Those are the words of Bellarmine.
Has a judiciary power been given to the ministers of the church?
§ 112. But how does Bellarmine prove from the authority to absolve that judiciary power was given to the priests? (1) He puts forward a metaphor of keys
which are usually given not to indicate that a door is closed or open but actually to close or open a door. So also among people keys are generally given to magistrates as a sign of power. (2) Binding and releasing do not mean denouncing or declaring but actually to put on chains or to remove them. (3) To retain is to refuse to remit; therefore remission is denied to those whom the priests refuse to remit. (4) The Gospel must be preached to all people without limit, but sins must not be remitted to all without limit but only to certain people, namely, to those whom the priests have judged ought to be absolved. (5) At the same time, the Holy Spirit was given by breathing on them [John 20:22] to show that sins are remitted by annulling and abrogating. (6) The fathers teach that priests remit sins from their power. (7) If the priests were not judges, then no one would perish solely because he could not have a reconciling priest. But Augustine asserts this. If the priest were not to absolve otherwise than by announcing the divine promises, then the deaf and those deprived of their senses could be absolved only in vain and with ridicule. If absolution were the announcement of the remission of sins, it would be either rash or superfluous. For when the minister says, “Your sins are remitted to you,” he is announcing this either absolutely or on the basis of a hypothesis, namely, “if you believe and, as necessary, if you repent.” If absolutely, he is declaring this rashly because he does not know if the person asking for reconciliation is truly penitent and has the sort of faith which is required. But if it is a conditional absolution, it cannot be the sort of absolution which makes the penitent certain. Finally, if absolution were not a judicial act but simply the announcement of a divine promise, a layman or a woman could absolve just as well.
Those are the words of Bellarmine.
We respond. (1) We willingly concede that absolution is not just a declaration of something which was already done beforehand within the penitent. Rather, it is also an effective means through which Christ in truth confers what He has promised upon those who repent. Thus we certainly do not say that the power of the Keys consists only in signifying that heaven is open for the repentant; rather, we say that absolution is an announcement of forgiveness of sins which is effectual by the power of the Holy Spirit, who through it offers, applies, and seals the forgiveness of sins to those who repent and believe; we also say that such absolution is valid in heaven. Sins are forgiven to the penitent by the ministry of the apostles and of other ministers of the church as truly as they are said to save those who hear them (1 Tim. 4:16).
(2) Nevertheless there remains an immovable distinction between power that is in one’s own authority [αὐτεξούσιον] and power that is ministerial. God alone forgives sins principally and of His own authority [αὐτεξουσίως], using a priest as a herald and minister announcing forgiveness to people. Therefore Christ is properly the judge, and the pastors are His ministers. Christ opens as the principal cause and “Lord of the house” (Heb. 3:6); the minister opens as the instrumental cause and the established steward of the mysteries in that house (1 Cor. 4:1). Therefore he is acting not by his own power and authority but in the manner of a minister, just as the prophet Nathan never said to David: “I have taken away your sin,” but rather: “The Lord has taken away” [2 Sam. 12:13]. So also the ministers of the church do not say, “I, by my own authority and power,” but rather: “I, as a minister of Christ and the church, announce to you the forgiveness of sins in Christ’s name.”
** Gregory (Homily 26 in evang.):
Thus the absolution of the presiding minister is true when it follows the judgment of the eternal Judge, which the resurrection from a four-day death well signifies. This raising demonstrates that the Lord first called the dead man and gave him life, saying, “Lazarus, come forth” [John 11:43]. Afterward he who had come forth alive was released by the apostles, as it was written. When he who had been bound by the grave wrappings had come forth, He then said to the disciples: “Release him and let him go,” and then the disciples released the man who was now alive, the man whom their Master had raised from the dead [v. 44]. For if the disciples were to release the dead Lazarus, they would be showing a stench rather than a virtue. From this consideration it ought to be apparent that through pastoral authority we should release those to whom we know our Creator gives life through His raising grace, etc. **
(3) If the forgiveness of sins were to depend absolutely on the voice of the absolving priest, it would follow that the minister would have to pronounce the form of absolution categorically out of full power and no longer hypothetically under the condition of faith. From this it would again follow that forgiveness of sins would truly come to hypocrites who pretend repentance and faith, since they hear the voice of an absolving priest. In turn, sins would truly be bound to those whose sins were bound wrongfully or by carelessness. For if absolution is a real taking away [of guilt] in the case of the impenitent, then binding is also a real putting on [of guilt] in the case of the penitent.
