Theodicies: The Problem of Evil
Theodicies: The Problem of Evil
A major problem which concerns the doctrine of God centers on the existence of evil in the world. How can the presence of evil or suffering be reconciled with the Christian affirmation of the goodness of the God who created the world? Traditionally, the problem of evil is framed in a four-step argument:
This fourth statement could be interpreted as implying either that there is no God or that God is not good.
Some approaches to “theodicy” – the technical term widely used to refer to an intellectual defense of God's goodness or existence in the face of the presence of evil and suffering – rest on redefining the categories in which the dilemma is stated. For example, something might initially be thought to be “evil,” yet closer examination discloses that it is able to bring about a good that was not initially suspected. Others explore the complex interaction between goodness and evil. Something that is good can, if abused or misused, lead to evil. This lies at the heart of the traditional free-will account of evil, which sees evil as the result of human misuse of its God-given freedom. Alternatively, it might he argued that good can only ultimately develop froma context in which evil is present – an argument which lies at the heart of John Hick's (1922–2012) “vale of soul-making” theodicy, which we shall consider below.
In what follows, we shall explore some of the options available within the Christian tradition, and offer a brief assessment of their merits.
Irenaeus of Lyons (c.130–c.202)
Irenaeus represents a major element within Greek patristic thought, which regards human nature as a potentiality rather than a fully developed actuality. Human beings are created with certain capacities for growth toward maturity and perfection. They are called to achieve perfection rather than being perfect already. This process of growth and development requires contact with, and experience of, good and evil if truly informed decisions are to be made. If we are to be good, we need to know its opposite. This tradition tends to view the world as a “vale of soul-making” (to use a term taken from the English poet John Keats, 1795–1821), in which an encounter with evil is seen as a necessary prerequisite for spiritual growth and development:
God made humanity to be master of the earth and of all which was there. [...] Yet this could only take place when humanity had attained its adult stage. [...] Yet humanity was little, being but a child. It had to grow and reach full maturity. [...] God prepared a place for humanity which was better than this world [...] a paradise of such beauty and goodness that the Word of God constantly walked in it, and talked with humanity; prefiguring that future time when he would live with human beings and talk with them, associating with human beings and teaching them righteousness. But humanity was a child; and its mind was not yet fully mature; and thus humanity was easily led astray by the deceiver.
This view is not developed fully in the writings of Irenaeus. In the modern period, it has found an able exponent in the British philosopher of religion John Hick, who is widely regarded as the most influential and persuasive bastion of such an approach. In his influential book Evil and the God of Love (1966), Hick emphasized that human beings are created incomplete. In order for them to become what God intends them to be, they must participate in the world. God did not create human beings as automatons but as individuals who are capable of responding freely to God. Unless a real choice is available between good and evil, the biblical injunctions to “choose good” are meaningless. Good and evil are thus necessary presences within the world, in order that informed and meaningful human development may take place.
The argument is obviously attractive, not least on account of its emphasis upon human freedom. It also resonates with the experience of many Christians who have found that God's grace and love are experienced most profoundly in situations of distress or suffering. However, criticism has been directed against one aspect of this approach in particular. The objection is often raised that it appears to lend dignity to evil, by allocating it a positive role within the purposes of God. If suffering is seen simply as a means of advancing the spiritual development of humanity, what are we to make of those events – such as Hiroshima or Auschwitz – which destroy those who encounter them? This approach, to its critics, seems merely to encourage acquiescence in the presence of evil in the world, without giving any moral direction or stimulus to resist and overcome it.
Augustine of Hippo (354–430)
The distinctive approach adopted by Augustine has had a major impact upon the western theological tradition. By the fourth century, the problems raised by the existence of evil and suffering had begun to become something of a theological embarrassment. Gnosticism – including its variant form, Manicheism, with which Augustine became fascinated as a young man – had no difficulty in accounting for the existence of evil. It arose from the fundamentally evil nature of matter. The entire purpose of salvation was to redeem humanity from the evil material world and transfer it to a spiritual realm which was uncontaminated by matter.
