CHAPTER III
keeping uprightness. Accordingly, ve should never call this man just, and we should never say that such uprightness is justice.
When we were dealing with the relationship of foreknowledge to free choice, we showed by a particular example that it is possible for this uprightness, which I call justice, to coexist with free choice. Through this example one can plainly see that the same thing can be true of many other cases. Thus, if we can show that no creature can obtain uprightness without grace, the harmony we are seeking between grace and free choice in the work of saving man will be manifest.
CHAPTER III
There is certainly no doubt that the will wills rightly only because it itself is upright. No man's sight is acute because he sees clearly; rather, a man sees clearly because his sight is acute. So too, the will is not upright because it wills rightly, but rather it wills rightly because it is itself upright. There is no doubt that when a man wills uprightness he wills rightly.
Therefore, he wills uprightness only because his will is upright. But it is the same for the will to be upright and for it to have uprightness. Thus it is clear that a man wills uprightness only because he has uprightness. I do not deny that an upright will wills an uprightness which it does not yet have when it wills more uprightness than it already has. But I maintain that no one can will this uprightness if he has no uprightness at all by which to will it.
Let us now consider whether someone who does not have this uprightness can obtain it in some way from himself. If he has it from himself, he must have it either by willing it or without willing it. Now, no one is able by willing uprightness to obtain it through his own efforts, since he cannot
will it unless he already has it. And no sound mind can believe that someone who does not have uprightness of will should be able without willing it to obtain it through his own efforts. Therefore, there is no way for a creature to have uprightness from himself. Furthermore, no creature is able to have it from another creature. For it is just as impossible for one creature to give to another the necessary means of salvation as it is for one creature to save another. It follows, therefore, that only by the grace of God can a creature have the uprightness of will that I have been discussing. We have demonstrated, however, that this uprightness can be kept through free choice. So with the bountiful help of God we have found that His grace works harmoniously with free choice for the salvation of man. Thus, grace alone can save man when there is no free choice exercized, as in the case of infants. But in those who have reached the age of understanding, grace always helps the natural free choice by giving to the will the uprightness which it can keep through free choice-v for without grace free choice can do nothing effective for salvation.
And although God does not give His grace to everyone, since 'He has mercy on whom He wills to have mercy, and whom He will He hardens' (Rom. 9:l8); nevertheless He does not give grace to anyone as a reward for some antecedent merit, for 'Who has first given to God and shall be recompensed by Him?'
(Rom. 11:35) If> however, the will through free choice keeps what it has re ceived and in this way merits either an increment of received justice, or even power for a good will, or some other reward, then any reward it earns is the fruit of the first grace. (John l:l6) The bestowing of these rewards, then, really amounts to the giving of grace for grace. Consequently, everything must be attributed to grace, for willing and running are 'not of him who wills nor of him who runs, but of God, who shows mercy.' (Rom. 9:l£>) For the
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