The Medieval Synthesis of the Doctrine of Grace
The Medieval Synthesis of the Doctrine of Grace
The repercussions of the Pelagian controversy were considerable. It forced upon the church discussion of a number of issues, especially during the medieval period, in which Augustine's legacy was subjected to a process of evaluation and development. While the modern discussion of the meaning of both terms may be said to have been initiated by Augustine, in the course of the Pelagian controversy, the medieval period saw his ideas being developed and modified. Augustine's legacy provided the frame within which the concepts of grace and merit were discussed.
The Augustinian Legacy
At its heart, the term “grace” (gratia) has a connection with the idea of “a gift.” Augustine stressed that salvation is a gift from God, rather than a reward. This immediately suggests a tension between the ideas of “grace” and “merit,” the former referring to a gift and the latter to a reward. In fact, the question is considerably more complex than this, and merits – if the pun may be excused – careful discussion. In what follows, we shall consider the medieval debate over the meaning of the terms, to illustrate some of the issues at stake and also as background material to the Reformation debates on the issues.
Augustine explored the nature of grace using several images, as noted earlier (p. 332). Two may be noted once more in the present context. First, grace is understood as a liberating force which sets human nature free from its self-incurred bondage to sin. Augustine used the term “the captive free will” (liberum arbitrium captivatum) to describe the free will which is so heavily influenced by sin, and argued that grace is able to liberate the human free will from this bias, to give the “liberated free will” (liberum arbitrium liberatum). To go back to Augustine's analogy of the pair of scales, grace removes the weights disposing the scales toward evil and allows us to recognize the full weight of the case for choosing God. Thus, Augustine was able to argue that grace, far from abolishing or compromising the human free will, actually establishes it.
Second, grace is understood as the healer of human nature. One of Augustine's favorite analogies for the church is that of a hospital, full of sick people. Christians are people who recognize that they are ill and seek the assistance of a physician, in order that they may be healed. Thus Augustine appeals to the parable of the good Samaritan (Luke 10: 30–4) in suggesting that human nature is like the man who was left for dead by the roadside until he was rescued and healed by the Samaritan (representing Christ as redeemer, according to Augustine). On the basis of illustrations such as these, Augustine argues that human free will is unhealthy and needs healing.
In exploring the functions of grace, Augustine developed three main notions which have had a major impact upon western theology. The three categories are as follows:
The Medieval Distinction Between Actual and Habitual Grace
The theologians of the early Middle Ages were generally content to regard “grace” as a shorthand term for the graciousness or liberality of God. However, the rise of university faculties of theology led to increasing pressure for systematization, which in turn led to the development of an increasingly precise and meticulous vocabulary of grace. The most important statement of the medieval understanding of the nature and purpose of grace is that of Thomas Aquinas (c.1225–74). Although Aquinas treats Augustine's analysis of grace with considerable respect, it is clear that he also has considerable misgivings concerning its viability. A fundamental distinction is drawn between two different types of grace, as follows.
Aquinas argues that there is an enormous gulf between humanity and God. God cannot establish a direct presence within human nature. Instead, an intermediate stage is established, in which the human soul is made ready for the habitation of God. This permanent alteration to the human soul is termed “a habit of grace,” where the term “habit” means “something which is permanent.” Habitual grace is thus a substance, “something supernatural in the soul.” This change in human nature is regarded by Aquinas as the basis of human justification. Something has happened to human nature which allows it to be acceptable to God. Whereas the reformers would locate the basis of justification in God's gracious favor, by which sinners are accepted in the sight of God, Aquinas argues for the need for an intermediary in the process of being accepted by God – the habit of grace, or “habitual grace.”
Aquinas's discussion of the nature of grace in the Summa theologiae (“The Totality of Theology”) involves the exploration of the three senses in which the word grace is used in everyday life.
As used in everyday language, “grace” is commonly understood to mean three things. First, it can mean someone's love, as when it is said that a soldier has the king's favor – that is, that the king holds him in favor. Secondly, it can mean a gift which is freely given, as when it is said: “I do you this favor.” Thirdly, it can mean the response to a gift which is freely given, as when we are said to give thanks for benefits which we have received. Now the second of these depends upon the first, as someone freely bestows a gift on someone else on account of their love for them. And the third depends upon the second, since thankfulness is appropriate to gifts which are freely given. Now if “grace” is understood in either the second or third sense of the word, it will be clear that it leaves something in the one who receives it – whether it is the gift which is freely given, or the acknowledgement of that gift. [...] To say that someone has the grace of God is to say that there is something supernatural in the soul, coming forth from God.
Aquinas's argument here is based on the recognition that every sense of the word “grace” is ultimately subordinate to the notion that anyone who is “favored” in this way is changed as a result. In other words, to “have the grace of God” is to possess the favor of God in such a manner that a supernatural change comes about within the soul of the one who has thus found favor. This “change” is described using the imagery of a supernatural habit of grace – that is, a permanent change in the recipient rather than a series of transient gracious actions.
The Late Medieval Critique of Habitual Grace
The idea of “habitual grace” became the subject of considerable criticism in the later Middle Ages. During the fourteenth century, William of Ockham (c.1285–1347) used his famous “razor” to eliminate unnecessary hypotheses from every area of theology. It seemed to him that a habit of grace was totally unnecessary. God was perfectly capable of accepting a sinner directly, without the need for any intermediate stage or intermediate entity. The principle “God can do directly what could otherwise be done through intermediate causes” led Ockham to question the need for habitual grace. It seemed an unnecessary intermediary.
So persuasive was his argument that, by the end of the fifteenth century, the notion of habitual grace was widely regarded as discredited. Grace increasingly came to be understood as divine graciousness – that is, a divine attitude toward humanity, rather than a divine or quasi-divine substance within humanity. In many ways, this can be seen as laying the foundations for the Protestant Reformation's insistence that grace was, at heart, nothing more and nothing less than the “gracious favor of God” (favor Dei).
The Medieval Debate Over the Nature and Grounds of Merit
The Pelagian controversy drew attention to the question of whether salvation was a reward for good behavior or a free gift of God (see pp. 333–4). The debate indicated the importance of clarifying what the term “merit” actually meant. Once more, it was the medieval period which saw clarification of the term. By the time of Thomas Aquinas, the following points had been generally agreed.
Within the context of this general consensus over the nature of merit, a debate developed during the later Middle Ages over the ultimate ground of merit, with two rival positions being distinguishable. The debate illustrates the growing influence of voluntarism in the later Middle Ages. The older position, which can be described as “intellectualist,” is represented by writers such as Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas argued for a direct proportional representation between the moral and the meritorious value of an action on the part of a believer. The divine intellect recognizes the inherent value of an action and rewards it accordingly.
In contrast, the “voluntarist” approach, represented by William of Ockham, placed the emphasis upon the divine will. God determines the meritorious value of an action, by an act of divine will. For Ockham, the intellectualist approach compromised the freedom of God, in that God was placed under an obligation to reward a moral action with a meritorious response. In defending the divine freedom, Ockham argued that God had to be free to reward a human action in any way that seemed fit. There was thus no direct link between the moral value and the meritorious value of a human action. To his critics, Ockham seemed to have snapped the connection between human and divine notions of justice and fairness – an issue to which we shall return when we consider the issue of predestination, which brings the role of the will of God into full focus.
Our attention now turns to the great controversy which engulfed the church at the time of the Reformation during the sixteenth century, centering upon the doctrine of justification by faith.