117. Passion and responsibility
117. PASSION AND RESPONSIBILITY
Does passion make us more or less responsible for sin?
The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states . . . if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin, because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control through the reason and will, and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness.
On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far as it shows the intensity of the will toward the sinful act (I-II,77,6).
. . . [O]ne who willfully gets drunk . . . is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. . . (I-II,77,7).
An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. . . .
Sometimes the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether, and then reason can drive the passion away by turning to other thoughts . . . wherefore such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether. . . (I-II,77,7).
The disordered passion that is a cause of sin by blinding the reason has two almost—opposite effects by the very same cause, the blinding of the reason: it both (a) adds to the personal harm of the sin and (b) lessens its personal guilt by lessening freedom and voluntariness.
The more consciously and freely we choose an evil, the more responsible we are for it and the more guilty we are of it; this is why spiritual sins like pride are greater in guilt than carnal sins. Passion that comes before the will’s choice to sin (“antecedent passion”), and helps to cause it and explain it, diminishes the guilt, by diminishing the freedom and reason. But there is also passion that comes after and as a result of the will’s choice. This is “consequent passion”, willed passion. And this increases the guilt, because we will not only the sin but also the cause of the sin, the disordered passion.
There are important practical, pastoral consequences of this moral principle.
First, since it is reason that disordered passions blind, we must keep our reason clear. “Take every thought captive to obey Christ” (2 Cor 10:5).
Second, we must stop excusing ourselves on the grounds of weakness, for there is always some degree of deliberately willed weakness, as in the case of knowingly getting drunk so that we are “freed” from moral inhibitions. As St. Thomas says, passion usually does not take away reason completely, so as to make the sin wholly involuntary.
Third, we must judge others’ sins more leniently, since motives are usually mixed, not pure. For the sinner’s reason is usually weak and blinded, as is ours. We habitually are very ready to see the aspect of voluntariness and blameworthiness in others’ sins and the aspect of blindness and weakness in our own. To be honest and to see things as they are, we must reverse this habit, and look at the voluntariness and blame in our own sins more, and look at our excuses less, while looking at the (neglected) excuses in others’ sins more, and their deliberateness less. For we already see the other half in each case all too readily.