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6o we have no basis for denying that something can be mutable in time while being immutable in eternity. Indeed, something's being mutable in time and immutable in eternity is no more contradictory than something's not existing at a certain time but always existing in eternity, or its having been or its going to be in the order of time what it always vis in the order of eternity.
I am not saying that something which always exists in eternity never exists in time, but only that there are moments in time when such a thing does not exist. I would not say, for instance, that my actions tomorrow never occur at any time; I merely deny that they are occurring today, even though their occur rence is forever present in eternity. Similarly, when we deny of something which was or will be in time that it ever was or will be in eternity, we are not claiming that what was or will be has no existence of any kind in eternity; we are only pointing out that what exists there unceasingly in its own eternalpresent mode does not exist there in the past or future mode. There seems to be no contradiction in this. Thus there is also no contradiction in saying that something is mutable in time, prior to its occurrence, and that it remains immutable in eternity, where nothing exists before or after but everything exists continually. For nothing exists in eternity according to temporal modes.
And there exists there even the eternal fact of something's temporal existence and of its being possible not to exist before it actually does come into exis tence. I think it is sufficiently clear from what I have said that there is no mutual incompatibility whatsoever between the foreknowledge of God and free choice. This is due to the very nature of eternity, which encompasses all time and everything whatsoever that exists at any time.
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Inasmuch as we do not have free choice in all things, we must determine
6i the nature and scope of the freedom of choice which we believe man always has, and we must say something about the nature of choice. For choice and freedom of choice are not the same thing. In many cases we speak of both freedom and choice. We say, for example, that someone is free to speak or to remain silent and that he has the choice of doing whichever he prefers. Freedom and choice are likewise said to be present in many other instances where they are not always present or where they are not necessary to the salvation of our souls.
But I am considering only that choice and freedom whose use is indispensible for man's salvation. Now many people complain bitterly because they think that free choice has nothing to do with their salvation or damnation, which they regard as solely a matter of necessity following from the foreknowledge of God.
Inasmuch as man, after he reaches the age of understanding, can be saved only if he is just, we must examine choice and the freedom from which choice is exercized in order to determine where the seat of justice is. But first we must explain what justice is, and then we can go on to discuss freedom and choice.
Any justice whatever, great or small, is uprightness of will kept for its own sake. And freedom is the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake. I think I have already clearly explicated these definitions, first in the treatise I published Concerning Truth and then again in the treatise On Freedom of Choice. In the latter I showed that this freedom belongs to man naturally and inseparably, even though he does not always use it. I also showed that this freedom is so strong that as long as a man wills to use it, nothing can take away the uprightness (that is, the justice) which he possesses.
Justice indeed is not a natural possession, but in the beginning it was some thing separable in both the angels in Heaven and man in Paradise. And even now it exists in this life, not by necessity but by the proper willing of those who
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possess it. Now, as I said, the justice by which a person is just consists in the uprightness of his will; and this uprightness is in a person only when he wills what God wills him to will. Hence it is clear that God cannot take a man's uprightness away from him against his will, for God cannot will such a thing. But neither can He will that the man who possesses uprightness should by reason of some necessity desert that uprightness unwillingly. If God did will this, He would be willing the man not to will the uprightness He wills him to will--which is impossible. It follows, therefore, that in this way God wills that the upright will be free to will rightly and to keep its uprightness. And when the will is able actually to do what it wills to do, then it does freely what it does. This, therefore, is another very clear way to see that there are wills which are free in their actions without contradicting the foreknowledge of God--a truth I demonstrated earlier.
Let us now postulate the case of a man in whom there appears (l) an upright, or just, will, (2) freedom of choice, and (3) an actual choice. Let us con sider how the upright will might be so attacked that it would desert upright ness, and how it might keep uprightness by free choice. Let us say that some one wishes in his heart to cling to the truth because he knows that it is right to love truth. He has, then, an upright will, or uprightness of will. We must bear in mind that the will itself is one thing, and the uprightness by which it is upright is another. Now suppose that someone approaches this man and threatens to kill him unless he tells a lie. He now has the choice of either forsaking life in favor of uprightness or deserting uprightness in order to live. This choice, or judgment, is free; for reason, which apprehends up rightness, teaches that uprightness ought always to be cherished for its own sake, and that anything set before the will to entice it to forsake uprightness
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