Chapter 117 of 362

114. The three dimensions of ethics

114. The three dimensions of ethics

114. THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF ETHICS

C. S. Lewis, in Mere Christianity, uses the image of humanity as a fleet of ships to explain why ethics has three dimensions. The fleet’s sailing orders must tell it three things: First, and most important, what the mission of the fleet is, why it is at sea at all; second, how each ship is to stay shipshape and afloat; and third, how each ship is to cooper—ate with the others and not hinder or bump into the others. These three things symbolize (1) the ultimate purpose of human life, which in fact is supernatural, is God Himself, (2) individual ethics, and (3) social ethics.

Is that right? Is there a necessary philosophical and theological basis for this classification of all moral good and evil into three parts?

Whether sin (and therefore also sanctity or virtue, sin’s opposite) is fittingly divided into sin against God (#1), against oneself (#2), and against one’s neighbor (#3)?

. . . there should be a threefold order in man:

One in relation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason;

Another order is in relation to the rule of the divine law, whereby man should be directed in all things;

And if man were a solitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is naturally a civic and social animal . . . hence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation to other men. . . .

Of these orders the second (the divine) contains the first (the individually human) and surpasses it. For whatever things are comprised under the order of reason are comprised under the order of God Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God which surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith and things due to God alone. . . .

In like manner, the first order (individual reason) includes the third (social ethics) and surpasses it, because in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our neighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason. Yet in some things we are directed according to the order of reason in relation to ourselves only and not in reference to our neighbor. . . .

. . . by the theological virtues man is directed to God, by temperance and fortitude to himself, and by justice to his neighbor. . .

To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as the order to God includes every human order, but in so far as order to God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special kind of sin (I-II,72,4).

The most practical consequence of this analysis is that all natural good or evil, virtue or vice, is part of supernatural good or evil; that the natural law, as St. Thomas elsewhere says, is a “participation in” the eternal law; and therefore “to sin against God (and the eternal law) is common to all sin”, including sin against yourself and your neighbor. In other words, the “vertical” dimension, the relation to God, is present, at least anonymously, in all “horizontal” choices and acts toward self or neighbor. Thus Christ said, “As you did it to one of the least of these my brothers [including yourself!], you did it to me” (Mt 25:40). Every sin takes the shape of the Cross: every “horizontal” sin against self or others always has the “vertical” dimension of defiling and profaning something holy. Every act of injustice to your neighbor is profaning the Christ of the Eucharist.

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