Chapter 4
Chapter 1
If, however, each of them exists through itself, there is surely some one power or nature of self-existing that they have in order to exist through themselves. And there is no doubt that they exist through this one thing through which they have self-existence.
Therefore, all things exist more truly through that one thing than through the several things that cannot exist without that one thing.
Now no reasoning allows for several things to exist through each other, since it is irrational to think that something exists through that to which it gives existence. For not even relatives* exist through each other in this way. For when a master and a slave stand in relation to each other, the men who stand in relation do not in any way exist through each other, and the relations by which they are related do not in any way exist through each other, since they exist through their subjects.
And so, since truth altogether rules out the possibility that there are several things through which all things exist, there must be one thing through which all existing things exist. Therefore, since all existing things exist through that one thing, undoubtedly that one thing exists through himself. So all other existing things exist through another; he alone exists through himself. Now whatever exists through another is less than the one through whom all other things exist and who alone exists through himself. There fore, he who exists through himself exists most greatly of all things. So there is some one thing that alone exists most greatly and supremely of all things. Now he who exists most greatly of all things, and through whom exists whatever is good or great and what ever is anything at all, must be supremely good, supremely great, and supreme among all existing things. Therefore, there is some thing (whether he is called an essence or a substance or a nature3) that is best and greatest and supreme among all existing things.
Chapter 4 On the same thing Moreover, if someone considers the natures of things, he cannot help realizing that they are not all of equal dignity; rather, some of them are on different and unequal levels. For anyone who doubts
3. Anselm is using these three words as synonyms. For a definition, see the glossary entry for essence* (1).
Monologion that a horse is by its very nature better than wood, and that a human being is more excellent than a horse, should not even be called a human being. Therefore, since it is undeniable that some natures are better than others, reason makes it no less obvious that one of them is so pre-eminent that he has no superior. For if this difference of levels is infinite - so that there is no level so high that an even higher level cannot be found—reason is brought to the conclusion that there is no limit to the multitude of these natures. But everyone thinks this is absurd — except for someone who is quite absurd himself. Therefore, there must be some nature* that is so superior to any other thing or things that there is nothing to which he is inferior.
Now either the nature that is like this is the only one, or there are several* like him and equal to him. Suppose they are several and equals. They cannot be equals through different things, but rather through the same thing. Now that one thing through which they are equally so great is either the very thing that they are-i.e., their essence* —or something other than what they are. Now if it is nothing other than their essence, then just as their essences are not several but one, so also the natures are not several but one. For I am here understanding nature to be the same as essence. On the other hand, if that through which those several natures are so great is other than that which they themselves are, they are certainly less than that through which they are great. For what ever is great through another is less than that through which it is great. Therefore, they are not so great that there is nothing else greater than they are. So if it is not possible either through that which they are or through something else for there to be several natures than which nothing is more excellent, there can in no way be several such natures. So the only remaining possibility is that there is one and only one nature that is so superior to the others that he is inferior to none.
Now whatever is like this is the greatest and best of all existing things. So a certain nature exists that is supreme among all existing things. But this cannot be the case unless he is through himself what he is and all existing things are through him what they are.
For reason showed a little earlier that he who exists through him self, and through whom all other things exist, is supreme among all existing things. Therefore, either (conversely) he who is supreme exists through himself and all other things exist through him, or