CHAPTER XI
willing something other than uprightness drives out the will for uprightness.
CHAPTER XI
Since the foregoing consideration refers above all to the will, I think it will be worthwhile to say something further about the will. In our bodies we have five separate senses and also various other members, each of which we use like instruments. Our members and our senses are all adapted to their own particular use. For example, our hands are suited for grasping, our feet for walking, our tongues for speaking, and our sight for seeing. In the same manner there are certain powers within the soul, which the soul uses as instruments in fulfilling its appropriate functions. There is, for instance, reason in the soul, which the soul uses as an instrument for reasoning; there is also will, which it uses for willing. Now, reason and will do not comprise the whole soul, but each is something in the soul. Inasmuch as every instrument has its nature, its aptitudes (aptitudines), and its uses, let us distinguish within the will (according to the categories we have just drawn) the instrument, its aptitudes, and its uses. The aptitudes of the will we can call affections, or dispositions (affectiones). For the instrument of willing is obviously affected by its aptitudes. For this reason, when the human soul strongly wills something, it is said to be disposed to will that thing, or to will that thing affectionally.
The word 'will' may be used equivocally to refer to three different things.
There is, first, the instrument of willing, secondly, the affection, or disposi tion, of the instrument, and thirdly, the use of the instrument. The instrument of willing is that power of the soul which we use for willing--just as reason is the instrument of reasoning which we use when we reason, and sight is the instrument of seeing which we use when we see. The affection, or disposition, of the instrument is that by which the instrument is so disposed to will some-
thing that when this thing comes to mind, even when the person does not reflect on it, he either wills it immediately or for its own proper time. For example, the instrument of willing is so disposed to will good health that as soon as this comes to mind, even if the person does not reflect on it, he wills it immediately. And the will is so disposed to will sleep that when it comes to mind, even if the person does not reflect on it, he wills it for its own proper time. Never is the instrument of willing disposed to will sickness or to will never to sleep. In the same way, the instrument of the just man's will is, even while sleeping, so disposed to will justice that when he thinks of justice, he immediately wills it. Finally, the use of the instrument of will is some thing we have only when we reflect upon the thing we are willing.
The word 'will' is used to refer to all three of these: the instrument of willing, its affection, and its use. We call the instrument 'will' in cases where we say that we direct the will toward various objects, such as toward willing to walk, and toward willing to sit, and toward willing now this, now that. Man always possesses this instrument even though he does not always use it--just as he has the power of sight, i.e., the instrument of seeing, even when (in his sleep, for instance) he is not using it. When he does use his sight, he directs it sometimes toward seeing the sky, sometimes toward seeing the earth, and other times toward seeing other things. In the same way we always possess reason, that is, the instrument of reasoning. We are not always using reason; but when we do use it we direct it toward different objects.
Secondly, the affection of the instrument of willing is also called 'will.'
This usage occurs when we say that man always possesses the will for his own well-being. For here what we call will is the affection of that instrument by which a man wills well being. In this way we say that a saint continually
has the will to live justly, even when he is sleeping and not thinking about it. When we say that one person has more of the will to live justly than another person, the only will we are referring to is the affection of that instrument by which he wills to live justly. For the instrument is not greater in one person and less in another. Lastly, the use of this instrument is also called 'will' when someone says 'I now have the will for reading,' that is, 'I now want to read'--or says 'I now have the will for writing,' that is, 'I now want to write.1 For just as seeing is using the sight which is the instrument of seeing, and just as its use is actual seeing, or sight, (at least in the cases where 'sight' signifies the same thing that 'seeing' does, for 'sight* can also signify the instrument of sight), so also willing is using the will which is the instrument of willing, and its use is the willing which occurs only when we think of what we are willing.
Now, the will understood as the instrument is only one thing; that is, in a man the instrument of willing is only one thing, just as reason is only one thing, only a single instrument. But the will understood as that by which the instrument is affected has a double aspect. For just as sight has many apti tudes- -such as the aptitude to see light, and through light to see figures, and in the figures to see color--so the instrument of willing has two aptitudes, which I call affections, or dispositions. One of these affections is for will ing that which is beneficial (commoditatem), the other is for willing upright ness. For the will as instrument wills nothing except uprightness or what is beneficial. Whatever else it wills, it wills for the sake of one of these.
And even when a man is mistaken in thinking that what he wills serves one of these ends, he nevertheless believes that it does. By "the affection to will what is beneficial, a man always wills happiness and being happy. By the
affection to will uprightness he wills uprightness and being upright, or just.
For the sake of what is beneficial he wills certain things, such as farming or laboring,, in order to obtain the means to sustain life and health., which he regards as benefits. For the sake of uprightness he wills certain things, such as the toil of study, so that he may know aright--that is, so that he nay live justly. And finally, as we have already explained, the will understood as the use of our oft-mentioned instrument is actual only in those cases where the person reflects on what he wills. The divisions of this will are manifold; but we shall not deal with them now, though perhaps we shall return to them later.
Thus, 'willing,1 like 'seeing,' has several meanings. For the man who uses his sight and also the man who has the aptitude to see but does not use it, are both said to see. In the same manner, the man who uses the instrument of willing with deliberation on what he wills and the man who does not use it are both said to will, for the latter still has the affection, or aptitude, of willing.
That the word 'will' indicates the instrument of willing, its affection, and its use can also be recognized from the following consideration. If we can at the same time both affirm that a just man, even when he is sleeping and not reflecting on anything, has the will to live justly, and deny that an un just man has this will when he is sleeping, then we are denying of the unjust man the same will we are affirming in the just man. But obviously, when we declare that the will to live justly is not in the unjust man who is sleeping, we are not denying that he has within him the will which I have called the instrument. For every man, asleep or awake, always has that will. Moreover, the will that is in the just man in the manner described above can only be