83. The sacredness of conscience
83. THE SACREDNESS OF CONSCIENCE
Why must we always obey our conscience? Why is it sacred?
Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action. . .), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason is the same as to inquire whether an erring conscience binds. . . .
And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason . . . from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil (even if reason is in error and the object is not in fact evil). . .
In like manner, to believe in Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation; but the will does not tend thereto except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil (Thus a belief in Christ that is dishonest or hypocritical is evil, not good, even if its object is in fact true.) . . . to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God (I-II,19,5).
Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?. . . Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring whether an erring conscience binds, so this question is the same as inquiring whether an erring conscience excuses. . . .
. . . [W]hen ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character of moral good and evil . . . when ignorance is in any way willed, either directly or indirectly . . . due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know . . . it does not cause the act to be involuntary . . . such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse the will. . . . [I]f a man’s reason or conscience err through inexcusable ignorance, then evil must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a dilemma, because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is vincible and voluntary (I-II,19,6).
St. Thomas, like the reason he champions, is soft as light and hard as nails; he will not let us escape our own conscience. If we claim we are not guilty for doing some evil because our conscience did not forbid it, since we did not recognize it as evil, he replies that perhaps our conscience did forbid our not wanting to know, our not seeking, honestly and open-mindedly, to know whether the act is in fact evil or not. “If it feels good, do it” is automatically evil, whatever “it” may be, because it means “Don’t worry about your reason and conscience; let passion rule reason.” And we all know in conscience that that is in itself a dishonest excuse, a rationalization.
Of course, “conscience” does not mean feeling. Feeling is a passion, and one of the things to be made subject to reason and conscience. Conscience is a knowing.
Do you want to meet God? Do you want to touch Him? Do you want to hear Him speaking to you? Do you want to know His will for you? Do you want to have a “religious experience”? You do this every time your conscience speaks. Seeking mystical experiences instead is a diversion and an excuse for neglecting this hourly, humdrum meeting with the divine will that confronts us, usually in an uncomfortable way. That’s why we look for something else. Do you want to be a mystic? Conscience is mystical enough. Do you want to meet Absolute Authority? Listen to your conscience. Do you want God to come closer to you? No you don’t; He is already too close for comfort in your conscience.
Ordinary conscience is sacred because it is the very voice of God speaking in your moral reason.
Here’s an embarrassing truth for you: A gloss on Matthew 12:35 says: A man does as much good as he intends (I-II, 19,8). Thus William Law tells you (in A Serious Call to the Devout Life) the only reason why you are not a saint: “Because you do not thoroughly intend to be.” You know you can become a saint if you really wanted to. You have no excuse but your own inexcusable laziness, and no hope but God’s mercy.