CHAPTER XIII
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CHAPTER XIII
In order that we may understand this matter more clearly., we must investi gate how this will for what is beneficial became so corrupt and prone to evil. For we cannot believe that God created our first parents with such an affection toward evil. When I stated earlier that human nature became cor rupt and acquired the appetites of brute animals because of sin,, I did not explain how such a will arose in man; for base appetites are one things but a base will that assents to them is another. I think, therefore, that we must inquire how such a will became the lot of man.
The cause of such a will shall quickly become apparent to us if we con sider the original condition of rational nature. The intention of God was to make rational nature just and happy so that it could enjoy Him. Eut it was able to be neither just nor happy without the will for justice and happiness.
How the will for justice is itself justice; but the will for happiness is not itself happiness, because not everyone who has the will for happiness has happiness. Ry common consent, happiness is understood to include a sufficient degree of beneficial things, without there being need for more. And this is true whether one is thinking of the happiness of the angels or the happiness of Adam in Paradise. Although the happiness of the angels exceeds that which belonged to Adam in paradise, we cannot for this reason deny that Adam had happiness. For the fact that one object is very hot and is not at all cold does not exclude the existence of a second object even hotter. Or the fact that an object is very cold and is not at all hot does not mean that it cannot get even colder. By the same token, there was nothing to prevent Adam from being happy in paradise and from having no needs, even though the angels' happiness was greater than his. Having less of a thing than someone else does
is not the same as being in need. For being in need consists in being deprived of something which one ought to have; but there was no deprivation in Adam.
Where there is need, there is wretchedness. God created rational nature to know and to love Him, and He would not have made it wretched without some blame on its part. So then. He created man happy and in need of nothing. Rational nature received at once (l) the will for happiness, and happiness, (2) the will for justice (i.e., it received uprightness, which is justice), (3) and free choice, without which it could not have kept justice.
God has so ordained the two wills, or affections, that the instrument of will should use the affection for justice to order and govern one's choices under the guidance of the spirit, which is also called mind, or reason; and that it should use the other affection to will obedience without bringing any disadvantage. Indeed, God gave happiness to man (not to mention the angels) for his benefit, but He gave man justice for His own honor.. He gave justice, however, in such a way that man was able to desert it. But He also provided that if man did not desert it but persistently kept it, he would merit elevation to fellowship with the angels; but if he did desert it, he would subsequently have no way to recover it on his own. Moreover, if he did forsake it, he would fail to attain the happiness of the angels and, furthermore, would be deprived of the happiness which he did possess. As a further consequence, he would fall into the likeness of brute animals and become subject with them to corruption and to the appetites we have often mentioned. Nevertheless, the will for hap piness would still remain, so that through a need of the good things which he had lost, he would be justly punished with dire wretchedness. Since the will actually did desert justice, it has lost its happiness. And the will, which received the good of happiness for its own benefit, became fervent with desire
98for benefits it cannot now keep from willing because it cannot now have those true,, but lost, benefits which are suitable for rational nature. In this con dition the will turns itself to the false benefits sought by brute animals at the urging of their appetites. When the will wills these false benefits in ordinately, then it either rejects uprightness, so that it does not receive it when offered, or else the will casts uprightness away once it has been received.
But when the will wills these benefits within proper bounds, it does not shun or cast away uprightness.
Insofar as the instrument of will has being, it is created good and just and with the power to keep the uprightness it has received. But it is made evil through free choice. It is then evil not insofar as it has being but in sofar as it has been made unjust by the absence of the justice which it ought to have at all times but which it freely deserted. The will henceforth became powerless to will justice which it had deserted. For through free choice one cannot will justice when he does not have it, although he can keep justice when he does have it. Moreover, the will for what is beneficial, which was created good insofar as it has being, becomes something evil; that is to say, it is made unjust because it is not subordinated to justice, without which it ought not to will at all. Therefore, the instrument of will freely became unjust; yet inso far as it possessed any capability after it had deserted justice, it was neces sarily unjust and a servant of injustice. For it cannot return to justice by its own efforts. However, without justice the will can never actually be free, because without justice the natural freedom of choice is useless. It is even made a servant to its own affection for what is beneficial, for once justice is taken away, a man can will only what this affection wills. I maintain that both the instrument and its affection actually will; for the instrument and the