Is man’s will a contributing cause of repentance?
Is man’s will a contributing cause of repentance?
§ 37. The Papists claim that a person’s will is a contributing cause [συναίτιον] of repentance. Bellarmine (De poenit., bk. 1, ch. 6, col. 1178) accuses Dr. Chemnitz of lying because he had written: “The Papists lead a man who falls into sin after Baptism to human works—that is, to his own works—so that when the word of absolution is present they are and become a sacrament, that is, the efficient cause which confers the grace of reconciliation with God.” [Bellarmine] says (in col. 1182) that [Chemnitz] falsely attributed this writing to Thomas Aquinas: “For the remission of sins, our action is required, and it is meritorious because it falls under free choice.”
To this we respond as follows. (1) Bellarmine writes (De poenit., bk. 2, ch. 2, prop. 2): “Contrition is a free act,” that is, the sort of action which is within our power. He tries to prove this from the fact that there are divine commands concerning contrition. He says, “Why would things that are not within our power be commanded of us?” He writes (ch. 3): “At this time we are quite in agreement with the Lutherans that repentance and, through it, conversion are gifts of God which we cannot obtain without divine inspiration, by the powers of nature alone.” [Again he says] (De poenit., bk. 1, ch. 6, mend. 3): “Contrition and the confession that follows are not only our work but also God’s, who inspires them in us.” Although Bellarmine disapproves of the obviously Pelagian opinion which attributes contrition—and therefore the entire work of conversion—solely to the powers of free choice, nevertheless he embraces the Pelagian idea which distributes conversion between the grace of God and man’s will. That is, he claims that man’s will from its natural powers cooperates immediately at the very first beginning of conversion, something we discussed in greater detail in our treatise On Free Choice [Commonplace XIV, §§ 50–101]. Let Bellarmine recognize his own words (De grat. et libero arbitrio, bk. 6, ch. 10, col. 901): “The Lord commands believing itself, something which is the work of God, so that we ourselves do this. In doing this He commands us to cooperate with God in this work.” Chapter 11 (col. 909): “The free choice in the act of believing and loving has been weakened but nevertheless not extinguished. Through it an act of piety can be performed if aided by grace.”
(2) Some Scholastics clearly argue that “from his purely natural state man can love God above all things,” as we showed from Scotus, Occam, Petrus de Alliaco, and Biel in their very own words in our commonplace On Free Choice [Commonplace XIV] (§ 51). But now, as we showed from Granatensis in the previous section, loving God above all things from one’s purely natural state and grieving over sins from one’s purely natural state are equals. Bellarmine responds coldly that Vega is showing what Scotus otherwise thought, and that the better part of his school teaches the contrary. But what will be done about the rest of the Scholastics, and especially about Biel, who deduces this conclusion quite fittingly from the principles of Scholastic theology and responds to contrary arguments?
(3) The words of Thomas are clear ([ST,] 1.2., q. 114, art. 6): “Our work is meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of divine impulse, and thus a person merits deservedly [de condigno]; second, according to the fact that it proceeds from free choice, and thus he has congruous merit [meritum congrui].” Article 3: “Meritorious work is considered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free choice; second, as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. In the first way there is no condignity, but there is congruity, for it seems congruous that God repays a person who works according to his own virtue according to the virtue of His excellence. In the second way the value of the merit depends on the power of the Spirit as He moves us to eternal life.” Article 4: “An act has the character of merit, first, from its divine ordinance; second, on the part of free choice.” How, then, was Chemnitz lying when he wrote that Thomas claims it is a meritorious act because it falls under free choice?
(4) When Chemnitz writes that the Papists draw people to their own works, he is contrasting this to Christ’s merit and works, but he does not deny that the Papists require the aiding grace of the Holy Spirit for works that are deservedly meritorious; and for works that are congruously meritorious some of them require prevenient grace. So under what guise of lying does Bellarmine brand him with this charge? Does he not himself claim that the actions of a penitent, when connected with the words of absolution, are a sacrament, that is, the efficient and conferring cause of the remission of sins? On the contrary, since he calls faith, by which we claim that Christ’s righteousness is imputed to us and our sins are forgiven from grace for Christ’s sake, “an empty persuasion, a fiction of Luther, and pure foolishness,” surely this is leading people away from Christ to their own works and merits. For even though he says that God’s special aid is required for contrition, confession, and satisfaction, nevertheless the same actions are and remain our works. In fact, their allied and cooperating cause is a person’s free choice, something which Bellarmine certainly does not deny.
(5) What shall we say about the dispositions to justification, the preparations for grace, and congruous merit—all of which they pretend proceed not from the grace of justification but which precede it, as will be discussed in greater detail in its own place [On Justification through Faith (Commonplace XIX), §§ 155, 167–75; On Good Works (Commonplace XX), § 108].