As noted earlier, a central aspect of many Gnostic systems was the idea of a demiurge – that is, a demigod who was responsible for forging the world, in its present form, out of pre-existent matter. The sorry state of the world was put down to the inadequacies of this demigod. The redeemer god was thus regarded as being quite distinct from the creator demigod.
Augustine, however, could not accept this approach. It might offer a neat solution to the problem of evil, yet the intellectual price paid was far too high. For Augustine, creation and redemption were the work of one and the same God. It was therefore impossible to ascribe the existence of evil to creation, for this merely transferred blame to God. For Augustine, God created the world good, meaning that it was free from the contamination of evil. So where does evil come from? Augustine's fundamental insight here is that evil is a direct consequence of the misuse of human freedom. God created humanity with the freedom to choose good or evil. Sadly, humanity chose evil; as a result, the world is contaminated by evil.
This, however, did not really resolve the problem, as Augustine himself appreciated. How could humans choose evil if there was no evil to choose? Evil had to be an option within the world if it were to be accessible to human choice. Augustine therefore located the origin of evil in satanic temptation, by which Satan lured Adam and Eve away from obedience to their creator. In this way, he argued, God could not be regarded as being responsible for evil.
Still the problem was not resolved. For where did Satan come from if God created the world good? Augustine traces the origin of evil back by another step. Satan is a fallen angel, who was originally created good, like all the other angels. However, this particular angel was tempted to become like God and to assume supreme authority. As a result, he rebelled against God, and thus spread that rebellion to the world. But how, Augustine's critics asked, could a good angel turn out to be so bad? How are we to account for the original fall of that angel? The problem had simply been pushed back by a stage, not resolved.
Karl Barth (1886–1968)
Thoroughly dissatisfied with existing approaches to evil, Karl Barth called for a complete rethinking of the entire issue. Barth, who was particularly concerned with the Reformed approach to the issue of providence, believed that a central theological flaw had developed in relation to the notion of the omnipotence of God. He argued that the Reformed doctrine of providence had become virtually indistinguishable from that of Stoicism. (In passing, we may note that many scholars of the Reformation make precisely this point in relation to Huldrych Zwingli's (1484–1531) doctrine of providence, which appears to be based upon the Stoic writer Seneca (4 bc–ad 65) to a far greater extent than upon the New Testament!) For Barth, the notion of the omnipotence of God must always be understood in the light of God's self-revelation in Christ.
On the basis of this principle, Barth argued that there was a need for a “radical rethinking of the whole issue.” He suggested that the Reformed doctrine of omnipotence rested largely upon logical deduction from a set of premises about God's power and goodness. Barth, whose theological program is distinguished by its “Christological concentration,” argued for a more Christological approach. Barth thus rejected a priori notions of omnipotence in favor of a belief in the triumph of God's grace over unbelief, evil, and suffering. A confidence in the ultimate triumph of the grace of God enables believers to maintain their morale and hope in the face of a world which is seemingly dominated by evil. Barth himself had Nazi Germany in mind as he developed this notion; his ideas, however, have proved useful elsewhere, and may be argued to be reflected in the theodicies that have been characteristic of liberation theology in more recent years.
Nevertheless, one aspect of Barth's theodicy has caused considerable discussion. Barth describes evil as das Nichtige – a mysterious power of “nothingness,” which has its grounds in what God did not will in the act of creation. “Nothingness” is that which contradicts the will of God. Das Nichtigeis the “uninvited” enemy, an unwanted intruder into created life. It is not “nothing” but that which threatens to reduce everything else to nothing, and thus poses a threat to the purposes of God in the world. For Barth, the ultimate triumph of grace ensures that “nothingness” need not be feared. However, his critics have found the idea of “nothingness” problematic, and have charged him with lapsing into arbitrary metaphysical speculation at a point at which fidelity to the biblical narrative is of central importance.
