[Augustine] ( De civ. Dei , bk. 13, ch. 4):
Whether a debt of punishment remains to be paid after fault is forgiven.
§ 125. Now that these have been set forth, Bellarmine attacks the acropolis of the controversy over satisfactions and tries to prove: first, that “there often remains a debt of punishment to be paid after the fault has been forgiven, since David was punished by the death of his son after he received forgiveness for adultery and murder (2 Samuel 12); since he was given the option to select war, pestilence, or famine (2 Samuel 24) on account of his numbering of the people even after the fault was forgiven; since this is very obvious from other examples (Exodus 32; Numbers 14 and 20; 1 Corinthians 11); and, finally, since even the devout are answerable to temporal death.
We respond. (1) If it had to be concluded that not every sin has been remitted due to the calamities which the devout still endure after being reconciled with God through repentance, it would follow by the same logic that even Baptism would not provide full remission of fault and punishment. The consequent is false, thus also the antecedent. The logical sequence of the argument is very firm. Indeed, baptized infants are susceptible to illnesses and disasters and sometimes die immediately after Baptism. Baptized adults are not freed from ailments through Baptism, but, as experience witnesses, they still remain susceptible to them. Bellarmine himself denies the consequent, for he writes (preceding chapter, col. 1419): “God could forgive the universal debt of punishment, as we are sure He does, as soon as He accepts us as His children through Baptism.” Thus we proceed in this way. The temporal calamities which the devout sustain after receiving the forgiveness of sins are either of this life or of the life to come (on the basis of the hypothesis of the Papists, for they claim that those people are subject not only to the disasters of this life but also to the flames of purgatorial fire unless they have provided sufficient satisfaction in this life; since this will be particularly disputed in the treatise On Purgatory [cf. On Death, Commonplace XXIX, §§ 181–292], here we shall speak about only the calamities of this life). We distinguish the former in this way: that we call some “contracted from elsewhere” (the Scholastics call them “penalties”), but some, “voluntarily attracted.” These latter are either civil [penalties] inflicted by a magistrate, or they are of the other sort, which God Himself inflicts, and these again are common or singular. As regards calamities contracted from elsewhere—that is, from original sin—it is obvious that these are not taken away completely through repentance either in or outside of Baptism, since corrupt concupiscence still has a place in the flesh (though mortified and resisted) and since the baptized also are susceptible to the temporal punishments of original sin. As regards civil penalties voluntarily attracted, repentance also does not take these away either in or outside of Baptism, since the Gospel does not abolish political arrangements, and it is in the best interests of the state, which criminals have upset, that crimes do not go unpunished. If receiving Baptism were to remit civil punishment, many would receive it because of the impunity of previously committed crimes and for the convenience of this life. Nevertheless the magistrate occasionally grants a certain relaxation of civil punishments to people who have converted from Judaism, something we leave to its own place. As regards the calamities which God Himself inflicts upon the reconciled and which we distinguish from civil [penalties] imposed through the government, we readily concede that, even after obtaining the forgiveness of sins, not only are the devout susceptible to the common calamities of this life (as Scripture and experience testify), but also some have singular calamities imposed on them in this life, which is proven by examples brought out into public view.
(3) Yet in this life God does not always impose singular punishments on all those whose sins He remits, as is testified by the examples of the paralytic (Matthew 9), the sinful woman (Luke 7), the publican (Luke 8), Zacchaeus (Luke 19), and Peter (Matthew 26). Consequently, it cannot be said in general that after the remission of fault there remains the debt of singular punishments to be repaid. Bellarmine himself seems to acknowledge this, and consequently he writes: “Once fault has been forgiven, the debt of punishment is not always forgiven” (De poenit., bk. 4, ch. 1) and “After fault has been forgiven, there often remains the debt of punishment” (same book, ch. 2). If the debt of punishment also is not always forgiven after fault has been forgiven, then at some time both fault and punishment are remitted. If there often remains the debt of punishment after fault has been forgiven, then this is not universal and constant and, consequently, cannot properly be called “debt,” which is something that must always be paid.
