105. The importance of reason in morality
105. THE IMPORTANCE OF REASON IN MORALITY
If reason is not sufficient for morality, is it necessary?
Whether there can be moral virtue without intellectual virtue?
(Objection 1.) It would seem that moral virtue can be without intellectual virtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says, is a habit like a second nature . . . as is evident in natural things devoid of knowledge. Therefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature. . .
(Reply to Objection 1.) The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is without choice; wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity require reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice; and consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that reason be perfected by intellectual virtue.
(Objection 2.) Further . . . it happens at times that men are virtuous and acceptable to God without being vigorous in the use of reason.
(Reply to Objection 2.) A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason as to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things which have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have full use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack of worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Mat. 10:16: Be ye wise as serpents and simple as doves.
Gregory says that the other virtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real virtues. But prudence (practical wisdom) is an intellectual virtue. . . . Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual virtues.
Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual virtues . . . but not without understanding and prudence. (For) in order that a choice may be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be directed to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which inclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with reason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly the things which have reference to (i.e., those things which are good means to) the end; and this he cannot do unless his reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence. . . (I-II,58,4).
On nearly every question, St. Thomas habitually avoids two opposite extremes that other philosophers tend to fall into. The two extremes in morality are intellectualism and anti—intellectualism.
Intellectualists like Plato say reason alone is sufficient for morality; that the cause of moral evil is intellectual ignorance and the cause of moral goodness is reason, with no role for will or feelings. (Plato has a very primitive concept of will: it is little more than the capacity for righteous indignation, which is really a passion rather than the will.) Modern Utilitarians make an error similar to Plato’s in identifying morality with rational self-interest, in a much more calculating way. The intellectualism of Aristotle recognizes the will but does not emphasize it as much as Jews and Christians do. No pagans did, since only Jews and Christians believed that the fundamental relationship for human beings, i.e., the relationship to a personal God, was a relationship of will and choice—to trust and obey His will or not to, i.e., faith or sin. These two categories were simply unknown to the pagans. God was not that intimate with them.
Anti-intellectualists make the opposite error. Emotivists like Rousseau say morality is a matter of emotion, not reason or will. Voluntarists like Kant say the opposite: that morality is a matter of will simply, not emotion; that “duty” is not only totally distinct from but even opposed to “inclinations”. For Kant the only thing that is good in itself is a good will.
So intellectualists say that reason is sufficient for morality and anti-intellectualists say it is not even necessary; St. Thomas says it is necessary (thus the point of this article: that there cannot be moral virtue without intellectual virtue: wisdom and prudence); but it is not sufficient. The navigator (reason) is necessary, but so is the captain (will), and also well—trained sailors (passions, desires, and emotions).