CHAPTER IX
it contracted no necessity of sinning.
From a consideration of the personal unity of the one who is assuming a nature and the nature which is being assumed, it can easily be shown that the second and the third necessity are different from the seed itself. (By the second necessity I mean the necessity that human nature be unable by itself to recover justice. And by the third necessity I mean the necessity by which the corrupted body weighs down the soul, so that without the help of grace the soul is unable to keep the justice which is received at the perfect age /i.e., when the rational will is given/, and so that the soul of infants is unable even to understand what justice is.) Now, regarding the first necessity, with respect to which human nature is obliged to make satisfaction for the sins of both its first and more recent ancestors: if it can be shown that the seed which descends from Jesus' first parents is free from the obligation of making satis faction for sin, then without a doubt no such obligation can descend to Him from His more recent ancestors. So with the help of God I shall try to show how the seed which descends from Jesus' first parents is free from the neces sity of making satisfaction for sin; though since this has already been shown in other works, it is not necessary to discuss it here at great length.
CHAPTER IX
Why the Sin by Which the Human Race Is Condemned Is Imputed to Adam Rather Than to Eve, Even Though Adam Sinned After Eve and on Her Account
It seems to me that we should first ask why the sin by which the human race is condemned is more often and more particularly imputed to Adam than to Eve, although she sinned before Adam did, and he sinned because of her. For the Apostle says, 'But death reigned from Adam until Moses, even in those who did not sin in the likeness of Adam's transgression.' (Rom. 5:1*0 And there
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