(4) But there must also be an explanation as to why and to what end God imposes such punishments or calamities upon the reconciled, namely, that they are not merits for the forgiveness of sins nor compensations for eternal punishment nor satisfactions for sins. Rather: (a) With respect to others, they are public signs of God’s judgment against sins (Num. 12:14; 2 Sam. 12:14). “If judgment begins from the household of God, what will be the end of those who do not believe the Gospel?” (1 Pet. 4:17). (b) With respect to the devout themselves, they are reminders of what has already happened and warnings against what is to come. After reconciliation, the devout are subjected either to common calamities or to particular punishments so that this warning quickly kindles and causes to grow within them a greater hatred and loathing of sin, the fear of God, faith which has an anxious concern to retain grace and remain in goodness, a diligence to be careful about sins so that their corrupt inclinations might be restrained and mortified. They are also exercises of repentance which ought to be constant, of faith, of obedience in the cross, of hope, of the petition for and expectation of help through forgiveness and mitigation, so that they may always bear witness that they would have to perish due to their sins unless they were received for the sake of the Son of God; and also that they not take for themselves the praise of their own righteousness, lest they lift themselves up above other sinners, but rather subject themselves to God in a true and humble confession of weakness. All these come from Dr. Chemnitz (Examen Concil. Trident., part 2, ch. De satisfact. p. 370).7 Briefly speaking, they are admonitions about the other sins which still adhere to the flesh. They are the reins which restrain the flesh, lest it continue to indulge in sins. They are the examples by which others are stirred to a hatred of sin. They are the instruments which serve to cast light on God’s glory.
Chrysostom’s statement belongs here (on 1 Corinthians, homily 28): “When the Lord corrects us, it is more for admonition than for condemnation, more for medication than for punishment, more for correction than for penalty.” Again: “Lest we remain useless sinners and become even worse, He did not remit our punishment but rather saw this clearly: that it is no less damnable for those sins not to be punished. For this reason, He imposes punishment but is not demanding the punishment concerning the sins, but is correcting us for the future” (Homily De poenitent. et confess.).
Augustine (De peccat. merit. et remiss., bk. 2, ch. 33): “Those who say that we surely would not die after the remission of sins which the Redeemer grants us, if the death of the body had been added to sin, do not understand how God permits the things of which He absolves the guilty man nevertheless to remain for the contesting of faith, so that those who are advancing in the combat of righteousness may be taught and trained by them.” Chapter 34: “Calamities before remission are the punishments for sins. But after remission they are the contests and exercises of the righteous.”
** Again (on John, tract. 124, toward the middle): “Once his sins are forgiven, man tolerates the wretchedness into which he is still coming because of his sin. Yet punishment keeps its hold on the man temporally, even one whom fault no longer holds guilty, so as to point out due misery or to correct a slipping life or to exercise necessary patience.” “Punishment is more productive than fault. Fault should not be considered unimportant if punishment is also included with it” (ibid.). “What you are suffering, the reason for your tears, is medicine and not punishment. It is chastisement, not condemnation” (on Psalm 102, vol. 8, fol. 1166). Theodoret (on Psalm 32): “The psalmist does not say, ‘You have forgiven my sin,’ but ‘the wickedness of sin’ [v. 5]. This is interpreted as follows: You did not punish me with the worthy punishment of my sin; rather, You remitted the excess of my sin and provided healing with a limited chastisement.” Augustine again (Contra Faustum, bk. 22, ch. 67) says, “David received forgiveness only for his eternal salvation, for he did not escape the chastisement of the paternal rod according to God’s threat so that, having confessed, he might be free forever but tested by temporal affliction.” **
[Augustine] (De civ. Dei, bk. 13, ch. 4):
For this the experience of the separation of the soul from the body is left, though its connection with sin was removed since faith itself would be weakened if the immortality of the body were to immediately follow the sacrament of regeneration. Faith is faith when it waits in hope for what it does not yet see in substance [Heb. 11:1]. By the strength and struggle of faith, at least in ages past, one had to overcome his fear of death. This was particularly clear in the case of the holy martyrs who surely could have had no victory and no glory in the struggle, since no struggle at all would have been possible if, after the washing of regeneration, those who were saints could not have suffered the death of the body.
(5) Bellarmine insists that “the calamities imposed upon the reconciled are punishments in the proper sense of the word and pertain to past sin.”
We respond. We shall not battle tiresomely over words, namely, whether the afflictions of the reconciled should be called punishments for sins.
