Chapter 46 of 322

Whether the condition of faith removes the grace and universality of the promises of the Gospel.

Whether the condition of faith removes the grace and universality of the promises of the Gospel.

Whether the condition of faith removes the grace and universality of the promises of the Gospel.

§ 42. The condition of faith, which the promises of the Gospel require, takes nothing away from its gratis character or universality. We prove the first in this way. Anything that is outside of and, in fact, against the merit of another and is offered and granted to someone by way of grace [ex gratia] is free [gratuitum]. The Gospel promises are outside of and, in fact, against merit, and by way of grace they offer heavenly goods to those who repent. Therefore they are surely free. Although the good things offered in the Gospel are accepted by faith and cannot be accepted except by faith, yet even on account of this they do not cease being free for two reasons. First, faith itself is God’s gift and is not a matter of our work. In fact, through the word of the Gospel the Holy Spirit kindles faith in our hearts. Second, faith is not involved as something meritorious for whose worth God has respect but rather only as the instrument, as a begging hand which at most merely accepts the alms of a rich man. Yet the alms do not cease being free because of this. Thus the mention of grace excludes not every condition but only the condition of our merit and works. Augustine (Sermon 15 de verb. apost.):

If grace depends on merit, you have purchased—you have not received freely. He says that He will save them for nothing. Why is it that You save people for nothing? You find no reason in them to save them, and still You save them. You give freely; You save freely. You precede all the merits so that Your gifts are determined by Your merits. Surely You give freely and save freely because You find no reason [in man] to save men, and You find many reasons to damn them.

§ 43. The following must be considered regarding the second point. The universality of the evangelical promises is set against the architects of the absolute decree of reprobation, who claim that the evangelical promises pertain only to a certain few who have been elected by an absolute decree, and that this happens by God’s intent and counsel. Yet such an indeterminate and absolute universality of those [promises] which would exclude the condition of faith must not be introduced. For just as God wants all people to be saved not absolutely and simply but in this order, that they repent and believe in Christ, and He wants those who persist in impenitence and unbelief to be damned (Mark 16:16), so also the promises of the Gospel are universal, not absolutely and indeterminately in every way but under the condition of faith.

“But,” you say, “the architects of the absolute decree also claim that the evangelical promises are universal with respect to believers. Will there thus no longer be any controversy about this matter?” We respond. Not at all; the controversy will be very great. For they claim that by an absolute decree God denies faith to certain people, and thus the evangelical promises do not pertain to them, even if the promises are offered to them outwardly. Against this we claim that God seriously wills that all should come to a knowledge of the truth [1 Tim. 2:4] and that to this end God offers to all people the word of the Gospel through which He wishes with all His heart to kindle faith in their hearts and make them partakers of salvation, even though they may stubbornly hinder the work of the Holy Spirit by resisting Him and in this way may judge that they are unworthy of eternal life [Acts 13:46]. Therefore the fact that not all people become actual sharers of the benefits which are offered to people in the word of the Gospel does not take anything away from the universality of the evangelical promises, for this ultimately happens [not due to the substance of the promises but] by accident and in no wise restricts the quantity of those promises.

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