Chapter 31
Monologion nature is. Therefore, it does not consist of several words; rather, it is one Word, through whom all things were made.
Chapter 31 That this Word is not a likeness of created things, but the truth of their essence, whereas created things are an imitation of that truth; and which natures are greater and more excellent than others
But behold! It seems to me that a question arises that is not easy and yet should in no way be left unresolved. For all words by which we say things in our mind (that is, think them) are like nesses and images of the things of which they are words. And every likeness or image is more or less true as it imitates more or less the thing of which it is a likeness. So what are we to hold about that Word by whom all things are uttered, and through whom all things were made? Is he, or is he not, a likeness of those things that were made through him? For if he is a true likeness of mutable things, he is not consubstantial* with the supreme im mutability, which is false. On the other hand, if he is not an altogether true likeness of mutable things, but merely some sort of likeness, the Word of the supreme truth is not altogether true, which is absurd. But if he has no likeness to mutable things, how is it that they were patterned after him?
But perhaps none of this uncertainty will remain if we under stand it in this way. The truth of a human being is said to exist in a living human being, whereas in a painted one there is the likeness or image of that truth. In the same way, the truth of existing is understood to be in the Word, whose essence exists so supremely that in a certain sense it alone exists, whereas in the things that by comparison with him in a certain sense do not exist, and yet have been made something through him and in accordance with him, there is judged to be an imitation of that supreme essence. Thus, the Word of the supreme truth, who himself is also the supreme truth, experiences no gain or loss depending on whether he is more or less like creatures; instead, it must be the case that every created thing is so much greater and more excellent the more it is like him who supremely exists and is supremely great.
For it is perhaps on this basis - no, not perhaps - it is certainly on this basis that every intellect judges that natures that are in some
Chapter 30
way living are more excellent than those that are not living, natures that perceive than those that do not perceive, and rational natures than those that lack reason. For since the supreme nature in his own unique way not merely exists but also lives and per ceives and is rational, it is clear that of all existing things, what is in some way living is more like him than what is in no way living; and what in some way knows something, even through a bodily sense, is more like him than what perceives nothing at all; and what is rational is more like him than what is not capable of reason. And by a similar argument it is clear that certain natures exist more greatly or to a lesser degree than others. For just as something exists more excellently by nature if its natural essence is closer to the most excellent nature, so a nature exists more greatly if its essence is more like the supreme essence.
That this also is the case can, I think, be easily established.
Suppose one first thinks of a substance that lives and is capable of perception and is rational. Then in thought one takes away its rationality, next its ability to perceive, then its life, and finally the bare existence that is all that remains. Who would not under stand that the substance that is thus destroyed a little at a time is gradually brought to exist less and less, and finally not to exist at all? So if these things are taken away one at a time, they lead an essence down to a lesser and lesser existence; but if they are added in an orderly way, they lead it up to a greater and greater existence. So it is evident that a living substance exists more greatly than one that is not living, one that is capable of percep tion than one that is not capable of perception, and one that is rational than one that is not rational. And so there is no doubt that every essence exists more greatly and is more excellent to the extent that it is more like the essence that supremely exists and is supremely excellent.
And so it is sufficiently clear that in the Word, through whom all things were made, there is no likeness of those things, but rather their true and unqualified* essence. By contrast, in the things that were made there is no unqualified and absolute es sence; instead, there is barely an imitation of that true essence.
Hence it must be that the Word is not more or less true depending on the likeness of created things; instead, every created nature stands at a higher level of essence and dignity the more it is seen to approach him.
Monologion Chapter 32 That the supreme spirit utters himself by his coeternal Word But since this is so, how can he, who is the unqualified* truth, be the Word of those things of which he is not a likeness? For every word by which a thing is uttered by the mind is a likeness of that thing. And if he is not the Word of those things that were made through him, in what sense is he a Word? Surely every word is the word of some thing. Furthermore, if there were never any crea ture, there would be no word of a creature. What then? Are we to conclude that the Word, who is the supreme essence and lacks for nothing, would not exist at all if no creature ever existed? Or perhaps that the supreme essence, which the Word is, would indeed be eternal through his essence, but he would not be a Word if nothing were ever made through him? For there can be no word of something that neither existed, nor exists, nor will exist.
But according to this argument, if no essence other than the supreme spirit ever existed, no word at all would exist in him. If no word ever existed in him, he would not utter anything within himself. Now for him, to utter something is the same as to under stand it. So if he did not utter anything within himself, he would not understand anything. If he did not understand anything, it would follow that the supreme wisdom, which is nothing other than that same spirit, would not understand anything, which is utterly absurd. What then? If he did not understand anything, how would he be the supreme wisdom?
But then if nothing existed apart from him, what would he understand? Would he not understand himself? Indeed, how can it even be thought that the supreme wisdom at some time fails to understand himself, since the rational mind can remember not only itself but even the supreme wisdom, and can understand both him and itself? For if the human mind were not capable of remembering or understanding either him or itself, it would in no way be able to distinguish itself from non-rational creatures or to distinguish him from all of creation by reasoning silently within itself, as my mind is doing now. Therefore, just as that supreme spirit is eternal, so he eternally remembers and understands himself after the likeness of the rational mind—or rather, not after the likeness of anything; instead, he does so paradigmatically,