Barth can certainly be defended against these criticisms. However, it is fair to point out that his notion of “nothingness” is very difficult to grasp and leaves many sympathetic interpreters puzzled by its apparent incoherence.
Alvin Plantinga (Born 1932)
The Reformed philosopher Alvin Plantinga often addressed the questions arising from the existence of evil in the world. The “free-will defense” offered by Plantinga is deeply rooted in the Christian tradition and can be summarized in terms of the following points:
In reviewing this argument, it is important to note how Plantinga insists that we must be cautious and responsible about using terms such as “omnipotent.” To say that God is omnipotent is not, as we saw earlier, to say that “God can do anything.” God operates under self-imposed limitations, reflecting God's nature and character. Plantinga brings this point out frequently. For example, in his essay “God, Evil, and the Metaphysics of Freedom,” Plantinga argues convincingly that it is possible that God cannot create every logically possible world. If Plantinga's argument has a weak point, it is not to be found in his discussion of God's omnipotence but in his assertion that a world with freedom is to be preferred to one that is without freedom.
Other Recent Contributions
The question of suffering remains high on the agenda of modern theology, and has been given a new sense of urgency and importance through the impact of the horrors of the Second World War and the continued struggle of oppressed people against those who oppress them. A number of approaches may be noted, each of which can be set against a different backdrop.
First, liberation theology has developed a distinctive approach to suffering, based on its emphasis upon the poor and the oppressed (see pp. 74–5). The suffering of the poor is not viewed as passive acquiescence in suffering; rather, it is seen as participation in the struggle of God against suffering in the world – a struggle which involves direct confrontation with suffering itself. This idea, in various forms, can be discerned in the writings of Latin American liberation theologians.
However, it is generally thought to find its most powerful expression in the writings of black theology, especially those of James Hal Cone (born 1938). The sequence of the cross and resurrection is interpreted in terms of a present struggle against evil, conducted in the knowledge of God's final victory over all suffering and that which causes it. Similar themes can be noted in the writings of Martin Luther King Jr. (1929–68), especially his “Death of Evil upon the Seashore” (1956).
Second, process theology locates the origins of suffering and evil within the world in a radical limitation upon the power of God (pp. 193–4). God has set aside the ability to coerce, retainingonly the ability to persuade. Persuasion is seen as a means of exercising power in such a manner that the rights and freedoms of others are respected. God is obliged to persuade every aspect of the process to act in the best possible manner. There is, however, no guarantee that God's benevolent persuasion will lead to a favorable outcome. The process is under no obligation to obey God.
God intends good for the creation and acts in its best interests. However, the option of coercing everything to do the divine will cannot be exercised. As a result, God is unable to prevent certain things from happening. Wars, famines, and holocausts are not things that God desires; they are, however, not things that God can prevent, on account of the radical limitations placed upon the divine power. God is thus not responsible for evil, nor can it be said, in any way, that God desires or tacitly accepts its existence. The metaphysical limits placed upon God are such as to prevent any interference in the natural order of things.
A third strand in recent thinking on suffering has drawn upon Old Testament themes. Jewish writers such as Elie Wiesel, retaining at least the vestiges of a belief in the fundamental goodness of God, point to the numerous passages in the Old Testament that protest against the presence of evil and suffering in the world. This approach has been picked up by a number of Christian writers, including John Roth (born 1940), who has named the approach “protest theodicy.” The protest in question is seen as part of the trusting response of a faithful people to their God, in the face of uncertainties and anxieties concerning God's presence and purposes in the world.
This chapter has provided a general introduction to the Christian doctrine of God, which needs to be supplemented by the material on the Holy Spirit (Chapter 12) and the doctrine of the Trinity, which seeks to give expression to a sequence of distinctively Christian insights concerning God which go beyond both Deism and Theism (Chapter 13). We now move on to explore a central Christian theological theme – the identity and significance of Jesus Christ.