(4) If ministers were to remit sins from a judicial authority, it would follow that the object of that ministry would be the quality and quantity of sins. But Scripture nowhere asserts this. Rather, it restricts the use of this ministerial power to earnest contrition and faith in Christ. God ordered that sins be forgiven to all who bear witness that they are heartily sorry for their sins, believe in Christ, and earnestly embrace the correction of their life. But He ordered that sins be retained to those who do not yet acknowledge their sins, who do not grieve earnestly over them, and who do not believe in Christ but rather continue in security.
(5) A specific, distinct enumeration of sins is by no means necessary for the use of the power granted to the ministry of the church. The church’s ministers have been commanded to announce the free forgiveness of sins to the truly repentant through and because of Christ, but they have received no mandate to demand a certain, definite payment for each sin of the repentant, or to be paid off with money or works of satisfaction and require a specific enumeration of sins to that end.
(6) The fact that a minister can make a mistake is not undone if all sins are enumerated in particular, for cannot the same thing be done, and was it not done, in the confession of sins committed before Baptism (Acts 8:13)? Furthermore, in the specific confession the same thing can also happen. For how does the Roman priest know precisely that the person confessing has kept nothing silent and has omitted nothing in the circumstances? Thus men must be warned earnestly that in absolution their business is not with people but with God, the Knower of hearts, who is not mocked (Acts 1:24; Gal. 6:7). This lordship over consciences and the investigation of other people’s hearts has not been mandated to ministers. But if any, after the warning of a faithful pastor, merely pretend repentance and ask for absolution hypocritically, they gravely offend God, and they do not gain any fruit from the absolution but rather incur grave judgment.
(7) Nor is it the case, as some wish to counter, that in this way all certainty in absolution is removed, if it is said to depend on the condition of repentance and faith. For we are not saying that judgment about absolution should be based on the quantity of contrition or of faith. Rather, we contend that earnest contrition and real, not hypocritical, faith are necessary. But now, everyone can test himself as to whether he truly acknowledges and hates his sins, whether he truly believes in Christ. “Test yourselves, whether you are in faith” (2 Cor. 13:5).
(8) Bellarmine is contradicting both himself and the truth in this statement: “Many perish solely because they could not have a reconciling priest.” For if earnest contrition is enough in an emergency situation, as he himself asserts (De poenit., 2, ch. 13), surely the absolution of a priest will not be absolutely necessary. If in an emergency situation catechumens who die without Baptism still become partakers of salvation through faith, it follows that they repent and become partakers of salvation in the same way, without the voice of an absolving priest. Reconciliation with God by no means depends by an absolute necessity on the voice of an absolving priest, but rather on a true conversion to God; and, conversely, damnation does not depend on the absence of a priest—in fact, not even on his binding, but on impenitence and unbelief.
(9) In brief: ministers of the church are God’s ambassadors; therefore they forgive sins to those to whom God wants them forgiven, and they retain them to those to whom God wants them retained.
** Bellarmine argues in this way: “Even if private citizens can settle litigations which they have among themselves without a sentence of the public judges, nevertheless they cannot settle the cases which they have with the king himself without approaching him whom the king wants to be the judge in his place. Thus all sins are cases which we have with God; therefore since God has entrusted judgment over sins to His priests in the church, if those who are in the church have cases of this sort, they cannot be reconciled to God without the judgment of the priests.” We respond. God is not of a condition lower than princes among people. Therefore since princes themselves very frequently investigate and decide many cases and absolve their enemies while their advisors and lower judges are unaware of and opposed to the decisions, why, then, is this not allowed to God? **
The reconciliation of subjects with their king made through an ambassador is certainly effectual. But it is not original [authentica] but ministerial, not a matter of absolute necessity but of free arrangement, not judicial but ambassadorial. On the basis of these points, judgment can be passed on the rest, especially on [what Bellarmine said about] absolution made to the deaf and to the mad and on absolution made through a layperson in a case of emergency. We disapprove of the former but accept the latter.