CHAPTER IV
rational nature can receive justice, so no nature except a rational nature is under obligation to justice. For this reason, since there can be injustice only where there ought to be justice, original sin--which is injustice--can be only in a rational nature. Now., rational nature exists only in God, in angels, and in that soul with respect to which a man is said to be rational and without which he is not a man. And since there is no original sin in God or the angels, sin exists only in man's rational soul.
We must also realize that if justice is uprightness of will kept for its own sake, then justice can be only in the will; and only the will can have in justice. For the absence of justice is called injustice only where there ought to be justice. Hence, nothing is said to be just or unjust except (l) justice itself or injustice, (2) the will, or (3) something caused by a just or unjust will. And we call men, angels, the soul, and the soul's actions either just or unjust solely with respect to the will and its volitions.
CHAPTER IV
That Nothing Is Just or Unjust in Itself Except Justice Itself or Injustice; and That Nothing Is Punished Except the Will
For nothing--whether it be a substance, or an action, or anything else-is considered to be just in itself except justice, or considered to be unjust and sinful except injustice. This applies even to the will itself, in which justice and injustice exist. For the will and justice are not identical.
The former is that power of soul by which the soul wills something, and which can be called 'the instrument of willing' just as sight is called 'the instru ment of seeing.' And the latter is that whose possession makes the will just, and whose absence makes the will unjust. Moreover the affections and uses of this instrument are also called 'wills,' but this distinction is too detailed to discuss here.
Those appetites which the Apostle calls both 'the flesh which lusts against the spirit' and 'the law of sin which is in our members, warring against the law of our mind' (Gal. 5*17: Rom. 7'.25), are not considered just or unjust in themselves. For in themselves they do not make a man who has them either just or unjust, but they make him unjust only if he consents to them when he ought not. For the same Apostle says, 'There is no condemnation to them who are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh' (Rom. 8:1), that is, to those who do not give willing consent to the flesh. For if having these appetites, even without consenting to them, constitutes injustice, then a man would be condemned merely for having them. And so we see that it is not sin to have these appetites, but is only sin to consent to them /when one ought not/. Moreover, if the appetites were intrinsically unjust, then every con senting to them would constitute injustice. But brute animals are not called unjust when they consent to them. Or again, if the appetites were sins, they would be removed by baptism, which washes away every sin. But this clearly does not occur. Therefore, there is no injustice in the essence of the appe tites, but only in a rational will which complies with them inordinately. For when the will resists them by delighting in the law of God according to the inward man, then the will is just. For the Apostle calls the justice which the law commands 'the law of God/ because it is from God;, and he also calls justice 'the law of the mind,' because it is known by the mind--just as the old law is called 'the law of God,' because it is from God, and also called
'the law of Moses,' because it was made known through Moses.
I have said that no action is to be called unjust in itself, but only on account of an unjust will. This is plain in the case of certain acts which can be done at times and not be unjust; for example, killing a man (as Phinehas
did) or sexual intercourse (as within marriage or among brute animals). But there are other actions whose injustice seems more difficult to ascribe simply to an unjust will inasmuch as they are always unjust; for example,, perjury and certain other things which ought not be named. Now, consider a certain sinful action which exists only while it is doing something and which ceases after it has accomplished this thing; or consider a sinful work which has been done and which remains after the act of doing it has ceased. (For example, when someone writes something which he ought not, the writing remains even after the act of writing it has ceased.) If it were the case that an action were sinful in it self > then when the action ceased and no longer existed,, sin would also cease; or if it were the case that a work were sinful in itself, then as long as the work remained, sin would also remain. But we see that sins are often not eliminated even when sinful actions are eliminated, and we see that sins are sometimes eliminated even when sinful works are not eliminated. For this reason, neither an action which ceases nor a work which remains is ever sin in itself.
Finally, if our members and our senses are blamed for their execution of voluntary actions, then they can reply: "God subjected us and the power that is in us to the will, so that we cannot keep from moving ourselves when the will commands and cannot keep from doing what it wills. For the will moves us as if we were its instruments, and it does the works which we seem to do. We cannot resist it by our own strength, nor can the works which it does be prevented by us. And neither can nor ought we refuse to obey the will, for God has appointed it to be our master. When we obey the will, we are obey ing God who ordained this law for us." Therefore, how can the members or the senses or their works (all of which God has subjected to the will) be sinful