they part ways; they seem, as it were, to flee from disputation along disparate paths. They must therefore be investigated in separate discussions. Therefore, we shall first see whether the supreme nature can exist as a whole in individual places either all at once or at different times. Then we shall ask the same question about times.22
So, if he exists as a whole in individual places, individual wholes exist in individual places. For just as one place is distinct from another place, in such a way that they are individual places, what exists as a whole in one place is distinct from what at the same time exists as a whole in another place, in such a way that they are individual wholes. For if something exists as a whole in a given place, there is nothing of that thing that does not exist in that place. Now if there is nothing of a thing that does not exist in a given place, then there is nothing of that thing that exists at the same time outside that place. Therefore, if some thing exists as a whole in a given place, there is nothing of it that exists at the same time outside that place. Now if there is nothing of a thing that exists outside some place, there is nothing of that thing that exists at the same time in some other place. Therefore, if something exists as a whole in a given place, there is nothing of it that exists at the same time in some other place. So if something exists as a whole in a given place, how can that whole exist at the same time in some other place, if nothing of it can exist in any other place?
Therefore, since one whole cannot exist as a whole all at once in individual places, it follows that if anything exists as a whole all at once in distinct places, it exists as individual wholes in individ ual places. And so if the supreme nature exists as a whole at one
22. That is, whether the supreme nature can exist as a whole at individual times either all at once or at different times.
Monologion time in all individual places, there are as many individual su preme natures as there can be individual places, which is an irrational view to hold. Therefore, he does not exist as a whole at one time in individual places. On the other hand, if he exists as a whole in individual places at different times, then as long as he exists in one place, there is no good and no essence in the other places, since without him nothing at all exists. But the places themselves show that this is absurd, since they are not nothing, but something. And so the supreme nature does not exist as a whole in individual places at different times. So, if he does not exist as a whole in individual places either at the same time or at different times, it is clear that he in no way exists as a whole in all individual places.
Now we must investigate whether that same supreme nature exists as a whole at individual times, either all at once or distinctly at individual times. But how does something exist as a whole at individual times all at once if those times themselves do not exist all at once? On the other hand, if he exists as a whole separately and distinctly at individual times, in the way that a human being exists as a whole yesterday, today, and tomorrow, then it is correct to say that he existed and exists and will exist. Therefore, his life, which is nothing other than his eternity, does not exist as a whole all at once; instead, it is prolonged by parts through the parts of time.
Now his eternity is nothing other than himself. So it would follow that the supreme essence is divided into parts in accor dance with the distinction of times. For if his life is produced by means of the flow of times, he has a past, present, and future along with those times. But what is his life, or the duration of his existence, other than his eternity? Therefore, since his eternity is nothing other than his essence (as the argument laid out above23 proves beyond doubt), if his eternity has a past, present, and future, it follows that his essence also has a past, present, and future. Now what is past is not present or future, and what is present is not future or past, and what is future is not past or present. So how will our conclusion survive, which became clear above24 by a rational and evident necessity—namely, that the supreme nature is in no way composite, but instead is supremely
23. In chapters 16 and 17.
24. In chapter 17.
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simple* and supremely unchangeable-if he is one thing at one time and something else at another, and if he has parts distributed through time? Or instead, if those earlier conclusions are truerather, since they are quite clearly true —how are these later con clusions possible?
So neither the creating essence nor his life nor his eternity in any way has a past or a future. For how can it be that he has no present, if he truly exists? But "he existed" signifies the past, and "he will exist" signifies the future. So he never existed and never will exist.25 Therefore, he does not exist as a whole at individual times either distinctly or all at once.
So if, as I have argued, he does not exist as a whole in all places and times in such a way that he exists as a whole in all of them at once and through his parts in each of them individually, or in such a way that he exists as a whole in each of them individually, it is evident that he in no way exists as a whole in every place or time.
And since I have likewise discerned that he does not exist in every place or time in such a way that one part exists in every place and time and another part exists outside every place and time, it is impossible for him to exist everywhere and always. For he cannot at all be understood to exist everywhere and always unless he does so either as a whole or in part.
Now if he does not in any way exist everywhere and always, either he exists determinately in some place or time, or else he exists in no place and time. And I have already shown that he cannot exist determinately in some place or time.26 Therefore, he exists in no place or time. In other words, he exists nowhere and never. For if he exists at all, he must exist either in every place and time, or in some place or time. And yet, once again, since it is irrefutably established not only that he exists through himself, without beginning and without end,27 but also that without him nothing exists anywhere or at any time,28 he must exist every where and always.
25. To put Anselm's point somewhat less boldly: "he existed" is never true of God, and "he will exist" is never true of him, since both of those expressions signify temporal categories that do not apply to God.
26. In chapter 20.
27. In chapter 18.
28. In chapter 20.