CHAPTER XXIV
the good of justice; and human nature, thus impoverished, causes all those persons whom it procreates from itself to be sinful and unjust because of the same need of justice. In this way, the personal sin of Adam is found in all those who are propagated from him, even though in them it is not personal sin, but natural (or original) sin.
So it is clear that there is a great difference between the magnitude of Adam's sin and that of those who are propagated from him. Because Adam sin ned by his own will, his progeny sin by that necessity of nature which the personal will of Adam merited for its sin. And although no one thinks that unequal sins are followed by equal penalties, nevertheless the condemnation for personal and original sin is identical, inasmuch as no one who has sinned in either way will be admitted into the Kingdom of God (for which end man was made) except by means of the death of Christ, which alone remits the debt in curred by the sin of Adam. For even though not all men deserve equal torment in Hell, /they all do deserve (apart from the death of Christ) to be excluded from the Kingdom of God/. Hence, after the day of judgment every angel and every man will be either in the Kingdom of God or in Hell. So we see that the sin of infants is less than the sin of Adam, and that nevertheless no one is saved in any way other than by means of that universal satisfaction through which every sin--both great and small--is remitted. And I have already dis cussed in the Cur Deus Homo why this satisfaction could not happen except through the death of Christ; and by the help of God, I also tried there to understand how salvation comes to man through Christ's death.
CHAPTER XXIV
That the Sins of Our Ancestors Who Lived After Adam Are Not Reckoned in the Original Sin of Their Descendants
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I do not think that the sins of our recent ancestors are a part of original sin. Indeed, had Adam not been able to transmit his own justice to those who were going to be generated from him, then he would also not have been able to transmit his own injustice to them. By the same kind of reason ing, since no one who lives after Adam is able to keep justice for his own offspring /for such a person has received from Adam no justice to transmit/,
I see no reason why the sins of recent ancestors should be imputed to the souls of their children. For there is no doubt that infants do not keep up rightness of will for its own sake; and so they are all equally unjust because they do not have that justice which every human being ought to have. This utter lack of justice is transmitted to all human beings from Adam, in whom human'-nature deprived itself of this same justice. Moreover, although some justice remained in Adam--so that he could keep an upright will in some things-nevertheless human nature was deprived of that gift by which it could have kept justice for itself in Adam's posterity. As a result, human nature was not able to propagate itself as a just nature in any of Adam's offspring. And all that human nature could remove from itself in infants was justice, to gether with the happiness which is given only to those who possess the required justice.
Thus, it does not seem possible that the injustice of our recent ancestors could increase the deprivation of justice in human nature such that a greater deprivation could descend to infants from the sin of Adam. For where there is already no justice, no justice can be taken away. And where no justice can be removed, no injustice can be added. Therefore, unjust ancestors are able to add no other injustice to their children than this deprivation of justice which we are discussing /viz., that which comes from Adam/. But
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justice can always be given where none now exists. So if unjust ancestors are said to add any injustice to their children, then it seems both possible and rather probable that just ancestors can give justice to their descendants.
But if this happens, the infant descendants of just ancestors have some kind of justice; and then these infants--if they die without baptism--would be condemned less severely than the children of unjust ancestors. Or if the children of just ancestors were saved; then they would be saved by virtue of having some antecedent merit. But the Apostle Paul denies such a thing when, by referring to Jacob and Esau, he proves that no infant is saved except by a grace which is antecedent to the merits of all infants alike. Therefore; since just ancestors do not give justice to their own descendants prior to baptism, unjust ancestors do not add injustice to their descendants.
But someone may say: 'It is true that unjust ancestors do non add any in justice to their descendants, inasmuch as they are unable to remove any justice from them. But they do cause that original injustice which their des cendants have from Adam to affect them more seriously. Conversely, just ancestors cause the original injustice which their descendants have from Adam to affect them less seriously. For this reason, if children of just ancestors are less unjust than children of unjust ancestors, then they ought not to bo blamed as much as the children of unjust ancestors.'' But let that person dare to say this only if he can prove it. I, for one, do not dare to say this when
I see that both the children of the just and of the unjust are variously elected to, or reprobated from, the grace of baptism. And if anyone else dares to propose the above argument, he cannot prove it. For certainly a man only becomes more just the more willing he is to seek or to avoid vhat he ought; in the same way, a man only becomes more unjust the. more he loves or