106. The proper role of feelings in a good man’s life
106. THE PROPER ROLE OF FEELINGS IN A GOOD MAN’S LIFE
Stoics say the emotions, passions, or desires are like wild animals: dangerous and bad. They wish they didn’t exist. Sentimentalists like the Epicureans, Rousseau, and modern pop psychologists say that emotions are the best thing in us. They think feelings like compassion and empathy, or sexual love, are the highest good. How does St. Thomas stake out a position between these two extremes? What is the role of the passions in the moral life?
(As Aristotle says,) passions are neither virtues nor vices. . . passions are not in themselves good or evil. For man’s good or evil is something in reference to reason; wherefore the passions, considered in themselves, can be either good or evil forasmuch as they may accord or disaccord with reason (I-II,59,1).
Augustine says: If the will is perverse, these movements, viz. the passions, are perverse also; but if it is upright, they are not only blameless but even praiseworthy. But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral virtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is consistent with them.
The Stoics and Peripatetics (Aristotelians) disagreed on this point . . . For the Stoics held that the soul’s passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man . . . (I-II,59,2).
Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow in Him, for He said (Mt. 26:38): My soul is sorrowful even unto death. Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue. . .
The Stoics . . . held that no evil can happen to a wise man, for they thought that just as man’s only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good to man, so man’s only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous man. But this is unreasonable. For since man is composed of soul and body, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body is some good to man, yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it. Consequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise man and can cause him moderate sorrow.
Also, although a virtuous man can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live without committing slight sins, according to 1 Jo 1:8: If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves . . . And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin. . .
Wherefore moderate sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful is a mark of virtue, as also the Philosopher says.
Moreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil since, just as good is more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more undauntedly shunned on account of sorrow (I-II,59,3).
No man is just who rejoices not in just deeds, as is stated in (Aristotle). . . But joy is a passion. . .
If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reasons for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle; whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason by exercising their proper acts. . .
Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion. It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin (I-II,59,5).
What St. Thomas says is so clear and complete that commenting on it would be like putting a blanket over a bell.