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it is present, is it possible for a present thing to be not-present at the same time.
In the same manner, there may be something—a certain action, let us say-that is going to occur without necessity, because before it occurs it is possible for it not to occur. But it is necessary that what is going to happen be going to happen, since what is going to happen cannot be not going to happen. As re gards the past, it is true that a thing may have happened without necessity, since before it occurred it was possible for it not to occur. But likewise, it is necessary that what has happened has happened, since it is impossible that what has happened has not happened. Now, the past event has a characteristic which neither the present nor the future event has. For what is past can never become not-past as what is present can become not-present and as what is going to occur without necessity can be not going to occur. But when we say of what is going to occur that it is going to occur, this statement, like all other such statements, must be true--because what is going to happen cannot be not going to happen. So too, 'Every man is a man,' 'If he is a man he is a man,' 'Every white thing is white,' and 'If it is white it is white' are necessarily true statements because something cannot both be and not be at the same time.
Certainly, if it is not necessary that everything which is going to be is going to be, then something which is going to happen is not going to happen.a selfcontradiction. Necessarily, therefore, everything which is going to happen is going to happen; and when something is said to be going to happen and it really is going to happen, then necessarily it is going to happen. But the necessity here is subsequent necessity, which does not compel anything to be.
CHAPTER III
However, a thing which we realize is going to happen need not in every
case happen by necessity; for if I assert., 'Tomorrow there is going to be a revolution in the country/ it does not follow that the revolution will occur by necessity. For before it occurs, it is possible for it not to occur, even though it will actually occur. Nonetheless, sometimes when we say that an event will occur, it is true that it will occur by necessity. An example of this is my stating 'The sun is going to rise tomorrow.' Therefore, if I state that something is necessarily going to occur, this may be understood in two ways: (l) in the way that tomorrow's revolution is necessarily going to occur or (2) in the way that tomorrow's sunrise is necessarily going to occur. For the revolution, which is not necessitated, is called necessary solely on the basis of subsequent necessity--since we are saying about what is going to occur that it is going to occur. For if tomorrow there is to be a revolution, then, necessarily, tomorrow there is to be a revolution. Tomorrow's sunrise, however, is understood to be something that will occur by two kinds of neces sity, namely, by antecedent necessity, which causes the event to occur (accord ing to which the event will occur because it is necessary that it occur) and by subsequent necessity, which does not compel anything to occur (but accord ing to which a thing that is to occur, necessarily is to occur).
Therefore, when we say of the events which God knows will occur that it is necessary for them to occur, we do not always mean that something is going to occur by necessity, but that something which is going to occur, necessarily is going to occur; for what is indeed going to occur cannot at the same time be something that will not occur. We mean the same thing when we say simply 'God foreknows such-and-such an event* without the additional statement, 'and this event is going to occur.' For to foreknow something implies that that thing is going to happen. Indeed, 'to foreknow' means nothing other than to know
what is going to occur. And so, if God foreknows something, then it is neces sary that the thing occur. But it does not follow from the foreknowledge of God that the thing foreknown will in every case occur hy necessity. For although He foreknows all future events, nevertheless He does not foreknow every future event as occurring by necessity. He foreknows that some things are going to occur through the free will of rational creatures.
We must note too that just as it is not necessary for God to will what He does, so in many cases it is not necessary for man to will what he does.
And just as it is necessary that whatever God wills should occur; so also in the things which God places under the control of the human will, it is neces sary that what man wills should occur. Accordingly, if a man wills something, it occurs, and if he does not will it, it does not occur. Now, it is impossible that what God wills should fail to occur. So when He wills that the will of man be neither compelled to will nor prevented from willing by any necessity, then it is necessary that man's will be free. And when God wills that the effect follow from the human will, it is necessary that what man wills should occur. Accordingly, although a man does not by necessity will sin, neverthe less when he does will to sin, a sinful act necessarily occurs. If one were to ask whether a sin committed by the will through its willing occurs neces sarily, the answer must be that just as the will does not will necessarily, neither does the sin of the will occur necessarily. Nor does the will commit sin necessarily, because if it did not will freely, it would not act--even though, as I said above, what it does will, necessarily occurs. Now, to sin in this case is nothing other than to will what one ought not to will; so the sin of the will is not necessary, any more than willing a particular thing is necessary. But it is still true that if a man wills to sin, it is necessary
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