** In a sound sense they can be called punishments, but not after the fashion of the Papists, for those are satisfactory, but rather in the scriptural mode which calls them “judgments” (1 Cor. 11[:29, 34]) since they are inflicted due to sins, not for death nor condemnation but so that they may learn to walk more carefully. But these punishments are marks of God’s love in another respect since “whoever loves his son chastises him” (1 Cor. 11[:32]; Heb. 12[:7]). Luther expressly calls them “punishments” (Scholia on Joel 2; Assert. articulor. suorum, art. 5; Wittenberg edition, vol. 1, fol. 53); Phil. (Opera Luth., Wittenberg Latin edition, vol. 1, f. 484); Chytraeus (on Leviticus 25); Kirchner (Meth. explicat., locus De poenit., fol. 811); Chemnitz (Exam., part 2, ch. 10, De operibus satisf., fol. 204); Leyser (on Genesis 49); Selnecker (Paedag.); Gesner (on Genesis 45, f. 851); Hesshusius (Examen, published at Helmstedt in 1586). [In the latter work, Hesshusius] corrected his own earlier opinion that they were not punishments, for he reports that he was admonished about this matter by pastors (preface to 1 Corinthians, written in 1573). Jon. 3:9: “Who knows if God may turn away from His wrath?” Our people explain this passage as pertaining to the averting of temporal calamities. “O Lord, rebuke me not in Your anger” (Ps. 6:1). Balduin (commentary on Romans 3, q. 4) distinguishes between the punishment of penalty and the punishment of chastisement or of testing. The punishment of penalty, which must properly be called punishment and which is a debt for committed sins, is forgiven along with sins. The punishment of chastisement or of testing, which must correctly be called “the cross” and “calamity,” is left even for the devout to bear in this mortal life. **
Should they be called paternal chastisement? But this is certain: there is a great difference between the afflictions which are inflicted upon the wicked and those which are imposed upon the reconciled. The former are the signs that God has been offended; they bear witness that such a person is under God’s wrath. But the latter proceed not from an angry but from a favorable God, “humbling the sons of men, but not from the heart casting them away” (Lam. 3:33). Nazianzen says (Σκετλ.) that they are “bitter arrows from God’s sweet hand.” The former refer to the correction and salvation of the devout, but the latter are the testimonies and, in fact, the beginnings of eternal punishment.
It cannot be denied that there is a constant relation between fault and punishment. Therefore wherever the remission of fault occurs, there punishments, in the proper sense of the word, can have no place. Moreover, the remission of sins is nothing other than the pardoning of punishment. In fact, original sin with respect to its root and tinder (though mortified and restrained) always remains in the reborn while actual sin with regard to actuality [ratione actus] passes away. But when it is forgiven, it is not returned from done to undone, but rather only the guilt of punishment is removed. Therefore these conflict with each other: that sin is truly forgiven and yet punishment, properly called, must still be endured because of sin.
** Augustine (Retract., bk. 1, ch. 9): “Every punishment is a punishment for sin if it is just.” Thomas ([ST,] part 1.2., q. 87, arts. 7–8) teaches: “Every punishment which is merely and properly a punishment is because of some fault.” Pererius (on Genesis 9, p. 541, no. 163): “If ‘punishment’ is taken properly, it necessarily corresponds to sin and cannot exist without it. Indeed, the punishment repays and reestablishes the equality of the justice which sin has violated.” Bellarmine (De poenit., bk. 1, ch. 7): “Fault is the cause of punishment because out of fault the obligation to punishment is born.” “Fault and punishment are related” (De laic., bk. 3, ch. 11). We have to contrast these testimonies of Bellarmine to the place where he says (De matrim., ch. 17, from [Ius canonicum,] 6., De reg. juris., reg. 23): “There must be no punishment without fault unless there is an underlying cause.” Then he adds: “Not only fault but also a cause must underlie, with the result that one could be punished in no way.” Thomas ([ST,] 2.2., q. 108, art. 4) distinguishes between punishment as it is considered according to the manner of punishment—that is, strictly and accurately—and then it is not owed except for sin; and punishment as it is considered as medicine, and then someone, namely, a devout person, is sometimes punished without any fault of his own, that is, fault which has been forgiven him for Christ’s sake, but not without cause. **