CHAPTER I
ON THE HARMONY OF THE FOREKNOWLEDGE, THE
PREDESTINATION, AND THE GRACE OF GOD WITH FREE CHOICE
With the help of God as I write, I shall try to set forth what He deigns to reveal to me concerning the three questions in which free choice seems to he incompatible with the foreknowledge, the predestination, and the grace of God.
Question One: Concerning Foreknowledge and Free Choice
CHAPTER I
The foreknowledge of God seems to be incompatible with free choice; for the things foreknown by God will necessarily occur, whereas things which happen through free choice take place out of no necessity. But if these are incom patible, then it is impossible that there should be foreknowledge of God, which foresees everything, and that there should also be an event which is brought about through freedom of choice. If, on the other hand, one perceives that there is no such impossibility, then the incompatibility which seems to hold is completely eliminated.
Therefore, let us posit both the foreknowledge of God, from which the necessity of future things seems to follow, and also freedom of choice, by which many things are believed to occur without any necessity; and let us see whether it is impossible for the two to coexist. If it is impossible, then there will arise a further impossibility. For if it really is impossible, then from our positing of free choice and divine foreknowledge, a contra diction will follow. Assuming, then, that there is some event which is going to happen without necessity, God foreknows it, for He foreknows every future event. But what God foreknows will necessarily occur in the same manner as He foreknows it to occur. It follows, then, that it is necessary for this event to be going to occur without neceecity. Therefore, it is true that what
God foreknows will necessarily occur, but also true that God foreknows an event which will occur without any necessity. Consequently, to one who understands correctly, the foreknowledge from which necessity follows does not seem at all incompatible with freedom of choice, from which necessity is excluded.
But you will say to me: 'Your reasoning does not do away with the neces sity of my sinning or of ray not sinning, because God foreknows whether I am going to sin or not sinj and therefore, if I sin, it is necessary for me to sin, and if I do not sin, it is necessary that I do not sin.' To this I reply:
You ought not to say merely 'God foreknows that I am going to sin' or 'God foreknows that I am not going to sin.' But you should say 'God foreknows that it is without necessity that I am going to sin' or 'God foreknows that it is without necessity that I am not going to sin.' From this latter formulation it follows that whether you sin or whether you do not sin, it will not be by neces sity, because God foreknows that the one you are to do shall be done without necessity. Do you see now that is is not impossible for the foreknowledge of God (according to which we say that things foreknown by God are going to occur by necessity) to coexist with freedom of choice (according to which many things are done without necessity)? For if this is impossible, then a contradiction must follow. But no contradiction arises from this.
Perhaps you are thinking: 'When you say that because of God's foreknow ledge it is necessary that I am going either to sin or not to sin without neces sity, you still have not shown that my heart is free from the influence of necessity. For necessity seems to have the ring of coercion or restraint. And therefore, if it is necessary for me to sin willingly, I understand this to mean that some hidden force compels me to will to sin; and if I do not sin, I think it is because I am restrained by this force from willing to sin. For