Chapter 114 of 362

111. Moderation and extremism

111. Moderation and extremism

111. MODERATION AND EXTREMISM

St. Thomas, following Aristotle, says that every moral virtue is a mean between two extremes. That sounds dull and boring. Weren’t the saints extremists, absolutists, zealots, and just a little bit wonderfully crazy?

Whether Moral Virtues Observe the Mean?

(Objection 1.) It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the mean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is extreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme. . . .

(Reply.) Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason, while its matter (contents, raw material) consists in passions (emotions) or operations (external actions). If therefore we compare moral virtue to reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity, while excess and defect (both) take the position of the other extreme, viz. deformity. But if we consider moral virtue with respect of its matter, then it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion conform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says that virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state, in so far as the rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter, but it is an extreme in reference to the ‘best’ and ‘the excellent’. . . (I-II,64,1).

Whether Theological Virtues Observe the Mean?

Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible to sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by excess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue; for it is written (Sir 43:33 DR): Bless the Lord, exalt Him as much as you can, for He is above all praise. Therefore theological virtue does not observe the mean. . . . [N]ever can we love God as much as He ought to be loved, nor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. . . . [T]here can be no excess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. . . (I-II,64,4).

Even the virtues that do consist in a mean or median, viz. the four cardinal natural moral virtues, consist in a mean only with regard to their matter or raw material, i.e., the bodily actions and emotional passions that the reason and the will rightly order. The order itself, that is, the imposing of order and form on the actions and passions, the forming of right actions and passions, is not a mean but is a matter of “extreme in reference to the ‘best’ ”. You can do too much or too little “stuff”, and you can feel too much or too little of any emotion, but you can’t be too virtuous.

Of course you can be too self-consciously virtuous, or too self—righteously virtuous, or too concerned with the apparent virtue of your public persona, but these are not virtues but vices. You can be too sissified, but that is not the virtue of kindness. You can be too conservative and risk—averse, but that is not the virtue of prudence. You can be too bull—headed, but that is not the virtue of courage. You can be a cold-hearted “control freak”, but that is not the virtue of self-control. You can refuse to go beyond what is “proper”, but that is not the virtue of justice, any more than revenge is.

As for the theological virtues, the more “extremism” the better! You can’t ever love God too much, for He is infinitely lovable. You can’t ever put too much hope in Him, for He is always more generous than you can imagine or conceive. You can’t ever put too much faith in Him, for He is always infallibly true—true to Himself, true to His promises, and true to His love for you. Be an extremist!

There is, however, only one right object for this fanaticism or extremism. For there is only one God. All other absoutes, all other extremisms, are idols. Once we are absolutistic about God, we are freed to be relativistic about everything else. Everything good is good only because it is relative to God, only because it either comes from God or leads to God. So Christianity is also the most relativistic of relativisms, as well as the most absolutistic of absolutisms.

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