Disagreements of the Papists concerning satisfaction.
Disagreements of the Papists concerning satisfaction.
§ 123. Now that these points have been distinguished and explained, we proceed to the teaching of the Scholastics and Papists concerning satisfaction. Here, first, we take note of their disagreements. Some argue that it is possible for us to make satisfaction for fault [culpa] itself. Others say that we cannot make satisfaction for fault but only for punishment [poena]. But here again there occurs a divergence of opinion. For some argue that, by the power of the Keys, the eternal punishment owed for sins is changed into temporal punishment so that we may make satisfaction for it. Some, however,5 claim that both fault and punishment are remitted through contrition, but that the obligation for some temporal punishment remains, part of which is remitted by the power of the Keys and the other part of which is expiated by satisfactions imposed or undertaken voluntarily. This opinion is embraced by most of the more recent theologians.
Let us listen to their words. To the question as to why satisfactory punishment is enjoined upon the penitent, Thomas ([ST,] [part] 3, q. 49, art. 3) responds in this way: “So that we may receive the effect of Christ’s Passion, it is necessary for us to be formed to correspond to Him. But we are formed to correspond to Him: in Baptism, sacramentally; in penance, through something having to do with penalty or suffering, which we endure within ourselves, which nevertheless is much less sufficient than would be worthy with respect to the sin, with the cooperation of Christ’s satisfaction.” Here you see that satisfactions are ordered for the remission of fault. Scotus (Sent., 4, dist. 15, q. 1) says, “Satisfaction is the outward working, laborious and penal, voluntarily assumed to punish the sin that has been committed.” Again (Sent., 4, dist. 16, q. 2) he explains that it must be understood in this way: “that the merit of the Mediator’s Passion concurs, because God has decreed that we should not undertake any work or bear anything as an equivalent satisfaction except to the extent that it is connected through faith to the Mediator’s satisfactory Passion.” Antoninus (part 3, title 14, ch. 20): “Satisfaction cures past sins by paying back for them, and it preserves from future sins by avoiding them.” The Council of Trent (session 14, c. 8) speaks in this way: “It befits the clemency of God that our sins not be forgiven us without any satisfaction.” And later: “While we suffer for our sins by making satisfaction, we are made to be in conformity with Christ Jesus, who made satisfaction for our sins and from whom comes all our sufficiency.”
Tapperus (Explic. art. 6. Lovan.) and Vega (In Concil. Trid., bk. 13, ch. 36) argue that satisfaction for fault and for eternal punishment can be made by us. Cajetan (Tract. de contrit., q. 4): “The punishment which remains to be paid after the remission of fault is the selfsame punishment of sense which the sinner ought to have paid in hell with only its eternity removed.” But Bonaventure (Sent., 4, dist. 15, q. 2) distinguishes between fault and punishment. He says:
When the sinner sins, he obligates himself to eternal punishment, but when divine mercy justifies him or gives him new life, it remits all fault and the guilt of eternal punishment. However, since mercy cannot rule out justice, which has the responsibility of punishing, it releases from fault and punishment in such a way that he still remains obliged to some little, temporal punishment. Furthermore, the Lord works together in the rectors of the church as if in arbiters through whom punishments for sins are imposed, and, as a consequence, the sinner makes satisfaction to the Lord principally and to the church consequently.
They also disagree in other questions concerning satisfaction. For some claim that no work or suffering is a satisfaction equivalent to the sin unless it is connected to Christ’s satisfactory suffering through faith. Others argue in the opposite way such that even if Christ’s merit had not intervened, yet a person who has grace or love could make satisfaction for his sins to God. Petrus Tataretus (Repert. in 4. Sent., dist. 15, q. 1, f. 523): “Consider that God could obligate us to always render Him honor for the benefit of creation; nevertheless He did not want this because of the frailty of human nature, which cannot accomplish this, since we were always and forever thus obliged to God in this way. This is false.” [Again]: “Therefore I am saying two things. First, any sinner at all can make satisfaction for a committed sin, even aside from the merit of Christ’s Passion, in regard to the absolute power of God, but not in regard to the ordained power, except by merit of Christ’s Passion. The conclusion is proved insofar as the first part is concerned because if the Word had not become flesh or had not suffered for us, a person predestined to eternal life could have made satisfaction for life without the merit of Christ’s suffering” (f. 524).
In the following way they argue about whether satisfaction must be made in love. Alexander of Hales, Thomas, Bonaventure, and Richard affirm this, since no one can please [God] without grace and love. But Scotus argues the opposite (Sent., 4, dist. 15, q. 1): “He who is once truly repentant and accepts the satisfaction or penance imposed, even if he backslides later, is never bound except to fulfill only that satisfaction. It is better if he completes it in love since he is not only paying the penalty but is even meriting glory.” Durandus says that the first opinion is a harsh one, and the second, less secure. Biel (Sent., 4, dist. 16, q. 2, dub. 2): “Scotus’s opinion is more in harmony with divine mercy.”
They ask whether a satisfactory work done in love deserves a degree of glory beyond the remission of punishment. Biel (dub. 6) confirms this with the following argument: “There is a sort of worthiness of a work elicited out of the grace and indwelling of the Holy Spirit for the beatific, essential reward. Therefore no meritorious work is rewarded sufficiently through any good less than blessedness, be it temporal or eternal.”
They ask whether someone can make satisfaction for another person, which they affirm using this distinction:
The priest imposes one kind of satisfaction, but another is assumed of one’s own will. The first is required of the very person who has accepted it unless a legitimate obstacle should arise, as, for instance, a weakness of the flesh, etc. For then he can make this satisfaction through another person. The latter can be done through another (1) since anyone can obtain the first grace for another, through which he is justified. Therefore he also can gain the remission of punishment for him. (2) The communion of the church militant within itself is no less than its communion with the dead. But a living person can make satisfaction for the dead. Therefore he can do it also for the living. (3) This is in the usage of the church.
Those are the reasons of Biel (dub. 8); but Bonaventure (Sent., 4, dist. 20) and Richard (Sent., 4, dist. 15) add this limitation: “provided that he for whom another wants to make satisfaction is contrite over it.” But if someone can make satisfaction for another, is not a person being established as the redeemer of another? Cajetan (In Thom., part 3, q. 48, art. 5): “Satisfaction for others is a category of redemption, since once the price has been paid the other is freed from the punishment.”
They ask if such a person, once he has made satisfaction for another, is also making satisfaction for himself. The Summa angelica of Clavisius responds that there are different opinions about this and that he likes this opinion: “that such work is satisfactory also for himself but not from obligation but through divine mercy, which has more to do with love than with work.” It is also said that “it is satisfactory for another through the mode of the payment of penalty and for himself through the mode of congruous merit.”
They ask whether satisfaction made while committing mortal sin is valid or must be repeated. Again the opinions about this differ. Richard (Quodlib., 1, q. 10) claims: “Such a person satisfies the command of the confessor and is not bound to repeat it. Meanwhile he does not make satisfaction for the punishment owed in purgatory.” Others make the distinction that “acts of repentance from which there remains some effect after that of satisfaction must not be repeated, as, for instance, fasting, almsgiving, and things of this sort. But the others, which do not retain an effect, such as prayers and the like, must be repeated.” Panormitanus (on De poenit. et remiss., c. Quod quidem) and others claim that “it is invalid but simply must be repeated.” Scotus (Sent., 4, dist. 15, q. 1, toward the end) looks for various distinctions but denies that they must necessarily be repeated.