Glossary
GLOSSARY
accident. An incidental property of a thing. That which affects something and is outside its essence. For example, “whiteness” can be an accident of a wall but is not of its substance. See substance.
actuality, primary (actus primus). This term can be taken in two ways. Sometimes it means “potentiality,” which is contrasted with “actuality.” For example, “The boy is a grammarian in primary actuality,” because as time passes he can become a grammarian, though he is not actually one now. But sometimes it means an inherent quality or habitus that one possesses, but that does not exert itself. “Primary actuality” in this sense is contrasted with “secondary actuality” or “operation.” For example, “Priscian, even in his sleep, is a grammarian in primary actuality, though he is not exerting this grammatical knowledge in secondary actuality.” In both cases, primary actuality refers to a power or potential that is not currently actualized. See actuality, secondary.
actuality, secondary (actus secundus). The actual operation of a thing. For example, “Priscian, when exercising his grammatical knowledge, is a grammarian in secondary actuality.” See actuality, primary.
adjunct. Anything added to something else which is not part of its essence. An adjunct is really distinguished from its subject, even if it is proper to the subject. While adjuncts are often accidents (such as wisdom in a man), they can also be substances (such as wine in a bottle).
argument from nondistributed to distributed. A fallacious argument that moves from what is unspecified to what is specified. It starts from the premise of what holds true for part of a set, and then concludes that this same thing holds true for the entire set. “Distributive particles” are words such as “none, all, some.” These words tell us specifically what part of a set is being discussed.
cause, contributory. A “contributory cause” or “co-cause” is a nonprincipal cause which, nevertheless, is required by the principal cause.
cause, efficient. Something by means of which something else happens and on which the effect of that happening depends; that which brings about an effect.
cause, formal. The same as the “form” of something. That which completes another thing, or determines it, or through which it operates. “Form” is that which gives the being of a thing. For example, the form of fire is what gives to fire the being of fire, or makes it what it is. A formal cause gives being to an effect by forming a material.
cause, impulsive. That which impels a principal efficient cause to act. This impulsion either comes from inside or outside the principal cause.
cause, instrumental. Also called a “secondary cause,” “organic cause,” or “ministerial cause.” In producing an effect, the instrumental cause makes a specific contribution, but it operates only in virtue of motion or power given it from the principal cause. See cause, principal.
cause, ministerial. Seecause, instrumental.
cause, principal. Also called a “primary cause.” In producing an effect, the principal cause is not an instrument of some cause that is higher or more primary in its class or genus. See cause, instrumental.
definition, formal (ratio formalis). What makes a thing to be what it is.
end. Aim, purpose, goal. An end is the cause for which a doer acts or that for whose sake something happens.
fallacy of cause. This sort of fallacious argument posits a false cause (or rationale) for a given fact and deduces a conclusion on the basis of that false cause.
fallacy of the consequent (or “fallacy of the conclusion”). Committed by confusing the antecedent and consequent parts of a conditional sentence. For example, it is true that if Joe is a man, he is an animal. But it is a fallacy of the consequent to say that if Spot is an animal, he is a man.
form. That which completes another thing or determines it or through which it operates. “Form” is that which gives the being of a thing. For example, the form of fire is what gives to fire the being of fire, or makes it what it is.
habit, innate and acquired. A disposition or habit [habitus] is an inclination of a rational being toward doing certain acts. A habit does not compel the doer, but makes him more ready and able to do certain acts. An “innate disposition” arises from a person’s nature. An “acquired disposition,” on the other hand, comes from repeated human actions, and hence it derives from free choice. For example, one can acquire the habit of playing the guitar by much practice.
material. Matter, the potential and determinable part of a composite, i.e., that from which something arises or of which it consists; the second cause—natural, internal, and essential—from which bodies are made and consist.
mode, fourth. See property in the fourth mode.
prescription of time. The allegation of long and immemorial time for the purpose of demonstrating the possession of something. Continuation of possession through a period of time defined by law is a way to attain possession of something. Here, the Pharisees claimed that their corrupt interpretations were genuine by using the “prescription of time,” the claim that these interpretations were ancient and therefore correct.
property in the fourth mode. The strongest manner in which something can belong properly to, or be the property of, a species. In the “fourth mode,” something is the property only of the individuals of a species, of all of them, and always.
πρὸς ἕν (“to one”). The term was used by Aristotle when speaking about an “imperfect genus,” a category of things in which a quality could not be predicated equally about all members of the category; the quality would belong more to one species than to another.
reduction. To practitioners of logic, reductio is the technique of making an imperfect syllogism perfect either by providing more evidence or by a “reduction to absurdity.”
refutation (elenchus). A syllogism that disproves something. There are either true refutations or sophistical, deceptive refutations.
related things (or correlated things or correlatives). Among the rules governing relations, Micraelius states: “Related things are together both in nature and in recognition, so that when one is posited, the other is posited too, and when one is recognized, the other is recognized too.” Micraelius uses “father” and “son” as an example (Lexicon Philosophicum, s.v. “Relatio”). Thus, upon learning that Isaac is a son, you know that there must be a father. The one implies the other.
subject (subjectum). A “subject” was usually the subject of a proposition, a something or someone about which something is stated. From there, a “subject” could be defined as anything that can receive an accident or an adjunct. Gerhard uses the term to refer to what something is in and of itself.
subordinates. Noncontradictory things or propositions of which one is categorized under the other.
substance. A being subsisting of itself. A concrete reality, that which exists. See accident.
term, middle. In a syllogism, the “middle term” appears in both the major and minor premises. For example, in the syllogism “All X is Y; but all Y is Z; therefore all X is Z,” the middle term is Y.