186. Anger
186. ANGER
Is anger sinful?
To be angry is not always an evil. . . .
The Stoics designated anger and all the other passions as emotions opposed to the order of reason, and accordingly they deemed anger and all other passions to be evil. . . . But according to . . . Aristotle . . . anger is not always evil.
Anger may stand in a twofold relation to reason. First, antecedently (anger before reason); in this way, it withdraws reason from its rectitude, and has therefore the character of evil. Secondly, consequently (anger after reason), inasmuch as the movement of the sensitive appetite is directed against vice and in accordance with reason. This anger is good and is called zealous anger.
This latter anger, although it hinder somewhat the judgment of reason in the execution of the act, does not destroy the rectitude of reason. . . . Nor is it incompatible with virtue that the deliberation of reason be interrupted in the execution of what reason has deliberated, since (practicing an) art also would be hindered in its act if it were to deliberate about what has to be done while having to act.
It is unlawful to desire vengeance considered as evil to the man who is to be punished, but it is praiseworthy to desire vengeance as a corrective of vice and for the good of justice (II-II,158,1).
Anger is properly the name of a passion. A passion of the sensitive appetite is good in so far as it is regulated by reason, whereas it is evil if it set the order of reason aside. . . . Wherefore if one desire revenge to be taken in accordance with the order of reason, the desire of anger is praiseworthy and is called zealous anger. On the other hand, if one desire the taking of vengeance in any way whatever contrary to the order of reason, for instance if he desire the punishment of one who has not deserved it, or beyond his deserts, or contrary to the order prescribed by law, or not for the due end, viz. maintaining justice and correcting faults, then the desire of anger will be sinful, and this is called sinful anger. . . . Anger should not be immoderately fierce, either internally or externally, and if this condition be disregarded anger will not lack sin even though just vengeance be desired (II-II,158,2).
Chrysostom says: He who is not angry when he has cause to be angry, sins. For unreasonable patience is the hotbed of many vices; it fosters negligence and incites not only the wicked but even the good to do wrong (II-II,158,8).
(However,) In the case where anger is contrary to charity, it is a mortal sin (II-II,158,3).
Jesus got angry! He was “like us in all things except sin”. Therefore anger is not sin.
Wrath (anger) is ascribed to God, by analogy, in the Old Testament. Even though this is only an analogy, since God has no passive passions, yet nothing evil can be an analogy for anything good. Therefore anger can be good.
Common sense tells us that someone who does not get angry even in the presence of gross evil is not morally superior but morally inferior. He is slothful. He does not care about justice.
Since anger is a passion (emotion), what is true of all the passions is true of anger too: that it is neither good nor evil in itself. The Stoics failed to see that the passions could be good, could participate in the good of reason. They did, however, correctly see that reason is the standard. Anger that destroys reason is evil. Anger that comes from and is justified by reason is good. (Please remember always that “reason” for St. Thomas and the ancients means not cold calculation but wisdom and understanding.)
Sloth is a capital sin. (See above, ##180-82). Sloth makes anger impossible. Thus “he who is not angry when he has (right) cause to be angry, sins.”
Anger is, however, dangerous: first, because it tends to paralyze the reason (although this is sometimes necessary) and second, because it can drive out charity (which is always inexcusable).