CHAPTER II
that what God determines to he going to exist, necessarily must he going to exist. Whatever God predestines, then, necessarily will he. So, if God pre destines both the good and the evil actions which occur, then every action occurs hy necessity and nothing occurs through free choice. If, on the other hand, God predestines only good actions, then only good actions occur hy neces sity and there is free choice only in regard to evil things--a view which is completely absurd. Consequently, God does not predestine only good deeds. Now, if the good works that make men just occur through free choice without being predestined, then God does not predestine all the good works which make men just. In this case He would not predestine men who are just through their works of free choice. So then, God would not foreknow them either, because
'whom He foreknew, them He also predestined.' (Rom. 8:29) But it is false to say that there are good works or just men that God does not foreknow. There fore, it is not the case that certain good works done hy free choice alone serve to justify men; rather only those good works which God predestines justify men. Thus, if God predestines everything and if everything that is predestined occurs by necessity, then since nothing which occurs through free choice occurs hy necessity, it seems to follow that as long as predestination remains in effect, there is no free choice. Or else it seems to follow that if we can establish some area of free choice, in that area predestination seems to he inoperative.
CHAPTER II
Before I answer this question, it is especially important to notice that predestination dees not apply only to good actions. It can also be said to apply to evil actions--just as God can he said to cause the evil deeds which He does not Himself do hut which He permits to occur. For example, God is