CHAPTER III
said to harden a man's heart when He does nothing to soften it, and He is said to lead a man into temptation when He does not deliver him from it. So then, it is the same sort of thing to say that God predestines evil men and their evil works when He does not correct these men and their evil works. But in a special way God is said to foreknow and predestine good things, because, as I said above, He causes both their being and their being good--whereas in evil things He causes only their essential being, not their being evil. We should also understand that like foreknowledge, predestination is not properly attri buted to God. For there is no before or after in God, but all things are present to Him at once.
CHAPTER III
Let us now consider whether some things can be predestined to occur through free choice. We must never suppose that there is a conflict between God's fore knowledge and predestination, for God predestines a thing exactly as He fore knows it. When dealing with the question of foreknowledge, we saw clearly that there is no contradiction in saying that some things are foreknown to occur through free choice. From this we now derive another truth no less evident, for reason tells us that there is no contradiction in saying that some things are predestined to occur through free choice. For God neither foreknows nor predestines anyone to be just by necessity. Anyone who does not keep justice by his free will does not really have justice. Therefore, although it is neces sary that what is foreknown and what is predestined should occur, nevertheless some of the things foreknown and predestined do not occur by the necessity which precedes a thing and causes it, but only by the necessity which (as I said above) follows the thing's occurrence. Even though God predestines the will, He does not cause it to do anything by compelling or restraining it; He merely leaves