Two Trinitarian Heresies
Two Trinitarian Heresies
In an earlier section (p. 97) we introduced the idea of heresy, making the point that the term is best understood as an inadequate version of Christianity. In an area of theology as complex as that of the doctrine of the Trinity, it is hardly surprising that a variety of ways of approaching the subject should have developed. Nor should it be cause for surprise that some of them turned out, on closer inspection, to be seriously inadequate. The two heresies which are to be discussed in what follows are the most important for the student of theology.
Modalism: Chronological and Functional
The term “modalism” was introduced by the German historian of dogma Adolf von Harnack (1851–1930) to describe the common element of a group of trinitarian heresies, associated with Noetus and Praxeas in the late second century and Sabellius in the third. Each of these writers was concerned to safeguard the unity of the Godhead, fearing a lapse into some form of tritheism as a result of the doctrine of the Trinity. (As will become clear, this fear was often amply justified.)
This vigorous defense of the absolute unity of God (often referred to as “monarchianism,” from the Greek word monarchia, meaning “a single principle of authority”) led these writers to insist that the self-revelation of the one and only God took place in different ways at different times. The divinity of Christ and the Holy Spirit is to be explained in terms of three different ways or “modes” of divine self-revelation (hence the term “modalism”).
Although there are various forms of “modalism,” they generally work with much the same understandings of the dynamics of the Trinity:
There is thus no difference, save that of appearance and chronological location, between the three entities in question. There are three terms for the same God. This led directly to the doctrine of “patripassianism,” as noted earlier (p. 185): the Father suffers as the Son, since there is no fundamental or essential difference between the Father and the Son.
Some forms of modalism are chronological and some are functional. It is important to appreciate this distinction:
The main features of Sabellianism were set out by Epiphanius of Constantia in the late fourth century, as follows:
A certain Sabellius arose not long ago (in fact, quite recently); it is from him that the Sabellians take their name. His opinions, with a few unimportant exceptions, are the same as those of the Noetians. Most of his followers are to be found in Mesopotamia and the region of Rome. [...] Their doctrine is that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one and the same being, in the sense that three names are attached to one substance [hypostasis]. It is just like the body, soul and spirit in a human being. The body is as it were the Father; the soul is the Son; while the Spirit is to the Godhead as his spirit is to a human being. Or it is like the sun, being one substance [hypostasis], but having three manifestations [energia]: light, heat, and the orb itself. The heat [...] is analogous to the Spirit; the light to the Son; while the Father himself is represented by the essence of each substance. The Son was at one time emitted, like a ray of light; he accomplished in the world all that related to the dispensation of the gospel and the salvation of humanity, and was then taken back into heaven, as a ray is emitted by the sun and then withdrawn again into the sun. The Holy Spirit is still being sent forth into the world and into those individuals who are worthy to receive it.
From this passage, it will be clear that Sabellianism is chronological modalism. Its basic feature is the belief that the one supreme God acts in different ways at different points in history.
In contrast, functional modalism designates the general belief that the same God acts in three different manners at any given point in history. The three persons of the Trinity thus designate different aspects of the activity of the one God. A simple form of functional modalism could be set out as follows:
Here, the three persons of the Trinity are held to designate (or to bring about) three different actions of the one supreme God. God acts as creator (and we call this “Father”); God acts as redeemer (and we call this “Son”); God acts as sanctifier (and we call this “Holy Spirit”). The persons of the Trinity thus refer to different divine functions. The approach to the doctrine of the Trinity set out by John Macquarrie (1919–2007, p. 316) could be interpreted as a variant of this form of modalism. Some scholars also argue that Karl Barth's doctrine of the Trinity is modalist, as it can be understood to mean that God operates in multiple ways in the present. Many Barth scholars, however, dispute this.
Tritheism
If modalism represented one apparently simple (yet ultimately inadequate) solution to the dilemma posed by the Trinity, tritheism offered an equally neat way out. Tritheism invites us to imagine the Trinity as consisting of three equal, independent, and autonomous beings, each of whom is divine. Many students will regard this as an absurd idea. However, the same idea can be stated in more subtle forms. Some critics have argued that an understated form of tritheism can be found in the writings of the Cappadocian fathers – Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nazianzus (329–89), and Gregory of Nyssa. Recent scholarship, however, has called this into question.
To explore this point further, we shall consider the most important of these writings: Gregory of Nyssa's treatise to his colleague Ablabius, subtitled “that there are not three gods.” Ablabius had earlier written to Gregory, expressing concern that the formula “three persons, one substance” seemed to lead to tritheism. After all, it was easy to envisage three human persons, each sharing a common human nature. But they were still three different people, weren't they? So how could he avoid falling into tritheism when using this formula?
In replying, Gregory insists “that the word ‘Godhead' does not signify a specific nature but an operation.” He illustrates his point by considering how the generic term “orator” affirms both shared generalities and specific particularities:
For instance, orators share the same occupation, and thus have the same name in each case – yet each of them works by himself as an orator, this one arguing in his own distinctive way, and another in his own way. Thus, since at the human level, the action of each individual sharing the same occupation can be distinguished, they are properly called “many,” since each of them is separated from the others within his own environment, according to the special character of his operation.
Gregory then applies this point to God, arguing that, while it is essential to appreciate the distinctive identities of each person of the Trinity in terms of their operations, the Godhead represents a unity in terms of the outcomes of these actions. The argument is not easy to follow and is probably best seen as pointing to the incapacity of any human model to do justice to the nature of God.
Perhaps the clearest statement of the doctrine of the Trinity to be found in the patristic period is that set out by the Eleventh Council of Toledo (675). This Council, which met in the Spanish city of Toledo and was attended by a mere 11 bishops, is widely credited with setting out the western view of the Trinity with an enviable clarity, and is regularly cited in later medieval discussions of this doctrine. In what follows, the Council explains the relationship between the words “Trinity” and “God,” and stresses the importance of the relationalities within the Godhead.
This is the way of speaking about the Holy Trinity as it has been handed down: it must not be spoken of or believed to be “threefold” [triplex], but to be “Trinity.” Nor can it properly be said that in the one God there is the Trinity; rather, the one God is the Trinity. In the relative names of the persons, the Father is related to the Son, the Son to the Father, and the Holy Spirit to both. While they are called three persons in view of their relations, we believe in one nature or substance. Although we profess three persons, we do not profess three substances, but one substance and three persons.