Chapter 88 of 362

85. Holiness in the passions

85. Holiness in the passions

85. HOLINESS IN THE PASSIONS

Augustine says while speaking of the passions of the soul: They are evil if our love is evil, good if our love is good.

We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves, secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite (only), then there is no moral good or evil in them, since this (moral good or evil) depends on the reason. If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them.

For the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will, and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary either from being commanded by the will or from not being checked by the will (I-II,24,2).

On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics (Aristotelians); for the Stoics held that all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. . . . The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin; but in so far as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue (I-II,24,2). (“Moderate” here refers to quality, not quantity. It’s not that fewer passions are better, but that passions moderated by reason, formed by reason, in accord with reason, are good while those contrary to reason are bad.)

. . . [J]ust as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act, so also does it belong to the perfection of moral good that man should be moved unto good not only in respect of his will but also in respect of his sensitive appetite, according to Ps. 83:3, My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God, where by heart we understand the intellectual appetite (will) and by flesh the sensitive appetite (I-II,24,3).

Just as eating is in itself neither good nor bad, but when it becomes a material aspect of a moral deed such as receiving the Eucharist, or eating poison, or gluttony, or cannibalism, it becomes good or evil. Sleeping is in itself neither morally good or evil, but a sentry sleeping on duty is evil.

In the third paragraph St. Thomas uses the analogy between physical deeds and emotions: physical deeds become morally good or evil when reason clicks in and they are consciously chosen. And the same applies a fortiori to the passions or emotions.

“Reason”, remember, means not just “calculation” but something almost as broad as “consciousness”. “Will” is “rational desire”, or “reason plus desire”. The “voluntary” is “what is done by the (free) will”. Only voluntary acts are morally good or evil.

We should feel less guilty or less proud than we do about the bad or good feelings and emotions we can’t help having, and we should feel more guilty or more proud about all the things we will—including the feelings we will. Bad feelings, when they arise spontaneously, are not morally bad; but when we will them, they become morally bad. Good feelings are not virtuous when they arise spontaneously, but when we will them because they are good, and the causes of good deeds, or when we enjoy them because they are the effects of good deeds, they become morally good. Good emotions are part of a saint’s soul! The better you are, the more you enjoy being good.

So don’t feel either guilty or proud of your feelings in themselves. All the “passions” (i.e., the emotions that just well up in us without our choice) are neutral, neither good nor evil morally (though some may be helpful and others dangerous) until we make rational choices, conscious choices that involve them. We feel aversion to a nasty person, or sexual excitement when we see a nice person. These are not sins. But when we plan or fantasize how we are going to make the nasty person suffer, or how we would seduce the nice person, that is sin. It takes reason and will to sin.

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